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INTRODUCTION
It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to
attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make
than to buy.. .What is prudence in the conduct of every
private family, can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.
If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper
than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with
some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a
way in which we have some advantage.'
The comparative advantage of nations described by Adam Smith
in 1784 profoundly influenced the liberal philosophy of trade and
regulation that would follow in the course of the next two centuries.
His economic rationale justifying domestic production and import
consumption heralded the institution of trade agreements maximizing
resource allocation and efficiency.2 As a famous example of Smith's
goes, claret and burgundy can be produced in Scotland at thirty times
the expense they can be produced in another state and imported for
consumption.3  While affording opportunities for business
entrepreneurs through the utilization of materials and processes
natural to a given territory, the comparative advantage principal also
afforded states an effective means for regulating domestic
economies. Production that remained bound to state jurisdictions
with imports and exports coming into and leaving the territory of the
1. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 456-57 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976).
2. See, e.g., id. at 547 (explaining the economic efficiencies that England
realized by virtue of importing Portuguese wine).
3. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the economic advantages England realized when
it exported the surplus tobacco it received from the colonies).
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state allowed for efficient, unilateral legal and economic policies to
dominate the domestic market.
Globalization and the rise of business enterprises engaged in
transnational business transactions present a serious challenge to the
tenants of Smith's theory on comparative advantage of nations.4
Technological developments in communications and transportation
coupled with the spread of free trade agreements have, in many
respects, removed the location bound character and necessity of
commercial activities.' Structural changes in businesses themselves
through business mergers and acquisitions and the reallocation of
management and production facilities in multiple jurisdictions have
led to the development of truly multinational enterprises, an entity
whose activities have far reaching effects beyond the locations in
which it conducts business. The comparative advantage of nations is
slowly being dispersed by the competitive advantage of enterprises:
advantages unique to firms based on the enterprise itself, not
territory.
The state itself, however, remains intrinsically bound to the
concept of territoriality. Herein lays the predicament of states and
domestic regulation in the confines of a globalized world.
Globalization has brought about significant changes in the way states
may administer their own domestic policies and regulate their own
domestic markets through the development of a global marketplace.
The rise of transnational business enterprises engaging in
commercial activities in numerous jurisdictions allow for the
possibility of actions in one state to have market distorting effects in
4. See Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory
Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
33 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC Report] (noting that an increasing number of nations
have opened their borders based on the rationale that competition from abroad
spurs innovation and economic efficiencies),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
5. See id. at 47 (reporting that in 2000 the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
estimated that approximately fifty percent of the transaction it reviewed affected
foreign consumers).
6. See id. at 33 (explaining that, whereas a century ago only the United States
had domestic antitrust laws, by 2000 approximately sixty percent of world's
countries had such laws).
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another state, subjugating the regulatory policies of the aggrieved
state to that of others. 7
States have responded to the demands inherent to globalization
and the global marketplace through various means aimed at limiting
adverse affects on domestic regulatory goals. The response of
competition regulators presents a fascinating example of a once
purely domestic policy responding to globalization through
international regulatory means.8  In an effort to examine this
phenomenon, this thesis analyses developments in bilateral
cooperation efforts between the United States and European
Community on competition law as a paradigm for future state
responses to the general strains globalization places on domestic
market regulation. 9
The first section of the Article analyses the area of competition
law as an example of a domestic policy that demands a transnational
response in order to provide for effective regulation.1" Specifically,
it sets out the organizational changes of transnational business
entities that lead to the necessity of extraterritorial measures by
states." This section also discusses the domestic competition laws of
the United States and European Community alongside the
development of bilateral efforts between the two to effectively
regulate transnational issues of competition law.'" Section II
7. See id. at 36 (recognizing that "law is national, but markets can extend
beyond national boundaries").
8. See id 36-37 (highlighting the fact that sound competition policy is a
central consideration of the World Trade Organization, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and numerous other bilateral and
multilateral treaties).
9. See discussion infra Part III.A (examining the nature of the bilateral
cooperation efforts, and favoring gradual convergence of competition laws through
such cooperation).
10. See discussion infra Part L.B (discussing the domestic framework of the
United States and the European Community's competition regulation).
11. See discussion infra Part I.A. 1 (noting that changes from globalization such
as the decline of trade barriers create new markets, and firms have strong
incentives to institute organizational changes in order to participate in the new
markets).
12. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing U.S. and E.C. competition policy
in the global market as well as agreements such as the 1991 Agreement).
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discusses the differences in U.S. and E.C. competition law policies.
It sets forth an economic model that describes difficulties and
inefficiencies inherent in unilateral attempts at regulating
competition law, and applies this model to show the difficulties in
bilateral and multilateral competition law harmonization.13 This
Section also includes a description of extraterritorial enforcement of
competition law by the United States and European Community to
supplement the shortcomings of bilateral cooperation and difficulties
in harmonization.14 Section III concludes with the case for continued
and enhanced bilateral competition law cooperation. It endorses
maintaining the use of extraterritoriality as a means for soft
harmonization and competition law convergence. 5  Future
transnational responses to the demands of globalization should
follow the U.S. - E.C. approach towards bilateral cooperation,
supplemented with extraterritorial competition law enforcement.
Such an approach is the most effective and realistic option to
maintaining domestic competition policies in the global
marketplace. 16
I. COMPETITION LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
A. COMPETITION POLICY IN A GLOBAL MARKET
Many areas that compose the global marketplace reflect the
growing interdependence of states and national economies discussed
in the first section of this thesis. Competition law presents an
interesting example, especially in relation to its evolution from a
13. See discussion infra Part II.A-C (explaining the differences in U.S. and
E.C. competition policy and the different approach each embraces in relation to
such policies).
14. See discussion infra Part II.D (highlighting the extraterritorial application
of U.S. and E.C. law through cases through various decisions).
15. See infra Part III (laying out the author's thesis in favor of increased
cooperation and arguing against the feasibility or the desirability of rapid
harmonization).
16. See id. (noting the efficiencies resulting from the bilateral cooperation and
arguing that such cooperation has lead to gradual procedural and substantive
convergence).
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purely domestic policy to one requiring international cooperation
and/or extraterritorial enforcement of state law beyond national
boundaries. 17 Changing organizational structures and contemporary
corporate activity, from foreign investment to intra-firm alliances
and mergers and acquisitions, compose a foundational characteristic
of globalization. Such changes require states to readdress regulatory
policies and market control mechanisms, which are diminished by
the evolution of the world market from domestic to global. 8 The
globalization of competition law highlights the erosion of individual
state sovereignty and the emerging power of intra-state cooperation
efforts.' 9 It also demonstrates how states may assert their own
policies through cooperative efforts within the global market without
total or complete regulatory harmonization or convergence. 20
Specifically, this section will analyze the changing landscape of the
global marketplace, noting the organizational changes and the
mechanisms introduced by the U.S - E.C. transatlantic partnership as
a model for further international competition law cooperation.
1. Organizational Changes from Globalization Affecting Competition
Policy
The decline of trade barriers and restrictions on foreign
investment, developments in communication technology, ongoing
deregulation, and the spread of government friendly policies towards
the market have inevitably led to significant developments in
corporate strategies. In particular, cross-border mergers of an
unprecedented scale, the global fragmentation of stages of
17. See ICPAC Report, supra note 4 , at 33 (observing that national economies
have evolved into global ones).
18. See id. at 44 (noting that international trade and investment barriers have
been reduced to such an extent that it is now more efficient for firms to simply buy
firms in other countries then to compete from their home states).
19. See id. at 37 (noting that the subject of competition rules has been under
intensive consideration at the WTO and other international arenas).
20. See id. at 36 ("Formal and informal bilateral arrangements have helped to
introduce, deepen, and regularize the structure of enforcement cooperation that
now occurs, while the contents of the agreements have gone through several
generations.").
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production, and the spread of network-based industries require states
to substantially alter the way they enforce competition law.1
Firms possess many motivations for organizational change and
restructuring, fundamental among which is the drive for profit
maximization. 2   Globalization and the opening and developing of
new markets, global and domestic, have significant implications on
operational costs, most notably in the past two decades from
improvements in transportation and communication technology and
the globalization of the marketplace. As economist Ronald Coase
explains in his famous theorem, firms seek to minimize the costs of
all of operations, the internal and external transactions encompassing
the whole of the firm's actiVity.23 These costs are both influenced by
whether the transaction is performed within the firm or by another
party outside of the firm in the open market, the relative costs of
which will likely determine which option the firm chooses.24
External developments in the market and the broader economy
implicate changes on these costs, requiring re-evaluation by the firm
in deciding whether to change such transactions from internal to
external, or vice versa.25 Organizational structural change is the
result. The role of globalization and the development of the world
21. See id. (reporting that in 2000 a merger wave encompassed nearly every
industry, including financial services, telecommunications, and defense and that
this phenomenon increased the number of antitrust merger reviews).
22. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-95 (1937)
(examining various aspects in the nature of firms and analyzing why a firm
emerges at all in a specialized exchange economy"), available at
http://www.jstor.org/view/00130427/di009864/00p00034/0?config=j stor&frame-n
oframe&userlD=9309bd3b@american.edu/018dd5533b0050115eb08&dpi=3 (last
visited Mar. 11, 2004).
23. See id. at 387 (explaining that, for the most part, the price mechanism
governs most firm activities). See generally MICHAEL C. JENSEN, THE THEORY OF
THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 83-
135 (2000) (expanding on the theory of the firm by examining its implications for
social responsibility, separation of ownership and control, and corporate
objectives).
24. See Coase, supra note 22, at 395 (explaining that firms will expand and
produce their own goods until the marginal costs of producing these goods
outweighs the costs of buying the goods on the open market).
25. See id. at 404 (predicting that in order to determine the proper course of
action, business people will constantly be experimenting as to whether to purchase
another unit in the market or produce it themselves).
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marketplace have led to an increase in options for the firms beyond
that which Coase originally contemplated. However, the soundness
of this theorem remains intact for the purposes of describing the
motivations for contemporary firm organizational change and the
desire of such firms to minimize transaction costs to as near zero as
possible. 6
The global merger wave of the 1990s and the scale of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions demonstrate such firm behavior
significantly affecting state competition regulators, especially in the
transatlantic arena. The worldwide total of mergers and
acquisitions rose from $199 billion in 1995 to $498 billion in 1999,
of which eighty percent involved American and European firms. 2
While acquiring or merging with a local partner in order to gain
access to certain markets has remained an important business
strategy since the introduction of the Bretton-Woods/GATT system
at the end of the Second World War, "[t]he attractiveness of this
mode of entry has been further strengthened by the ongoing
liberalization of foreign investment regimes and, in some nations, a
more relaxed attitude toward foreign takeovers of domestic firms."29
In fact, diminished tariff and nontariff barriers have not, as one might
expect, reduced the allure of such market entry; high fixed costs
remain associated with constructing distribution chains along with
other considerations, such as the reputation value of certain firms
already established in a particular market.30 Deregulation and
privatization, especially in Europe, have also stimulated the rise in
merger and acquisition activity. For example, the opening of many
public utilities sectors such as electricity, water, gas, and
26. See id. at 405 (stating that dynamic changes external to the firm will dictate
the firms internal organization and future growth).
27. See ICPAC Report, supra note 4, 43-46 (highlighting the merger wave that
extended into the year 2000).
28. See Simon J. Evenett et al., Antitrust Policy in an Evolving Global
Marketplace, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC
COOPERATION? 1, 4 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds. 2001) (providing statistics on
cross-border mergers and acquisitions from 1995-1999).
29. Id. at 4.
30. See id. at 4 (noting that even in those sectors in which the establishment of
distribution networks and brand recognition are relatively costly, cross-border
mergers are still the most attractive alternative).
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telecommunications to competition have lead to a surge in cross-
border transactions, placing the utilities industry among the top ten in
value of sales of total merger and acquisitions between 1995-99.11
The changing landscape of the global marketplace though
international mergers and acquisitions has raised many problems for
domestic competition authorities. The impact of such transnational
corporate alliances inevitably carries both positive and negative
externalities, often benefiting certain domestic economies to the
detriment of others and the marketplace itself.3" These negative
externalities may arise in numerous circumstances, including the
creation of dominant firms with controlling market shares capable of
engaging in monopolistic practices, distortions of market prices for
products or services resulting from favorable policies beyond the
territory of an affected domestic market, and even restrictions on
future competition through resulting restrictions on new product
development.33 These and other implications from the activities of
global enterprises raise important questions as to the extent to which
import competition can control the market power of the entities
resulting from mergers and acquisitions. They also raise questions as
to the proper competition law response to cross-border efficiencies
that lower the cost of supplying foreign markets to the exclusion of
the domestic market.34  Competition law, particularly the
enforcement of competition law, has responded through increased
31. See id. at 5 (explaining the significance of deregulation to the precipitous
rise in merger activity).
32. See id. (arguing that mergers that have anticompetitive effects on domestic
markets will have the same effects on the international market). For example,
numerous European antitrust regulators expressed concerns that the Federal-Mogul
and T&N merger would negatively effect both their domestic markets and the
worldwide market for automobile parts. Id.
33. See, e.g., id. (highlighting international regulators' concerns regarding a
reduction in future competition resulting from slowed technological development).
34. See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antistrust and Market Access, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1997) (noting that the harm that offshore conduct inflicted on
another nation's domestic competition was one reason that led to the need for the
effects doctrine). The author also highlights the divergent approaches taken by
U.S. and European antitrust regulators. Id. U.S. regulators focus on transactions
that artificially lower output and/or prices. Id. European regulators focus on the
broader concept of market abuses and the health of small to mid-sized businesses.
Id.
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review by multiple jurisdiction authorities, as well as the institution
of competition policies in states formerly without such control
mechanisms.35 While one can view these responses as broadly
positive, more regulatory regimes mean more jurisdictions reviewing
mergers, more extraterritorial assertions of domestic law, and more
enforcement efforts in need of coordination.36
In addition to the increase in merger and acquisition activity,
evolving attitudes on corporate production strategies present new
problems for state competition authorities. Specifically, the
fragmentation of multi-step production across national boundaries
(i.e. Part 1 is built in State A and shipped to State B to be combined
with Part 2) has replaced traditional notions of single-state
production, which was once optimal before globalization
developments arose." Such cross-border production strategies have
led to a massive increase in the total value of imported components
embodied in exports, which now accounts for approximately thirty
percent of world trade.38 The liberalization of foreign investment
regimes and reductions in intermediate product tariffs play
significant roles in the rise of cross-border production and vertical
35. See ICPAC Report, supra note 4, at 33 (noting that by 2000, approximately
sixty states had adopted antitrust laws, mostly in the early 1990s, and that twenty
more states were in the process of drafting laws); see also Fox, supra note 34, 12-
13 (highlighting the approaches to antitrust regulation taken by various
industrialized countries); Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law: Linking the World, in
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL
PROSPECTS 243, 244-45 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2001) (explaining early
international antitrust issues, stating that economic problems are increasingly
transnational, and that nations are increasingly adopting competition laws).
36. See Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market:
Implications for Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 409, 427-
28 (1994) (noting that transactions that might have formerly been reviewed by one
country's regulators are now being reviewed by two or three countries).
37. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational
Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REv. 401, 431-32 (2002)
(stating that transnational imports of components are termed "world-wide
sourcing" and commenting on the globalization of production).
38. World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division,
Fragmented Production: Regionalization of Trade?, at 31 (Staff Working Paper
ERSD-2003-01, Aug. 2003) (noting that vertical fragmentation accounts for thirty
percent of world trade, but noting that large differences exist between countries
and industries to the relative perception of vertical fragmentation),
www.wto.org/English/rese/resere/ersd2003Ol-e.doc (last visited Feb. 22, 2004)
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disintegration of firms, while complicating traditional antitrust
analysis.39 In addition, the spread of network-based industries raise
new questions for competition authorities, particularly whether
monopoly power in one product market can be used to leverage
power in another product market.4a It also raises the question of how
one should view the fast pass entry and development of new products
in light of likely short-term obsolescence (e.g., computer chips likely
to be surpassed quickly in technical capabilities although market
power is maintained for a short amount of time).41
Further problems arise for competition authorities through new
organizational forms taken by global firms. While mergers and
acquisitions present perhaps the most visible example of
organizational change, other forms such as the joint venture and
partial equity stake represent additional means by which global firms
are using globalization to increase production efficiency and reduce
transaction costs. 42 The joint venture allows two or more separate
firms to combine complementary skills or assets for an intended
purpose or project.43 Joint ventures offer the benefits of a merger or
acquisition without the full costs associated with such an endeavor,
the spreading of development costs often associated with certain
undertakings (such as scientific, technical, or other research), and
39. See Cao, supra note 37, at 429 (arguing that the internationalization of
corporate activities has changed the dynamic between national regulators and
international firms).
40. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 34, at 7 (citing the example of British
Telecommunications, which used its dominant status in the U.K. market to affect
the overall European market for international calling).
41. See Peter Swan, A Road Map to Understanding Export Controls: National
Security in a Changing Global Environment, 30 AM. BUS. L. J. 607, 610 (2002)
(noting that "high-tech" items, such as computer chips with high obsolescence
rates should be subject to more revision of controls).
42. See generally SPENCER WEBER WALLER & JEFFREY L. KESSLER,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 8-21 (2003) (highlighting the
special interest that U.S. regulators take in joint ventures with the potential for
market disruption).
43. See President's Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Organization
and Competition Policy, 2002 Economic Report of the President reprinted in 19
YALE J. ON REG. 541, 553 (2002) [hereinafter PCEA Report] (explaining that a
joint venture involves two or more separate firms that make substantial
contributions to a joint enterprise).
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cost savings through the use of services and assets of the participants
in the venture. 44 Such enterprises carry their own problems for
competition regulators, including problems inherent in horizontal
competitors cooperating in a joint venture that leads to a reduction in
their ability or incentive to compete independently, the potential for
collusion and conspiracy for price fixing, and engaging in other
anticompetitive behavior.45
In addition to joint ventures, partial equity stakes present
additional concerns for competition authorities. A partial equity
stake refers to a partial acquisition by one firm of another where the
acquiring firm remains legally independent, as opposed to a full
merger or complete acquisition where one hundred percent of the
shares in one of the corporations are taken, or when two firms
exchange all of their shares for those of the new, successor
corporation. 46 The acquisition of partial equity stakes is a method
that firms increasingly utilize. 47 These acquisitions prompt several
competition law concerns, including the effects partial ownership
imply on "control" and "ownership" in the decision making process
of the partially acquired firm and the potential for alterations in
44. See id. 553-54 (pointing to the economic efficiencies created by joint
ventures).
45. See id. (arguing that joint ventures may create an environment wherein
sensitive price and product information are exchanged between market
competitors). See generally ALBERTINA ALBORS-LLORENS, EC COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY (2002) (analyzing the European commission's framework for dealing
with anticompetitive practices); SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, ECONOMICS OF
E.C. COMPETITION LAW: CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT (1999)
(looking at how E.C. regulation addresses the economic impact of predatory
pricing); WEBER WALLER, supra note 42 (overviewing the U.S. approach to
anticompetitive practices).
46. See PCEA Report, supra note 43, at 554 (defining the nature of partial
equity stakes, and stating that such partial acquisitions are a form of corporate
governances that poses concerns about one party's "control" or ownership" over
another party).
47. See id. 554-55 (reporting that in the year 2000, twenty-three percent of
transactions reported to U.S. regulators involved the purchase of less than fifty
percent equity stakes)
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production and pricing decisions (especially if the two entities are
direct competitors).48
2. Competition Law Problems in an Integrated Global Market
The impact of these and other organizational changes, as well as
new corporate strategies facilitated by globalization, imply
significant changes for antitrust analysis and state regulation of
competition. Defining the relevant market presents the core aspect
of contemporary antitrust analysis.49  The implications of such a
determination range from effects on consumers to competitors,
which essentially becomes more complicated as the range of such
groups spread across the purview of multiple jurisdictions and
regulatory regimes.50
In theory, antitrust enforcement and trade liberalization should
logically promote competition. The economic motivations behind
the United States' Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, for example,
demonstrate the necessity of antitrust enforcement in a market
heavily protected from outside intervention through tariffs.51
Inversely, increased foreign competition should substitute for antirust
activism and domestic competition enforcement as a means for
controlling prices, while increased trade liberalization should serve
to reduce the scope of antitrust intervention and antitrust conflict
between national regulatory authorities. 2
48. See id. (pointing out that the investing firm can exercise substantial control
over the target firm, even if the shares of the target firm are widely dispersed
among many firms).
49. See ANDREW I GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES,
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 473-74 (2002) (explaining that
market definition performs a key role in antitrust analysis in that it facilitates
predictions as to whether a particular combination of firms will disrupt a particular
market).
50. See id. at 474 (highlighting the various factors that regulators must take
into consideration, including the geographic reach of a particular product).
51. See id. 60-60 (illuminating the ideological origins underpinning the
Sherman Antitrust Act).
52. See Fox, supra note 34, at 9-11 (explaining that this belief in trade
liberalism as a vehicle for driving down consumer prices was the rationale
underlying the U.S. Department of Justice's overhaul of international antitrust
policy in the 1980s). The basic idea was that less government intervention would
2004]
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However, transnational trade has not eliminated the need for cross-
border competition cooperation, but rather enhanced such a need. 3
This is primarily the result of remaining domestic market power not
eliminated by trade liberalization and the fact that antitrust conflict
has actually become more likely as trade increases. 4  While
economic theories often rely exclusively on participants behaving
rationally, competition law represents an area where rational
decisions often are displaced with those based on political
assessments.5 Antirust has always been, and remains to be, heavily
political and thus subject to the interests and pressures borne by the
political officials charged with formulating and enforcing
competition policy. 6 The prevalence of domestic interests and
lobbying power in initiating antitrust enforcement is especially
evident in situations where such firms are subject to foreign
open markets and drive down prices and that, as a result, international antitrust
enforcement would only focus on those transactions that negatively effected prices
or output. Id.
53. See id. (noting that the U.S. policy of trade liberalization only targeted
public sector barriers to free trade; many of the trade barriers faced by U.S. firms
were the work of private competitors).
54. See Wood, supra note 36, at 427 (estimating that approximately one-third
of mandatory merger notifications of U.S. regulators involved foreign firms).
55. See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 869 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (involving a price fixing case brought by the U.S. government against
General Electric ("GE") and DeBeers, a South African diamond importer). This
case provides a premier example of the difficulties in unilaterally enforcing
competition laws on foreign corporations against the desire of the home state. The
Justice Department indicted GE, a European subsidiary of DeBeers, and two
foreign nationals for a price-fixing conspiracy of industrial diamonds. Id. at 1288-
90. However, despite some advantages and the likelihood of successful
prosecution, the government's case fell apart when neither the DeBeers subsidiary
nor the foreign individuals appeared in court. Id. at 1301-03. In the end,
complications arising from service or process, personal jurisdiction, discovery,
witness availability, and lack of cooperation from home states uninterested in
having their nationals prosecuted defeated the U.S.'s attempt at prosecution. Id.
56. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 36, at 425-27 (highlighting the network of
antitrust exemptions that exist in the United States as a result of domestic pressure
to protect certain industries).
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competition, and as a result, where competition enforcement is most
likely to target the foreign firm over the domestic firm.57
In order to implement effective state regulation in the global
market, inter-state cooperation on antitrust analysis and enforcement
should replace purely domestic competition regulation.58 This
analysis now turns to the premier example of antitrust cooperation
between foreign states, specifically that of U.S - E.C. competition
law cooperation. 9
B. U.S. - E.C. COMPETITION LAW COOPERATION
The transatlantic arena stands at the epicenter for corporate
development and activities in the global market. The overwhelming
share of merger and acquisition activities and the centralization of
ownership, corporate command, and control centers within the
United States and Europe present the transatlantic partnership with
increasing capacities to regulate and shape the global market.6" This
also allows the partnership to influence the rest of the world with its
own policies and ideas for its functioning. The United States and
European Community continually share overlapping authority over
57. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 34, at 1 (restating the U.S. contention that, in the
late 1990s, embedded Japanese interests blocked U.S. access to the Japanese
marketplace).
58. See id. at 3 (arguing that firms "engaged in offshore conduct" may
purposefully attempt to harm domestic competition in a particular nation and that
the law in the place of the conduct may not effectively address the harm).
59. See ICPAC Report, supra note 4, at 36 (noting that in 2000, the United
States was a party to bilateral antitrust arrangements with seven other countries). It
is important to note that the bulk of antitrust cooperation has come through
bilateral arrangements. Id. The U.S. - E.C. partnership represents one of the most
developed relationships, although varying types of similar bilateral agreements
exist between the United States and Canada, the United States and Australia, the
European Community and Canada, the European Community and Japan, and
Australia and New Zealand. Id.; See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of
Australia and the Government of the United States of America Relating to
Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., 1982 Aust.. T.S. no.
13, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1982/13.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2004); U.S./Canada Agreement Regarding Application of their Competition and
Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, Aug. 1, 1995, U.S.-Can., 35 I.L.M. 309.
60. See ICPAC Report, supra note 4, at 45 (reporting that in 1999, the United
States and the European Community announced a combined $2.9 trillion worth of
mergers).
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transnational companies seeking to implement the organizational
changes discussed in the preceding section.61 The following section
will analyze the domestic frameworks of the United States and
European Community for competition regulation and the current
structures in place for bilateral competition in the transatlantic arena.
1. Domestic Framework
a. European Community
European Community competition laws apply to all sectors of the
common market.62  Articles 81 and 82 (formerly 85 and 86
respectively) of the European Community Treaty provide the core
basis of E.C. competition rules.63 In general, these articles proscribe
specific anticompetitive agreements, practices, and actions by
"undertakings" as incompatible with the common market.' While
originally applying exclusively to undertakings established within
the jurisdiction of the European Community, the Wood Pulp Cartel
decision by the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") extended the
reach of Article 81 to include practices initiated in non-E.C. states
implemented within the European Community with effects
prohibited by Article 8 1.65
61. See id. at 51 (noting that the United States and the European Community
have a high level of convergence between their antitrust regime due to their high
level of interaction and cooperation).
62. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 81, O.J. 2002 C 325/1 [hereinafter E.C. TREATY]
(applying E.C. competition law to "all agreements... which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market").
63. See ALBERTINA ALBORS-LLORENS, supra note 45, at preface
(characterizing Articles 81 and 82 as the two "core competition provisions" in the
Treaty Establishing the European Community).
64. See, EC TREATY, supra note 62, art. 81 (prohibiting "all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertaking and concerted
practices" that the article defines as incompatible with the common market).
65. See Case 89/95, Ahlstrom v. Commission, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4
C.M.L.R. 901, 901 (1988) (holding that Article 85 of the E.C. Treaty, now Article
81, applied to the conduct of U.S. and Canadian wood pulp manufacturers because
those manufacturers sold directly to customers in the European Community and
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Article 81(1) generally prohibits concerted market behavior
"which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market. ' 66  Specifically, Article
81(1) enumerates specific market activities of "particular" concern,
namely price fixing, limitations on production, market-sharing,
discrimination among parties, and tie-ins.67  Of noteworthy
importance is Article 81's exclusive application to joint conduct,
essentially requiring two or more parties acting in collusion as
opposed to the conduct of a single actor, much like Section 1 of the
Sherman Act in the United States.68 Any such agreements prohibited
under the first subsection are deemed automatically void under
Article 81(2), unless the agreement meets certain conditions under
the exemption clause of Article 81(3), which remains the exclusive
decision of the European Commission (the "Commission").69
engaged in price competition in the common market). This decision is commonly
referred to as the Wood Pulp Cartel.
66. E.C. TREATY,supra note 62, art. 81(1).
67. See id. (enumerating activities that may fall within the scope of Article 81).
Such activities include undertakings that
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions; limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment; share markets or sources of supply; apply dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage; make the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
Id.
68. Compare EC TREATY, supra note 62, art. 81(1) (addressing "agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade"), with Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)
(implicating "[e]very contract, combination. . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States").
69. See E.C. TREATY, supra note 62, art. 81(2)-(3) (prohibiting the abuse "by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position" within the common market" and
outlining the Council and the Commission's role). This exclusive decision-making
power of the Commission will change under Council Regulation 1/2003, which
goes into effect in May 2004, allowing the competition authorities and courts of
the Member States to make this determination as well. See Regulation 1/2003,
infra note 313, art 45.
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Filling the gap left by Article 81's application to joint conduct,
Article 82 prohibits the abuse of the dominant position within the
common market.70  As such, "[a]ny abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in
a substantial part of it shall be prohibited," followed by four
examples constituting abuse.7  These examples substantially
resemble those proscribed in Article 81(1), although significant
differences remain between these two articles.72 First, a single firm
may violate Article 82 acting on its own as the joint conduct or
collusion requirement of Article 81 is not present. 73 Also, Article 82
does not contain any exemptions, though both provisions afford
national courts the opportunity to request a non-legally binding
ruling from the Commission based on information provided by the
firm as to whether the Commission would prosecute such activities
under either Article 81 or 82. Of notable significance is the fact
that Article 82 does not prohibit the acquisition or attainment of the
dominant position, only the abuse of such a position, which is a
similar aim of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 5
While E.C. competition laws cover all sectors of the common
market, these rules operate in conjunction with the individual
competition regimes of the Member States. Articles 81 and 82
establish direct rights that the courts of the Member States must
protect, and which such courts may apply if the Commission has
initiated proceedings and the national law of the state authorizes such
70. See E.C. TREATY, supra note 62, art. 82 (prohibiting any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position and outlining what activities may consist
of such abuse).
71. See id. (providing examples of abuse such as price fixing and limiting
production).
72. See id. (using identical language as Article 81(1)(a)).
73. See ALBORS-LLORENS, supra note 45, 18-19 (noting that the basic
distinction between Article 81 and 82 is that Article 81 applies to concerted action,
whereas Article 82 applies to unilateral behavior).
74. See CAMERON MARKBY HEWITT, BUSINESS GUIDE TO COMPETITION LAW:
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS 88 (1995) (explaining that member states can seek non-
binding guidance from the ECJ on the application of Articles 81 and 82).
75. Compare EC TREATY, supra note 62, art. 82 (addressing "[a]ny abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position"), with Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2 (2000) (implicating "[e]very person who shall monopolize.., with any other
person or persons ... any part of trade or commerce among the several States").
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application.7 6 Also, pending cases before the European courts do not
preclude actions in the Member States based on state competition
law.77
The Commission plays the leading role in competition law
enforcement in the European Community.7 s Council Regulation 17,
as amended, prescribes the powers and procedures that the
Commission may utilize in such enforcement, which includes the
institution of legal proceedings to determine the existence of Article,
81 and 82 violations. 79  The Commission may proceed with
investigations and rulings on its own initiative, or based upon an
application by a Member State or "natural or legal persons who
claim a legitimate interest. ' '8°  If the Commission finds an
infringement, it may "require the undertakings or associations of
76. See STEPHEN WEATHERHILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAw 883-84 (1999)
(explaining that the E.C. competition policy is enforced at the national and
community levels).
77. See id. 920-21 (noting that Member State courts may apply their own laws
to particular transactions).
78. See MICHELLE C1NI, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION: LEADERSHIP,
ORGANISATION, AND CULTURE IN THE EU ADMINISTRATION 14-15 (1996)
(describing the various roles the Commission plays, including initiator of
legislation, administrator, guardian of legal framework, representative of Member
States, and conscience voice of European Union).
79. See Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 J.O. (204), amended by Council
Regulation 59/62 J.O. (1655) [hereinafter Regulation 17] (providing that
"[w]hereas, in order to secure uniform application of Articles 85 and 86 in the
common market, rules must be made under which the Commission, acting in close
and constant liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States, may take
the requisite measures for applying those Articles"); Allison J. Himelfarb,
Comment, The International Language of Convergence: Reviving Antitrust
Dialogue Between the United States and the European Union With a Uniform
Understanding of "Extraterritoriality" 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 909, 931
(1996) (stating that European Council Regulation 17 gives the European
Commission the authority to investigate antitrust actions). See generally Thomas
Horton & Stefan Schmitz, The Lessons of Covisint: Regulating B2Bs Under
European and American Competition Laws, 47 WAYNE L. REv. 1231, 1236-78
(2002) (providing an overview of the general competition laws set forth in Article
81 and Article 82 of the treaty establishing the European Community).
80. See Regulation 17, supra note 79, art. 3 (providing that "[t]hose entitled to
make applications are: (a) Member States; (b) natural or legal persons who claim a
legitimate interest.").
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undertakings concerned," to end the violation.8 A notable contrast is
the lack of third party enforcement through private litigation, which
plays a fundamental role in competition law in the United States.82
The absence of third party enforcement is partly attributable to the
lack of treble damages and contingency fees in the Member State
courts.83
Decisions by the Commission pursuant to Council Regulation 17
are subject to judicial review by the Court of First Instance ("CFI").84
Both a party to a decision rendered by the Commission, as well as a
third party person affected by the decision can make an appeal.85
Notably, the CFI reviews both the facts and the legality of the
Commission's decision, though determinations on factual findings
are limited to whether the Commission's findings are justified on the
record. The CFI has the power to grant interim relief, including
suspending an obligation that the Commission has imposed, pending
the hearing on appeal.8 6 Such rulings from the hearing of the appeal
are subject to appeal by the ECJ, but the grounds for challenging a
CFI decision before the ECJ are limited to lack of competence,
81. See id. (stating that the "Commission may, before taking a decision under
paragraph 1, address to the undertakings or undertakings concerned
recommendations for termination of the infringement").
82. See discussion infra Part I.B.2 (providing an overview of the U.S.
competition law and addressing the role of litigation).
83. See Himelfarb, supra note 79, at 930 (stating that private parties do not
have the incentives to bring claims because the European Union does not allow
them to recover treble damages). But see Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan,
[2001] E.C.R. 1-6297, 5 C.M.L.R. 28, para. 36 (2001) (holding that "[c]ommunity
law does not preclude a rule of national law barring a party to a contract liable to
restrict or distort competition from relying on his own unlawful actions to obtain
damages where it is established that that party bears significant responsibility for
the distortion of competition").
84. See Paul J. De Rosa, Comment, Cooperative Joint Ventures in European
Community Competition Law, 41 BUFF. L. REv 993, 1010 n.82 (1993) (explaining
the work of the Court of First Instance).
85. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE
45 (F.G. Jacobs ed., 1999) (providing an overview of cases involving standing
before the CFI).
86. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OF 2 MAY 1991, available at
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/instit/txtdocfr/txtsenvigueur/txt7.pdf (last visited Mar.
13, 2004).
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significant breaches of procedure, and infringement of prior judicial
decisions.
The epicentre of E.C. merger review is Merger Regulation
4064/89,8 as amended by Regulation 1310/9788 and Regulation
139/2004 effective from May 2004.89 Prior to the Merger Regulation
("ECMR") becoming effective in 1990, the European Community
operated under the assumption that Article 82 applied to merger
review, although years of use and litigation before the European
courts exhibited the weaknesses of this article, necessitating a new
regime.90  The ECMR essentially encompasses Community
competition law governing "concentrations," (mergers and
acquisitions) that may significantly impeded competition within the
common market or in a substantial part of it.9 While Articles 81 and
82 apply in certain situations, the ECMR recognises that these
provisions are insufficient to cover all potentially anticompetitive
operations.
The ECMR operates what is commonly referred to as a "one-
stop shop," meaning that, except in limited circumstances, all
concentrations deemed to have a Community dimension are to be
reviewed and subject to authorisation by the Commission.92 The
87. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, O.J. 1989 L257/90, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc
&lg=en&numdoc=31989R4064&model=guichett (last visited March 24, 2004).
88. Council Regulation 1310/97 amending Merger Regulation 4064/89, O.J.
1997 L180/1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc
&lg=en&numdoc=31997R1310&model=guichett (last visited March 24, 2004).
89. Council Regulation 139/2004 amending Merger Regulation 4064/89, 2004
O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter ECMR] (giving "the Community the objective of
instituting 'a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not
distorted"').
90. See generally MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER
(2d ed., 2001).
91. See ECMR, supra note 89, art. 1 (stating that the ECMR applies to all
concentrations that have certain market values); see also Stefan Schmitz, The
European Commission's Decision in GE/Honeywell and the Question of the Goals
of Antitrust Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 539, 542-44 (2002) (explaining
Europe bases its antitrust law on German law in the protection and benefit of small
and medium enterprises and the benefit of consumers).
92. Under article 3(1) a concentration arises when two or more previously
independent undertakings merge or when one or more persons already controlling
at least one undertaking acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of
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Community dimension determination revolves around the "turnover"
of sales of goods and provision of services within the preceding
financial year.93  A concentration will be deemed to have a
Community dimension if: (a) the aggregate worldwide turnover is
over five billion euros, and (b) the aggregate Community-wide
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings is more than 250
million euros, unless (c) each of the undertakings achieves more than
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within one
Member State.94 Merger activity by companies based outside of the
Community is deemed covered if they have sufficient turnover in
more than one Member State. The 1998 amendments to the ECMR
added additional standards for concentrations involving firms with
turnover in at least three Member States, notwithstanding that the
turnover does not meet the standards originally set.95
Proposed transactions falling within the ECMR must undergo
a series of mandatory pre-merger notification and procedural
undertakings before the Commission Merger Task Force, the entity
one or more undertakings. See ECMR, supra note 89, art 3(1); see also id. art.
1(2) (defining the threshold market values for transactions regulated by the
ECMR); Stefan Schmitz, How Dare They? European Merger Control and the
European Commission's Blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell Merger, 23
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 325, 332-33 (2002) (stating that the one-stop shop
principle "ensures that any other national jurisdiction with the European
Community need not be notified of the mergers, no matter how much effect they
may have in these jurisdictions"); Wood, supra note 36, at 420 (contending the
drafters of the European Commission's merger regulation produced a "one-stop
shopping" system so the parties would know the competency of the Commission).
93. See Jason A. Garick, International Horizontal Mergers: A Comparison of
European Union and United States Regulatory Policy and Procedure, 7
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 293, 300 (1994) (stating turnover "is calculated by adding the
value of the products sold and services provided to separate undertakings or
consumers").
94. See ECMR, supra note 89, at art. 1(2) (explaining when a concentration has
a community dimension for purposes of the regulation).
95. See Council Regulation 1310/97, supra note 88, art. 1 (stating that the
standards for a concentration with a Community dimension may also be met if: (a)
the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings is 2.5 billion
euro, and (b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate
turnover is more than 100 million euor, and (c) in each of at least three Member
States included in (b), the turnover of at least two undertakings is more than
twenty-five million euro each, and (d) the aggregate Community wide turnover of
each of at least two undertakings is more than 100 million euro, unless (e) each of
the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate
Community wide turnover within one Member State).
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charged with administering the ECMR. Notifications on the
conclusions of agreements, the announcement of a public bid, or the
acquisition of a controlling interest must be made to the Commission
and the transaction is not allowed to be consummated until a final
decision is rendered. 96 Under Article 4(1), concentrations with a
Community dimension "shall be notified to the Commission after the
conclusion of the agreement, announcement of the public bid, or
acquisition of a controlling interest."97 A Phase I review occurs after
the Commission invites third party competitors to submit their views
on the transaction, and a decision must be taken between twenty-five
and thirty-five days under Article 10(l).9s In the event that serious
questions are raised as to the effects the transaction will have on
competition, a second stage review will be initiated.99 Phase II
review involves additional requests for information from the parties
to the undertaking, a publication to the parties of a Statement of
Objections from the Commission, and oral hearings that includes
third party complainants. Also, the parties are given access to the
Commission's file under Article 13 following the publication of the
Statement of Objections for the purposes of enabling the parties to
exercise their rights of defence.100 Based on its determination as to
whether the proposed concentration will create or strengthen a
dominant position that would impede effective competition, 0 1 the
96. See Schmitz, supra note 92, at 351 (noting that the E.C. merger control
requires that clearance must be received from the Comission in orde for the merger
to take place).
97. ECMR, supra note 89, art. 4(1)..
98. See id. art. 10(1) (stating when the decision period shall begin and end).
99. See id. arts. 10(2), 8(1), 8(2).(outlining the process by which a second
review should be initiated).
100. See id. art. 13 (noting that access to the file is also given to "other involved
parties" such as the seller and the company which is the target of the concentration,
who have been informed of the Commission's objections)
101. See ECMR, supra note 89, art. 2(1). Article 2(1) provides that in making its
decision, the Commission shall consider:
(a) the need to preserve and develop effective competition within the common
market in view of, among other things, the structure of all the markets
concerned and the actual or potential competition from undertakings located
either within or without the Community;
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and
financial power, the opportunities available to suppliers and users, their
access to supplies or markets, any legal or other barriers to entry, supply and
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Commission may either allow the transaction to pass, with or without
conditions, or prohibit outright the consummation of the
transaction. 0 2  Phase II decisions must be rendered within ninety
days of the date of the Phase I ruling and initiation of the Phase II
investigation." 3 Parties may appeal decisions by the Commission on
substantive and procedural grounds to the Court of First Instance
("CFI") and, from there, to the ECJ, much the same way as the may
appeal decisions involving Articles 81 and 82, including appeals
from third parties and competitors."° Appeals have generally failed
and negotiated outcomes with the Commission prior to the appeal are
common. 1
05
Similar to the United States, the Commission utilises a series of tools
and guidelines for assessing the potential anticompetitive effects of
proposed merger transactions. Like the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, the recently issued Commission Notice on the Appraisal
of Horizontal Mergers ("E.C. Merger Guidelines") sets forth the
guiding criteria on how the Commission seeks to analyse proposed
mergers within its jurisdiction, though variations in the focus of
demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests of the
intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and
economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not
form an obstacle to competition.
Id.
102. See NEIL NUGENT, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 274 (2001) (listing the
options that the Commission has at the completion of their investigation; approval,
which is most common, disapproval, only happening about three times a year, or
approval subject to conditions).
103. See id. art. 10(3) (nothing that this may be extended by fifteen days when
undertakings offer concessions pursuant to Art. 8(2), or twenty days if requested
by the parties).
104. See Schmitz, supra note 92, at 353-54 (allowing parties to appeal
Commission decisions to the European Court of First Instance and then appeal
decision of the Court of First Instance to the ECJ on points of law issues only); see
also Case C-7/95, John Deere Ltd. v. Comm. of the European Communities,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-3111, para. 18 (1998) (limiting appeals to points of law and on
grounds of lack of competence by the CFI, breach of procedure adversely affecting
the appellant, and infringement of community law by the CFI.); STEPHEN
WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW 918-20 (3d ed., 1999).
105. See generally JOELSON, supra note 90, at 300 (discussing the deficiency of
the pre-1989 regulatory regime for creating undistorted competition in the
Common Market).
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analysis and the tools used remain." 6 The Commission's appraisal
centres around two overlapping issues: the definition of the relevant
product and geographic markets, and a competitive assessment of the
merger. 107 Similar in format and substance to U.S. guidelines, the
E.C. Merger Guidelines set forth a five-pronged set of elements for
analysis. The first looks to the likelihood the merger will have
anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets, absent countervailing
factors.108  This prong analyses relevant market characteristics,
including a reliance on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") as
an indication of the competitive pressures in the market post-merger,
the market power that may be created and utilised by the proposed
firm, and the risk of creating or allowing for non-collusive
oligopolies. °9 The increased risk of coordination plays a significant
role under this first prong.110  The second prong analyses the
likelihood buyer power will act as a countervailing force to an
increase in market power resulting from the merger, assessing factors
such as credible alternatives for buyers to resort to in the case the
merged entity increases prices or deteriorates conditions of
delivery. 1 Similar to step three of the U.S. guidelines, the third
106. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 2004 O.J. C
31/5 [hereinafter E.C. Merger Guidelines] (providing guidelines for the assessment
of horizontal mergers pursuant to Council Regulation No. 139/2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/c_031/c_03120040205enOO050018.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2004).
107. See id. para. 10 (explaining that the purpose of assessing market definition
is to highlight competitive constraints immediately facing the merged entity).
108. See id para. 11 (b) (referring to Section IV of the guidelines).
109. See id. paras. 19-21 (identifying appropriate HHI levels to qualify as
horizontal competition concerns). HHI regions are marginally higher under the
E.C. approach, with an HHI of 2000 or more and an increase of 150 points or more
raising serious anticompetitive concerns, as opposed to 1,800 and 100 points
respectively under U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Id.
110. See generally Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, [1999] E.C.R. II-
753; Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585
(demonstrating that mergers changed the nature of competition in oligopolistic
markets to allow sellers, who previously were not able to co-ordinate behaviour, to
co-ordinate actions and raise prices, without entering into an agreement or
resorting to a concerted practice under the meaning of Art. 81).
111. See E.C. Merger Guidelines, supra note 106, paras. 64-67 (stating that the
Commission will consider the ability of customers to "counter the increase in
market power that a merger would otherwise be likely to create"); see also, e.g.,
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prong looks at the likelihood entry by new firms will maintain
effective competition, while the fourth prong analyses the
efficiencies likely to result from the merger.112 Likewise, prong five
looks at the conditions for a failing firm defence." 3 In addition to the
draft E.C. Merger Guidelines, the Commission has also published
notices useful for parties to proposed mergers in assessing how the
Commission will undertake its review'1 4 and "Best Practice
Guidelines" for handling divesture commitments." 5
The recent amendment and reform of the ECMR that will
come into effect in May of 2004 is particularly relevant to this
analysis. Based on a major review of the ECMR and a Green
Paper'"6 published in December of 2002, the Council recently passed
an additional amended version of the Merger Regulation with
Case IV/M.1313, Danish Crown v. Vestjyske Slagterier, O.J. 2000 L20/l; Case
IV/M. 1225, Enso v. Stora O.J. 1999 L 254/9.
112. E.C. Merger Guidelines, supra note 106, paras. 68-88.
... Id. paras. 89-91.
114. See, e.g., Commission Notice on calculation of turnover under Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, O.J. 1998 C66/25 (Mar. 2, 1998) (stating the purpose of the notice as
expanding upon the text of Articles 1 and 5 of Council Regulation 4064/89, and in
doing so elucidating "certain procedural and practical questions which have caused
doubt or difficulty"); Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market
for the purposes of Community Competition law, O.J. 1997 C372/5 (Dec. 9, 1997)
(providing guidance on how the Commission applies the concept of relevant
product and geographic market in its enforcement of Community competition law),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevma-en.html (last visited Apr.
5, 2004).
115. See European Commission, Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission's
Model Texts for Divesture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate under the EC
Merger Regulation (2004) (serving as a model as best practice guidelines for
notifying parties submitting commitments under the E.C. Merger Regulation),
available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm!competition/mergers/legislation/divestiturecommitmen
ts/explanatory-note.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
116. Report on the Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, EUR. PARL. DOc. (COM(2001) 745-C-
0159/2002/2067(COS)); see also Mario Monti, European Competition
Commissioner, Review of the EC Merger Regulation - Roadmap for the reform
project, Address before Conference on Reform of European Merger Control
(Brussels) (June 4, 2002) (providing an overview the main areas of public
comment submitted on the amended regulations), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt-gt&doc=SPEECH
02/252/0/RAPID&lg=EN&display (last visited Apr. 1, 2004).
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significant changes in the manner which mergers will be reviewed by
the Commission in the future."' Reforms, largely in response to
questions over existing system checks and balances and hurried by a
series of judgments from the CFI overturning Commission merger
decisions,"'8 have important substantive ramifications. These include
the abolition of the requirement of a binding merger agreement as a
pre-condition to notification; 19 a strengthening of the Commission's
investigation powers; and, an extension of the Phase II investigation
by fifteen days where the parties submit remedies, and by twenty
days at the request of the parties or the Commission to look more
closely into difficult aspects of particularly complex cases. 20
Additional reforms include state of play meetings between the parties
and the Commission, provisions for access to key documents in the
Commission file before the Statement of Objections is published, the
establishment of a post of Chief Competition Economist for greater
expertise in economic analysis, and the creation of peer-review
panels in which other states assess the quality and effectiveness of
the merger review system.' 2'
A particularly noteworthy development on merger review is the
Commission's move to the new substantive test prohibiting mergers
that would "significantly impede effective competition" ("SIEC
117. See generally ECMR, supra note 89 (stating the need to reform the
regulation to meet new challenges of a more integrated market and an expanding
European Union).
118. E.g., Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. 11-2585; Case
T-310/01, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission [2002] ECR 11-4071; Case T-
05/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission 5 C.M.L.R. 17 (2002).
119. See Comission Welcomes Agreement on New Merger Regulation, Press
Release IP/031/1621 (November 27, 2003), at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/03/162
SIOIRAPID&lg=EN&display= (last visited March 17, 2004) (highlighting this
change that was made in response to the International Competition Network's
guiding principles for merger notification and review); see also International
Competition Network, Guiding Principles and Recommended Practices for
Merger Notification and Review, at
www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/guidingprinciples.html (last visited
March 17, 2004).
120. See ECMR, supra note 89, art. 4(1)
121. See id. art. 10(3). Many of these reforms and developments have arisen out
of efforts by the International Competition Network and Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("O.E.C.D."). See Guiding Principles
for Merger Notification and Review, supra note 115.
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test"). 1 22  Analysis by the Commission has traditionally focused
substantive review through the "dominance" test, usually taken to
ban mergers creating a market share of forty percent or more. The
"dominance test" arises largely out of German competition law and
the European Community's incorporation of that system into the
Community level. The move away from "dominance" towards the
SIEC test indicates a shift closer to the United States' "substantially
lessening of competition" test, a difference that has contributed to
diverging opinions on the potential market effects of proposed
mergers and decisions to clear such mergers. The new SIEC test will
seemingly allow the European Community to retain case law based
on the traditional "dominance" test, while converging towards a SLC
approach that allows for greater economic analysis - time will
expose the significance or triviality of this shift.
b. United States
Described as the Magna Carta of free enterprise, competition law
in the United States carries a long and distinctive history dating to
the first U.S. antitrust statute enacted in 1890, the Sherman Act.2 3
The purpose of this act originated out of popular concern for the U.S.
economy during a period when a small number of corporations and
individuals had accumulated a vast amount of wealth. 124 Corporate
organizations, unconcerned with public interests, were spawning in
122. See E.C. Merger Guidelines, supra note 106 (establishing the new test the
Commission shall apply to merger analysis); Press Release, European
Commission, EU Gives itself new merger control rules for 21st century (Jan. 20,
2004) (stressing that the purpose of the new test, in part, is to provide guidance to
the legal community concerning the legal tests the Commission will apply to
mergers),
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=LP/04/70101
RAPID&lg=EN&display = (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
123. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (stating that monopolizing any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations
constitutes a felony); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
610 (1972) (stating that antitrust laws in general, and particularly the Sherman Act,
are considered the Magna Carta of free enterprise, and that they are as important as
the Bill of Rights). These acts are "are as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." Id..
124. See ANDREW I GAVIL ET AL., supra note 49, at 60-61 (2002) (explaining the
historical origins of the Sherman Act).
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large numbers; dangerous business establishments known as "trusts"
were growing in number and suppressing competition. 21 In the
interests of curbing business excess and abuse while preserving the
competitive nature of the U.S. economy, the Sherman Act became
one of the first modem competition law statutes and the first of such
statutes to become a significant factor in legal and economic life.
126
The Sherman Act contains two broadly construed substantive
sections of importance. Under Section 1, "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.' 2  Section 2 makes it a
felony offence for "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations."'1 28 Fines for such violations
now include up to $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for
individuals and/or three years imprisonment. 129
Of great importance for the Sherman Act and the U.S. competition
law system is the role of the judiciary in hearing and deciding such
cases.130 The Sherman Act, for example, may be enforced not only
criminally by the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), but civilly as
well by the government and aggrieved parties.' This allows for a
large amount of case law and evolving judicial precedent that ensures
125. See id. (noting the influence that the rise of industrial organization
economics had on antitrust).
126. See id. (examining the influence of the Sherman Act and examining various
courts discussing the act).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1. (2000)
128. 15 U.S.C. § 2. (2000)
129. See id. (providing that the court shall have discretion in regards to both
punishments).
130. See Wood, supra note 36, at 414 (stating that the "existence of private
parties makes it more difficult for government policymakers to control
developments in antitrust law through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
since the courts perforce deal with the full range of issues"). "Therefore, it is the
judiciary that has the greatest influence on antitrust policymaking, not the
administrators of the laws." Id.
131. See id. at 411-14 (describing the ability of private parties to sue for treble
damages or for injunctive relief in order to enforce antitrust laws).
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a contemporary and timely competition law system.'32 In fact, the
broad language of the Sherman Act essentially demands that the U.S.
Judiciary play a vital role by imparting content to the very general
phrases contained within the Act. The most important early
interpretation of Section 1 came in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. in 1898, which gave birth to the "rule of reason" commonly
applied in Sherman Act cases today.'33 Under the "rule of reason,"
no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the
covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main
purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the
covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the
contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use
of those fruits by the other party. 3 4
Developing out of this decision, only restraints of trade deemed
unreasonable violate the Sherman Act. 135
Of particular importance to the Sherman Act has been the
interpretation of the Section 2 prohibition against those who
"monopolize."' 36  Under Section 2, becoming a monopoly or
achieving monopoly status is not in itself an illegal act, but rather the
132. See id. at 414 (noting the importance of the judiciary in influencing
antitrust policy making).
133. See 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (interpreting whether an association of a
group of pipe manufacturers was "a contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restrain of trade" and examining the relationship between a contract of association
under the common law and contract of association under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act).
134. Id. at 282.
135. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) (analyzing
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act). The Court concluded that
the criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining
whether violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason
guided by the established law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions
of the act and thus the public policy which its restrictions were obviously
enacted to subserve.
Id.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (making it a felony to engaged in monopolizing
trade as defined by the statute).
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act or attempt at monopolization constitutes such an offence.'37
Hence, a company that becomes a dominant force in its industry is
not per se perpetrating an illegal act, and the lack of effective
competition in the sector and market occupied by the company is not
illegal. A monopoly becomes illegal when a company incorporates
unfair means to achieve a dominant position or when monopoly
power is used to maintain a dominant position and to exclude
competition from the market.138 The degree of market power that
must be shown varies from case to case, although it is often reflected
in market share percentage calculations, and the definition of what
constitutes unfair monopolizing behavior remains the subject of most
cases in this area. 139
Along with the Sherman Act, several other statutes exist that form
the core of U.S. competition law. One of these acts, the Wilson
Tariff Act of 1894, specifically Sections 73-76, imposes punitive
measures on the abuse of U.S. import laws through agreements or
conspiracies between importers and others. 140  The act forbids
"[e]very combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract"
between two or more parties where either party is engaged in
importing goods from foreign states into the United States, intending
to restrain trade or increase market prices. 141 Violations of this act
137. See id. (stating that it is a felony to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other persons or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations").
138. See Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 16-17 (explaining that monopolization of
a particular industry is not per se illegal and that in order fall with the Sherman
Act, the monopoly must secure or acquire "'the exclusive right in such trade or
commerce by means which prevent or restrain others from engaging therein"' ).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (holding the defendant guilty of a Section 2 violation for drastically
increasing its production capacity of aluminum ingot in anticipation of market
demand when the defendant held a dominant position); In Re Microsoft Corp.
Antitrust Litig., 355 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2004) (providing an additional example of
the evolving interpretations given to illegal monopolization).
140. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 73-76 (2000) (discussing agreements involving
restrictions in favor of imported goods and delegating the Secretai-y of Treasury to
make rules and regulations necessary for carrying out the Wilson Tariff Act).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 8 (2000) (providing further that "persons engaged in
importation that violates the section shall be guilty of a misdemeanour").
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are almost always brought in conjunction with Sherman Act suits and
the act is of little significance on its own. 42
In addition, the Clayton Act enacted in 1914 forms an enormously
important role in the U.S. competition law system. 143  Filling gaps
left open in the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act deals with price
discrimination, exclusive dealing, and mergers, aiming to reach in
their inception acts or practices that may eventually cause
anticompetitive effects.'" Important parts of this act include the
provisions authorizing treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees in
private suits by persons injured by antitrust violations, 145 rendering
corporations subject to the jurisdiction of any U.S. District Court
where they transact business, and making companies vulnerable to
suit for antitrust violations. 146
142. See Jennifer M. Siegle, Suing US. Corporations in Domestic Courts for
Environmental Wrongs Committed Abroad through the Extraterritorial
Application of Federal States, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REv. 393, 411 (2002) (noting
that while various statutes grant U.S. courts extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust
suits, the majority of such suits are brought under the Sherman Act).
143. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 - 27a (2000) (prescribing antitrust laws
to protect trade and commerce against "unlawful restraints and monopolies").
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000) (stating that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or
indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality."); 15 U.S.C. §14 (2000) (making it illegal to enter into
agreements not to "not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce"); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (prohibiting
the acquisition by one corporation of stock of another where "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly").
145. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (stating that the amount of the controversy
shall not be taken into account and that any person who shall be injured in his
property or business may sue).
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000) (stating that "[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding
under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the
judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may
be found or transacts business").
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The nucleus of merger review in the United States is the Section 7
of the Clayton Act. 147 As amended through the 1976 Hart-Scott-
Rodino legislation ("HSR Act"), 48 Section 7A of the Clayton Act
directs parties intending to engage in merger and acquisition
activities to provide advanced notice to the DOJ and the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") and observe specified waiting periods
allowing for the review of the competitive implications of the
proposed transactions. 149  Like the Sherman Act, the broadly
construed wording of the Clayton Act has been the subject of
significant judicial interpretation as to its application, especially in
regards to acquisitions of and by foreign companies. 50
The U.S. merger review process is designed to provide
competition regulators with the opportunity to review mergers and
acquisitions before they occur. The mandatory pre-merger
notification program, with filing and waiting period requirements,
provides the responsible agencies with the time and information
needed to conduct a thorough review.' The HSR Act provides the
147. See Clayton Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended by 15 U.S.C.
ss 1-12 (2000)).
148. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(2000).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 7A (2000). In addition to the DOJ and FTC, numerous other
public competition authorities exist that share responsibility for formulating and
implementing merger policy. For example, the Department of Transportation has
exclusive authority to approve agreements between U.S. airlines and foreign
carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 41309 (2000). The DOJ shares jurisdiction over mergers
involving banks with four other federal regulators, including the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. Telecommunication mergers involving service providers are subject to
review by the FTC, DOJ, Federal Communications Commission, and the public
service commissions of each state in which the parties do business. See
Telecommunications Act of 1996 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
150. United States v. American Building Maintenance, 422 U.S. 271 (1975)
(interpreting Section 7 as applying to cases of U.S. acquisitions of foreign
companies only when the acquired company is actually 'engaged in commerce,'
i.e. directly involved to some degree in producing, making, or selling in the U.S.);
United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F.Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal 1966)
(holding that it is sufficient for the acquired company to have a subsidiary in the
U.S. for Section 7 to apply).
151. See FTC and DOJ, Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Operation of
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Program, 3-4 (FISCAL year 2001)
(hereinafter FTC AND DOJ REPORT) (explaining that the primary purpose of the
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starting point for regulatory review of proposed mergers by U.S.
authorities. Under the HSR Act, Section 13(b) of the FTC Act,152
and Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 53 the FTC and DOJ investigate
proposed merger transactions meeting specific thresholds for
review. 154 Under 2001 HSR reforms, proposed dealings that meet a
size of transaction threshold of over U.S. $200 million must be
reported. 5 5 Transactions resulting in an acquiring person holding
over U.S. $50 million in assets or voting securities must also be
reported. 15 6 In regards to foreign transactions, the nexus with the
United States that triggers a filing obligation from merger activity
resulting in the acquisition of foreign assets or voting securities are
transactions valued above U.S. $50 million.'57 Also, acquisitions of
foreign assets by foreign persons are likewise subject to the same
law is to perform the necessary antitrust review), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/09/hsrarfy2001 .pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
152. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2000)).
153. 15 U.S.C. §18a(2000).
154. See Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 630, 114 Stat.
2762 (2000) (raising the size-of-transaction threshold and modifying the filing and
waiting period requirements). It is important to note the peculiar overlapping
regulatory scheme present in U.S. competition and merger review. The FTC is
charged with the mandate to halt anticompetitive practices from their inception
before maturing into actual antitrust violations. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) Specific
statutes remain under the jurisdiction of the FTC for enforcement, including the
provisions of the FTC Act and the Clayton Act, all of which are enforced by the
FTC through civil litigation. Id. The Antitrust Division of the DOJ places a
principal role in investigating antitrust violations of the Sherman Act and Clayton
Act and in bringing the appropriate criminal or civil actions for violations, criminal
or civil for Sherman Act violations, civil for the Clayton Act. For merger activity,
the DOJ and the FTC share responsibility, engaging in regular consultation under
an internal "clearance" agreement between the two agencies and often deferring to
the agency with greater expertise in the area of a particular investigation. See
JOELSON, supra note 90, at 15.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
156. Adjustments to the size-of-transaction threshold will be made each fiscal
year beginning in 2005 to reflect the percentage change of GNP for the previous
year. Id.
157. 67 Fed. Reg. 11898, 11898 (Mar. 12, 2002) (stating that the threshold was
increased from $15 million to $50 million).
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U.S. $50 million nexus-with-the-United States test.' Recent
changes to the HSR Act have also been made regarding filing fees
and timelines.15 9
Proposed transactions meeting HSR thresholds become subject to
a relatively flexible process whereby the parties remain largely in
control of the timelines for investigation. Under the HSR Act,
parties have discretion to file merger notifications any time after they
sign merger agreements and can delay filing to allow pre-filing
discussions with agencies or await the outcome of other
jurisdictional reviews. HSR filings, which require little upfront
analysis, trigger a thirty day waiting period that can be halted by the
withdraw and refilling of HSR forms in order to gain additional time
for preliminary review before moving onto the next phase. 160  The
vast majority of mergers notified are cleared within the first thirty
days of review (95-98%), 161 while "Second Requests" for
information are issued for transactions raising competitive concern.
Second Requests are heavily document intensive with deadlines for
filings and agency decisions, but once parties comply with the
request, extensions are possible depending on strategy. During the
post-Second Request period, negotiations and agreements on
remedies are common. 16 2 When no agreement is reached, the agency
158. See id. Notably, an exemption exists for acquisitions by foreign persons
who do not meet the U.S. $200 million aggregate sales and assets test. Id. at 11901
("Since the new legislation removes the size-of-person test for acquisitions valued
at over $200 million, the Commission likewise believes that it is appropriate and
consistent to require filings from foreign persons, regardless of the size of their
U.S. presence, where the transaction is valued at over $200 million and the $50
million nexus test of these exemption rules is satisfied").
159. A three-tiered filing fee structure was implemented, replacing the U.S.
$45,000 flat fee, based on the aggregate total value of the voting securities and
assets resulting from the transaction. Acquiring persons now pay U.S. $45,000 for
transactions valued at less than U.S. $100 million, U.S. $125,000 for transactions
valued at U.S. $100 million but less than U.S. $500 million, and U.S. $280,000 for
transactions valued at U.S. $500 million or more. The waiting period for
compliance with additional requests for information or documentary material has
been extended from twenty to thirty days for most transactions. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a
(2000).
160. See 15 U.S.C § 18a (2000)
161. See FTC AND DOJ REPORT, supra note 151, Appendix A (detailing the
percentages of DOJ and FTC investigations in which second requests were issued).
162. See id.
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seeking to block the merger must seek an injunction before a federal
court. Cases are then litigated on the merits, in the case of the DOJ
before the federal court and the FTC before an administrative trial
within the agency. The administrative and judicial decisions are
subject to federal appellate review.
The essential goal of U.S. competition policy is to "maximise
consumer welfare and promote economic efficiency through the
optimal allocation of resources in a competitive market context,"1 63
an aim reflected in the analytical tools and framework for merger
review.1 1 Under the premise that antitrust protects the process of
competition not competitors,165 U.S. review seeks to prohibit mergers
that "substantially lessen competition" ("SLC") or tend to create a
monopoly. 66  The Horizontal Merger Guidelines 67 and the Non-
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6 provide the analytical framework
for analysis by the FTC and DOJ, focusing squarely on "whether the
merger is likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
163. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON COMPETITION, THE OBJECTIVES OF
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY AND THE OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A COMPETITION
AGENCY: UNITED STATES 2, OECD Doc. No. CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2003)34
available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/0/ee395192e97c98c5cl 256cbf003f70e 1
/$FILE/JT00138532.PDF (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
164. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK MERGERS WORKING GROUP
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK SUBGROUP, ANNEX FOR ISSUE PAPER FOR 2002 NAPLES
CONFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK UNDER UNITED STATES
MERGER LAW (2002) [hereinafter US Analytical Framework] (outlining an
analytical rubric for mergers), available at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/afsgusa.pdf (last visited Apr. 7,
2004)
165. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (reiterating that damages awarded in antitrust suits are designed to give the
injured party the profits they would have made if the illegal competition was not
present).
166. See US Analytical Framework, supra note 164 (describing methods of
analyzing U.S. merger law).
167. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM., 1992
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1992) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES], available at http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/00002/006674.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
168. U.S. Dep't of Justice, NON-HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
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exercise. '  Under the consumer welfare driven SLC test, the
responsible agency assesses, in light of market concentration and
other factors that characterise the market, whether the merger raises
concern about potential adverse competitive effects through market
power and the likely net effect of the transaction on price and
output. 170 For horizontal mergers market, concentration is a useful
indicator of the likely potential competitive effect of a merger and is
assessed through the use of the HHI. 7 1 No public interest test or
analysis is employed, 72 and efficiencies, i.e. the lowering of costs
169. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167, § 0.2.
The evolution of both sets of merger guidelines reflect the significance of
economic analysis in U.S. merger policy. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were
established by the DOJ in 1968, undergoing periodic revision by the FTC and
DOJ. The 1982 and 1984 Guidelines marked a dramatic departure towards
economic analysis, shifting from a singular focus on market concentration to an
evolving economic perspective on the effect of concentration on competition in a
particular market. Out of significant academic and theoretical work, this
perspective gained judicial recognition in the mid-1970s, and by 1982 reflected the
economic consensus that although high concentration could contribute to reduced
competition, by itself it was not efficient to bring about that outcome. The 1982
Guidelines and 1984 Revisions codified this view, describing quantitative levels of
market concentration that would likely cause the DOJ and FTC to go on to
examine the full set of factors and possibly challenge the merger. These revisions
resulted in greater firm flexibility during a time of substantial restructuring in the
1980s. The common firm restructures of the time, the first involving mergers
between two large firms in the same industry, the second involving the break-up of
conglomerates where business lines were often sold to firms competing in the same
market as the business line they were acquiring, would have faced greater
opposition under the 1968 Guidelines, but led to a total real dollar value of merger
activity in the 1980s of more than four times greater that what it had been during
the 1970s. 2002 Economic Report of the President, President's Council of
Economic Advisers chap 3 reprinted in (2002) 19 YALE J. ON REG. 541
170. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 2.1 (establishing that the agency will
be in charge of determining whether post-merger market conditions are conducive
to allowing firms to coordinate their efforts).
171. Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, HH1 is calculated by summing
the squares of the individual market shares of all participants. For example, a
market containing five firms with market shares of 40%, 20%, 15%, 15%, and
10% has an HHI of 2550 (402 + 202 + 152 + 152 + 102 = 2550). The HHI ranges
from zero (an atomistic market) to 10,000 (pure monopoly). See generally
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167, n. 17.
172. See id. § 0.2 (establishing the "analytical process that the Agency will
employ").
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and improvement of product quality, play an important role in the
agency analysis.'73
Utilising these tools and frameworks, the reviewing agency
proceeds through a five-step analytical process to determine whether
to allow or challenge the merger. 74  First, the agency assesses
whether the merger would significantly increase market
concentration. 75 This is defined and measured through product and
geographic market definition, identification of firms participating in
the relevant market, calculating market shares, and assessing
concentration and market shares through HHI analysis. Second, the
agency assesses whether the merger, in light of the preceding factors,
raises anticompetitive concerns by lessening competition through
coordinated interaction or unilateral effects. 176  The third step
involves an agency assessment of the concerned market as to
whether entry by other participants would be timely, likely, and
sufficient, either to deter or to counteract the competitive effects of
concern, i.e. the post-merger market cannot collectively or
unilaterally profitably maintain a price increase above pre-merger
levels. 177 The fourth step involves an efficiency analysis, assessing
efficiency gains that reasonably cannot be achieved by the other
parties through other means, while the fifth failing firm analysis
assesses whether, but for the merger, either party to the transaction
would likely fail, causing its assets to exit the market. 178 This step
factors in the ability of the firm to meet its financial obligations, the
likelihood of successful reorganisation under Chapter 11 of the
173. See id. § 4 (noting that the Agency will take into consideration the
efficiencies that the merger is likely to accomplish, which the companies could not
accomplish individually).
174. The guidelines and analytical framework for assessing horizontal mergers
and non-horizontal mergers are similar, but place differing weight on factors of
respective relevance given the differing nature of the horizontal and non-horizontal
mergers.
175. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167, § 0.2.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
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Bankruptcy Act, and good-faith efforts to solicit alternative offers or
acquisitions. 179
The regulation and administration of competition law in the
United States is of specific importance given the peculiar
overlapping enforcement scheme. The FTC is charged with the
mandate to halt anticompetitive practices before such practices
mature into full blown antitrust violations. 180  Specific statutes
remain under the jurisdiction of the FTC for enforcement through
civil litigation, including the provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Clayton Act."' The Antitrust Division of
the DOJ plays a principal role in investigating antitrust violations of
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act. The DOJ may bring criminal or
civil actions to enforce violations of the Sherman Act, but it can only
enforce violations of the Clayton Act through civil actions. 82  In
some cases, especially in the area of mergers and acquisitions, the
DOJ and the FTC share responsibility, engaging in regular
consultation under a "clearance" agreement between the two
agencies and often deferring to the agency with greater expertise in
the area of a particular investigation.'83
In addition to actions by the DOJ and FTC, private enforcement
plays a fundamental role in the administration of competition law in
179. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167, § 5.1.
180. See generally Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 -
58 (2000) (defining the scope of the FTC's authority).
181. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm., 1995 Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (Apr. 1995) reprinted in
TERRENCE F. MACLAREN, 1 ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
OPERATIONS: JOINT VENTURES app. 4A (explaining the various enforcement
jurisdictions of the DOJ and the FTC).
182. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (2000) (codifying the Sherman Act and
explaining DOJ jurisdiction), with 15 U.S.C. § §14, 18, 19, 20 (2000) (providing
recourse only to civil actions).
183. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DIVISIONAL MANUAL, ANTITRUST DIVISION
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER AGENCIES AND WITH THE PUBLIC (Feb. 1998)
(explaining the relationship between the DOJ and the FTC and noting that "the
Department has referred all civil Robinson-Patman Act matters to the FTC for
action, and, second, the FTC routinely refers possible criminal violations of the
antitrust laws, such as price fixing, to the Division"), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/foia/divisionmanual/ch7.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
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the United States. 8 4 The allure of treble damages under the Clayton
Act (i.e. three times actual sustained damages plus the costs of the
suit and attorneys' fees) provides significant incentive for aggrieved
businesses and individuals to initiate actions for competition law
violations. 185  The role of "class action" law suits, where a large
group of similarly wronged individuals bring an action as a class and
not as individuals, plays a major role in private enforcement of
antitrust in the United States. In addition, each of the fifty U.S.
states may bring their own private actions for damages sustained by
the state.'86 While federal antitrust laws also allow for foreign states
to bring actions in the United States, for the most part only actual
damages are recoverable in such suits by foreign states, rather than
treble damages.'87 Violations of federal antitrust legislation are
brought within the federal court system, and such suits have a
potential for appellate review up to the Supreme Court.'88
2. E.C. - U.S. Bilateral Competition Law Cooperation
Following the introduction of the ECMR in the European
Community in 1989, concerns over the new enforcement authority
held at the community level in competition enforcement over large
transnational mergers and joint ventures grew on both sides of the
184. See Wood, supra note 36, at 414 (explaining that as a result of the existence
of private parties, the judiciary has tremendous influence in antitrust
policymaking).
185. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (providing that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee").
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000) (stating that any attorney general of a state may
bring a civil action on behalf of that state for a violation of the Sherman Act).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (2000) (stating that "any person who is a foreign state
may not recover under subsection (a) of this section an amount in excess of the
actual damages sustained by it and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee").
188. See e.g. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (involving a
case where defendant oil companies sought a review from an order issued by a
circuit court in an antitrust case).
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Atlantic. 18 9 The potential for clashes over jurisdictional prerogatives
and remedies, coupled with increasing corporate re-organization
strategies fuelled by globalization, resulted in the 1991 Antitrust
Cooperation Agreement between the United States and European
Community ("1991 Agreement"). 190 Evolving out of existing
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") recommendations and other existing bilateral
arrangements, the 1991 Agreement represented an acknowledgement
by both sides of the Atlantic of the extent that evolving business
activities transcended traditional national boundaries and the need for
concurrent jurisdiction over such activities based on their impact in
both American and European markets.1 9'
The 1991 Agreement reaches far beyond predecessor agreements
on regulatory cooperation. 192 Rather than growing out of animosity
resulting from competing claims to jurisdiction, the 1991 Agreement
reflects transatlantic consensus that "sound and effective
enforcement of competition law is a matter of importance to the
189. See Merit E. Janow, Transatlantic Cooperation on Competition Policy, in
ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION 29,
30-31 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2000) (describing the three developments in the
European Community that compelled the creation of the 1991 Agreement). These
developments included: (1) the ECJ's decision in the Wood Pulp case that
confirmed the extraterritorial application of E.C. competition law and suggested
convergence of E.C. and U.S. models on subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the 1992
program in the European Community aimed at the expansion of E.C.-level
regulation, which underscored the importance of European integration and
competition law enforcement; and (3) the recent adoption by the European Council
of the 1990 Merger Regulation, which made it clear that the United States and the
European Community would regularly be asserting conflicting claims of
jurisdiction and examination over the same mergers. Id.
190. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of the
Competition Law, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.C., U.S. Sate Dep't No. 91-216, 30
I.L.M. 1487, 1991 WL 495155 [hereinafter 1991 Agreement].
191. See id. at pmbl. (stating that "the sound and effective enforcement of the
Parties' competition laws would be enhanced by cooperation an, in appropriate
cases, coordination between them in the application of those laws").
192. See Janow, supra note 189, 33 (noting that the 1991 Agreement was the
first such agreement specifically related to competition law as well as the first
agreement to recognize the importance of positive comity between the United
States and the European Community).
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efficient operation" of both markets. 193  The 1991 Agreement
contains undertakings by U.S. and E.C. authorities providing for
notification of cases that impact upon the important interests of the
other party, and for the mutual exchange of information, both
through regular meetings of officials and on an ad hoc basis.'94 It
further establishes a framework for cooperation and coordination in
antitrust enforcement, including a traditional comity procedure
obligating each party to take into account the important interests of
the other.195 The 1991 Agreement also contains a positive comity
provision, by virtue of which a party may request the other to
undertake enforcement action with respect to anti-competitive
conduct taking place on its territory that is adversely affecting the
requesting party's interest. 196
The subsequent 1998 Agreement expanded this notion of positive
comity, providing guidelines on how authorities should deal with
positive comity requests, while raising the presumption that, in
certain cases, either side will normally defer or suspend its own
enforcement activities. 197 In effect, the 1998 Agreement clarifies the
situations that necessitate referrals between U.S. and E.C. agencies
and further articulates the report-back and consultation mechanisms
193. 1991 Agreement, supra note 190, at pmbl.
194. See 1991 Agreement, supra note 190, arts. 2-3 (regarding inter-party
notification and exchange of information).
195. See id., art 5(1) (agreeing that it is in the interest of both parties to address
anticompetitive activities that may occur within the territory of one Party, and in
addition, "adversely affect important interests of the other Party").
196. See id., arts. 5(2) (providing that if "a Party believes that anticompetitive
activities carried out on the territory of the other Party are adversely affecting its
important interests, the first Party may notify the other Party and may request that
the other Party's competition authorities initiate appropriate enforcement
activities").
197. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles
in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, June 4 1998, U.S.-E.C., art. III,
U.S. State Dept. No. 98-106, 1998 WL 428268 [hereinafter 1998 Agreement]
(providing further that "a Requesting Party may request the competition authorities
of a Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy anticompetitive
activities in accordance with the Requested Party's competition laws").
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that are triggered when a referral is made.1 98 Importantly, Article 3
provides that either party may request the other to "investigate and, if
warranted, to remedy anticompetitive activities in accordance with
the Requested Party's competition laws."1 99
The 1998 Agreement does not, however, apply to mergers due to
statutorily imposed deadlines for merger investigations in the
European Union,z°° and like the 1991 Agreement, does not provide
for the exchange of confidential business information, unless the
source of the information consents.2 1 Officials on both side of the
Atlantic have praised both agreements for facilitating effective
communications between the two jurisdictions.202 In light of the high
numbers of cross-border mergers and acquisitions between U.S. and
European companies, the increasing interactions between U.S. and
E.U. authorities is a seemingly natural development, driven by
market forces rather than the need for an underlying agreement.0 3
198. See id. at art. 4 (explaining the procedures for deferral or suspension of
investigation in relation on enforcement activity by the Requested Party).
199. Id. at art. 3.
200. See Janow, supra note 189, at 33 (stating that the short statutory deadlines
for merger violations resulted in the non-application of the 1998 Agreement and
noting that the provisions apply to all other competition violations).
201. See 1998 Agreement, supra note 197, art. 5 (incorporating the 1991
Agreement's disclosure and confidentiality requirements).
202. See Report from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament
on the Application of Agreements Between the European Communities and the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
Regarding their Application of Competition Laws, 1 January 2001 to 31 December
2001 (providing an overview of the 1991 Agreement and the 1998 Agreement, and
noting the levels of enhanced cooperation, which continue to be a mutual benefit to
both parties),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/intemational/bilateral/documents/us3-en.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); William J. Kolasky, Department of Justice, Global
Competition Convergence Cooperation: Looking Back and Looking Ahead,
Address to American Bar Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7, 2002) (commenting on
the successes of the U.S. and E.C. cooperation in antitrust enforcement), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200442.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
203. See Janow, supra note 189, at 35 (stating that "[g]iven the degree of cross-
border mergers and acquisitions activity between U.S. and European firms,
increased cooperation and interaction between antitrust officials would appear to
be a natural - indeed a market-drive - development and one that does not even
require an underlying accord").
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The recent formal adoption of Best Practices for Coordinating
Merger Review also plays an important role in the U.S.-EC bilateral
relationship.204 Developed by a joint working group of lawyers and
economists from the FTC DOJ and Commission, the document sets
forth best practices, which the domestic agencies seek to apply when
simultaneously reviewing the same merger transaction. The Best
Practices recognise the interest of both jurisdictions reaching
consistent and non-conflicting outcomes and the risks divergent
approaches have in undermining public confidence in the process,
imposing different outcomes, and frustrating the agencies' respective
remedial objectives. 20 5  The Best Practices recommend the
establishment of schedules for agencies to confer with each other and
encourage senior officials to engage in discussions at key moments
in one another's investigations.0 6 In addition, they offer merging
parties a meeting early in the process to discuss timing issues,
encourage joint interviews of parties and third parties, and provide
for increased coordination with respect to remedies. 20 1The
characteristics of transatlantic competition cooperation expose
several features that may be of significance for future international
cooperation in this area. One very important fact is that, while
cooperation between U.S. and E.C. competition authorities appears
to have increased, such cooperation has not become "formulaic" or
legally binding.20 8 Second, cooperation appears especially successful
when parties grant waivers for the exchange of confidential
information, as illustrated in the WorldCom/MCI and
Halliburton/Dresser Industries merger cases. 209 These examples of
multi-jurisdictional merger review were effective in that they
preserved "independent decision-making authority" on both sides of
204. See Press Release, U.S. - E.U. Merger Working Group, Best Practices on
Cooperation in Merger Investigations (Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Best Practices],
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/docs/20O405.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2004)
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 42 (noting that while interaction between officials at all levels are
common, the cooperation between the U.S. and European competition authorities
is not becoming "formulaic").
209. See id. (observing that such cases involved independent but coordinated
investigations and illustrating the benefits that resulted when the parties granted
waivers to the exchange of confidential information).
812 [19:769
GLOBAL COMPETITION GOVERNANCE
the Atlantic, exemplified effective staff interaction, created a
coordinated resolution of the issues in the same timeframe, and "the
divestiture results satisfied the completion concerns of both
authorities. ' '21°  A third characteristic is the fact that cooperation
between enforcement agencies and communication between
investigating staffs do not necessarily guarantee coordinated or
similar outcomes. 1 In a related sense, the fourth characteristic
shows that direct conflicts in the form of irreconcilable remedies can
take place, as evident in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger and
the most recent GE/Honeywell merger failure.212 In both cases, even
in the midst of highly praised and successful cooperation, both sides
threatened to initiate trade wars against the other.213  A final
observation supports the contention that even in spite of occasional
conflict and disagreement, "the market is itself creating incentives
for interagency cooperation. ' 12 4  Following the arguments of
traditional game theorists that the incentives for cooperation or
accommodation increase in repeat interaction games more than in
on-off transactions, the fact that U.S. and E.C. competition
authorities are more likely to deal with each other on a regular
recurring basis will increase the efficiency and predictability of such
cooperation and the chances for similar and coordinated
conclusions.1 5 While increased interaction and cooperation cannot
eliminate the possibility of differing decisions by competition
authorities, on a balance repeat interaction is creating new incentives
for cooperation.21 6
210. Id. at 43-44.
211. See id. at 44 (noting that in the case of the proposed merger between two
Swiss pharmaceutical companies provides an example where the two authorities
came to different conclusions on the issue of competitive effects).
212. Janow, supra note 189, at 44 (stating that although incompatibles remedies
can occur, they are rare and that the Boeing/McDonnel Douglas merger provides
the best example of such a case).
213. See id. 44-45 (describing the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, which
involved two U.S. companies with no production assets in the European
Community and almost started a trade war).
214. Id. at45.
215. See id. at 45 (commenting on the application of game theory to the
transatlantic merger cooperation).
216. See Janow, supra note 189, at 45. (arguing that frequent interaction
between agencies will result in new incentives for cooperation). While one may
challenge this contention by pointing to US-E.C. trade policy relations that are
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To summarize, significant differences in the administration and
enforcement of competition law exist between the United States and
European Community, but contemporary agreements on competition
law cooperation have served to increase interaction between
complementary agencies, thereby increasing the efficiency and
effectiveness of competition law enforcement in a globalized market.
The challenges posed by globalization-influenced cooperate
strategies and the potential clash of regulatory regimes charged with
overseeing these globalization activities have resulted in the 1991
and 1998 Agreements. These agreements facilitate cooperation and
coordination of competition law application, although they remain
limited in their overall effectiveness in regulating competition
concerns in a globalized market.
II. DIFFERENCES IN U.S.-E.U. COMPETITION
POLICY AND DIFFICULTIES IN HARMONIZATION
Competition law represents an area of extreme sensitivity to
national regulatory goals, market power, and political strategy.217
The application of an economic analysis to the U.S.-E.U.
competition policy relationship serves to explain many of the
successes and shortcomings of transatlantic antitrust cooperation, as
well as difficulties likely to be encountered in the future, as will be
discussed throughout this section.
replete with trade disputes and brinkmanship, significant distinctions separate trade
policy and competition policy disputes. Id. Specifically, trade disputes regularly
revolve around unfair treatment and discrimination, which unsurprisingly leads to
escalating tensions and brinkmanship given the nature of discriminating treatment
of the foreign product or firm by the foreign government. Id. In contrast, when
discrimination concerns are absent from the beginning, mitigating influences in
merger review operate from the start, whereas many transatlantic mergers involve
firms from one or both jurisdictions working to make the necessary adjustments
needed to have the transaction cleared. Id. at 46. Hence, while regulatory friction
may result, the merging parties themselves provide the countervailing influence
working to close the transaction. Id.
217. See generally, Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73.
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1501 (1998) (discussing the role of antitrust law in national
politics).
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A. ECONOMIC MODEL FOR COMPETITION LAW
Economic analysis plays an important role in competition law
strategy. From an economic perspective, a globally-efficient level of
antitrust exists when antitrust enforcement maximizes overall world
welfare by balancing (1) the efficiency gains from economies of
scale created by larger firms against (2) the output reduction
resulting from the allowance of larger firms to exercise market
power. Economically speaking, the level of efficient global
antitrust sought arises when the marginal costs of additional size are
just equal to the marginal benefits 9.2 1  However, competition law in
practice does not exist in the theoretical world of economics and
states do not specifically act to promote global efficiency, especially
to the detriment of national economies. 220 Hence, the main obstacle
to global efficiency remains political, primarily on the basis of
national boundaries.221 States in practice pursue national antitrust
policy on a worldwide scale for the benefit of national economies
and their constituents, thus skewing the amount of enforcement from
its efficient level.222 In effect, some states will over-pursue such
policies, while others will under-pursue them. The unpredictability
and often economically illogical decisions of heavily politicized
policies in competition law administration and enforcement
218. See id. 1509-10 (describing the effects of efficiency gains and increases in
market power on antitrust policy).
219. See Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1708, 1725 n.55 (2002) ("A careful cost-benefit
analysis of all plausible alternatives, however, should lead to the selection of the
alternative for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs.").
220. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1510-24 (comparing a state's self-
interested behavior in antitrust policy with behavior that would maximize global
welfare).
221. See, e.g., THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: THE PUBLIC-
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds. 1995)
(providing various models that exist to describe the policy-making behaviour of
national regulators, and suggesting that public policy towards business is a result
of political bargains and that it is largely to due the influence of special interest
groups).
222. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1538 (noting that state's are more likely to
choose a policy that advances their own self-interests rather than a worldwide
policy).
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admittedly poses a great challenge to any economic analysis of
antitrust law.223
Professor Andrew Guzman's simplified economic model
demonstrating how national antitrust polices are pursued on a
worldwide scale involves two states, one that only produces a certain
product (A), the other that only consumes that product (B).224 Given
that each state will pursue a policy beneficial for its national
economy and its national constituents, States A and B will initiate
different analyses to control the conduct of firms acting within their
territories. 225  According to Professor Guzman, as the producer
country, State A will adopt a competition policy aimed at
maximizing the wealth of producers, seeking to maximize producer
profit.2 26 As the consumer country, State B, conversely, will seek to
maximize welfare for consumers by adopting competition laws
designed to keep prices for the good as low as possible, thus
minimizing producer profits and transferring surpluses to
consumers 227
Problems in competition policy arise when firms in the producer
state decide to merge.228 In its simplest form within the model,
imagine Firm 1 and Firm 2, both producers solely in State A,
effectuating a merger that would result in both an increase in
productive efficiency and an increase in market power. 229  The
merger would reduce costs by £250 (+), while increased market
power would reduce production by £100 (-), hence creating a world
223. See id. 1538-42 (examining the various challenges that arise from
nationalized antitrust laws).
224. See id. at 1512 (explaining the economic model in terms of consumers and
producers in order to demonstrate the differing objectives of the two groups).
225. See id. at 1513 (stating that Country A's interests are aligned with that of
the firm while Country B's interests are counter to welfare-reducing activity).
226. See id. at 1513 (noting the policy of a producer country and its effects on
the consumer country).
227. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1514-15 (detailing the policy of a
consumer country).
228. See id. at 1515 (describing the effects of a merger of two firms in a
producing country).
229. See id. at 1513-15 (providing an example and analysis of mergers on
efficiency and market power).
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surplus of £150 (£250-£100).2 0  From a globally optimum
viewpoint, the proposed merger would be desirable given the
increase in global welfare. However, competition policy is
conducted on a national level, and thus the globally optimum
analysis will not necessarily be factored at all. In Professor
Guzman's example, while State A will likely approve the merger
given the fact that national welfare will be increased by £250, State B
will likely reject the merger given its potential loss of £100 due to
the decrease in global production that its consumer will bear as a
result of the merger.2 1' The interests of State A and State B directly
conflict, as gains from the merger for the economy of State A must
be offset by losses from the economy of State B, and hence no
agreement between these two states is likely. Whether the merger
will actually take place largely depends on State B's ability to block
the merger through extraterritorial application of its merger laws, a
topic to be discussed in detail later in this section. 32
In practice, production and consumption of goods often take place
in a more mixed context with producers and consumers residing in
multiple states.233 On a more general level, assuming a proposed
merger would lead to greater efficiency and more market power, but
increased market power enables firms to reduce quantity and raise
prices, competition authorities in producer states will often be at
odds with competition authorities in consumer states.3 The globally
optimum analysis rarely if ever will supersede the interests of the
national economy and its constituents. 235  According to Professor
230. See id. (giving examples of increased in profits and losses in consumer
surplus that may result from various mergers).
231. See id. (describing the differing views of the producer state and the
consumer state to mergers).
232. See discussion infra Part 1I.D (providing an overview of the extraterritorial
application of competition law in the United States and the European Union).
233. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1518-21 (detailing the interactions between
firms and consumers in multiple states).
234. See id. at 1515 (stating that the policy of an importing country is not
aligned with the optimal global policy because it does not consider the increased
profits that producers earn).
235. See id. (noting that unlike the global optimal policy, the consuming
countries' will attempt to prevent activities that increase total welfare when those
activities reduce the welfare of its consumer under its jurisdiction).
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Guzman, the appropriate simplified formula for this type of
economic analysis can be stated as such:
A country whose firms are responsible for X% of global
production will take into account X% of the change in global
producer surplus generated by a particular activity. A state
whose consumers account for Y% of global consumption will
take into account Y% of the total change in global consumer
surplus generated by the activity.236
In many cases, a state will have both producers and consumers
and, thus, factor both X and Y into its analysis.237 From a
competition regulation perspective, when X and Y are equal, optimal
regulation will be obtained; when X is greater than Y, under-
regulation will result; when X is less than Y, over-regulation will
result.238 Accordingly, the general conclusion is that net exporters
will tend to under-regulate their competition policy enforcement, as
national welfare will increase, while net importers will tend to over-
regulate, as national welfare will suffer losses.239 Hence, in these
cases, states have little incentive to cooperate.
Professor Guzman recognized that the power of states to enforce
their competition laws on an extraterritorial basis plays an important
role in national antitrust policy. 2 0 The simplified model discussed
above assumes states have equal power, while in reality states have
different degrees of leverage in the market for enforcement of their
competition laws. 241 Hence, states with more power will have a
236. Id. at 1520.
237. See id. at 1519 (providing examples to describe optimal global policy in the
general case were firms and consumers are located in both countries)/
238. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1519 (describing the effects of this
equation on countries that are either net importers or net exporters).
239. See id. (describing the behaviorr of producing and consuming countries as
determined by their overall share of producing and consuming benefits and costs).
240. See id. at 1521 (arguing that the ability of the state to enforce its laws
beyond its own borders affect antitrust laws and that a "country that can apply its
laws extraterritorially will underregulate anticompetitive behaviour if it is a net
exporter and overregulate such behavior if it is a net importer").
241. See id. at 1526 (asserting that cooperative agreements between countries
reflects the specific interests of the negotiating parties, not the globally optimal
result).
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greater capacity to enforce their antitrust laws on other states with
less power.242 Such market power and the ability to enforce antitrust
laws extraterritorially depend largely on the attractiveness of a state's
domestic market to foreign producers. 243 Extraterritorial application
relies greatly on denial of market access. 44 Hence if a state seeking
to enforce its competition policy extraterritorially has a large
domestic market that foreign firms are greatly dependent upon, the
greater the likelihood the state will succeed in extraterritorial
enforcement. 2 5  This stands in contrast to a state with a small
domestic market that foreign firms are less dependent upon in which
extraterritorial enforcement will be difficult.246  States maintain
significant advantages for extraterritorial enforcement when the cost
to the affected firm for antitrust compliance is less than the value of
presence in the state's economy.247 From this perspective, a rational
firm will accept antitrust enforcement as a condition of market
participation because from a cost-benefit analysis, the benefits of
market participation are greater than the losses of antitrust
compliance. Hence, the degree a state can impose its competition
laws extraterritorial is a function of the size of the state's market and
its attractiveness to foreign firms.248
242. See id. at 1506 (noting that at "one extreme, for example, is a country that
has minimal power over the behavior of foreign firms because those firms do only
a small fraction of their business in the country and hold no assets there").
243. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1536 (discussing the unique position of the
United States after WWII as the only country able to apply its laws
extraterritorially).
244. See id. at 1506 (stating that a country will be almost powerless in affecting
the behavior of a foreign firm where the foreign firm only does a fraction of its
business in that country and holds no assets there).
245. See id. at 1506 (arguing that if a firm has a large proportion of its business
in a country, that country has considerable leverage on the firm and can penalize
the firm with monetary sanction in the event the firm fails to comply with the
country's demands).
246. See id. (arguing that such a country, even if it threatens to deny access to its
domestic market to foreign firm, will still not be effective in influencing the
behavior of the foreign firm).
247. See id. at 1506 (noting the considerable leverage a country has a firm that
has substantial assets in that country and providing examples of sanctions the
country can impose on that firm).
248. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1506-08 (noting the differences in the
influence countries have over foreign firms where the firm has substantial assets in
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The economic model factoring a state's extraterritorial capacity
unfolds as such. Imagine State B, which cannot apply its laws
extraterritorially, and two producers, one within State B and one
without. Given the non-extraterritorial abilities of State B, its
competition policies will only be applicable to the domestic
producer.2 49 Consider what happens when the two producers seek to
merge with separate third parties, both resulting in a loss of global
welfare.250 Clearly, from a global perspective State B should block
the merger through the domestic application of its competition laws.
However, this may not be optimal for State B, as the foreign merger
will likely proceed even in spite of B's objection. The foreign
merger will reduce market power and reduce consumer welfare
through higher prices, while in the meantime the domestic producer
will itself be harmed given its resulting weaker competitive position
to the merged firm.25' Thus, in an effort to increase its own welfare,
State B will allow the domestic merger. Based on this example of
the economic model, it is possible to conclude that states without
power to enforce their competition laws extraterritorially will under-
regulate antitrust at a globally sub-optimal level.252
Globalization has in fact reduced the incentives for states to
enforce antitrust policies exclusively to their own domestic firms.
253
that country and where the firm does only a small percentage of its business in that
country).
249. See id. at 1527-28 (providing an examples of situations where there are no
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws and analyzing the effects of this
situation on the prospects for harmonization).
250. See id. at 1526-28 (stating that "in the absence of extraterritoriality, a
trading country's optimal antitrust policy is weaker than the optimal global policy,
regardless of whether the country is an importer or an exporter").
251. See id. at 1510 (analyzing the effects of an increase in market power and
positing that "[a]s a firm's market power increases, the firm is able to increase the
price of its goods and services above the level that would prevail in a competitive
market"). As a result the firm can reduce the amount it sells, raise prices, and
increase profits. Id. at 1510. Such a result is bad for consumers and reduces
overall welfare. Id.
252. See id. at 1527 (asserting that a state's inability to discipline foreign firms
for violation of antitrust laws will result in under regulation).
253. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1529 (noting that states will exclude a
strict competition state from intemational treaties so as to avoid application of the
more stringent laws to domestic exporters).
[19:769
GLOBAL COMPETITION GOVERNANCE
This leads to the general result of weaker antitrust policies in states
lacking the power to apply their laws extraterritorially as strict
domestic policy, and the absence of extraterritoriality prevents local
firms from engaging in profit-maximizing anti-competitive activities.
This, however, does not stop or prevent similar foreign firms from
engaging in the same anti-competitive conduct and reducing
domestic consumer surplus in the affected jurisdiction. 4 Likewise,
as the global marketplace continues to grow through increased
international trade, national policies become less stringent as the
beneficial effects of regulating anticompetitive conduct are enjoyed
by foreign consumers and decreasingly by domestic ones in states
unable to invoke extraterritorial enforcement. 5 Extraterritoriality,
in effect, allows countries to block such activities and increases the
likelihood for stricter competition policy within the domestic
sphere. 6
B. DIFFICULTIES IN COMPETITION LAW HARMONIZATION
While the economic model can explain much of the successes and
failures of cooperation in transatlantic competition policies, differing
economic ideologies and beliefs as to the appropriate role of
competition policy, the state, the consumer, and the producer in the
marketplace serve to correlate and supplement the economic model's
shortcomings. 257 The U.S.- E.U. cooperation in antitrust exemplifies
the increasingly difficult task faced by the United States and
European Community of reconciling the objectives of protective
social regulation with free competition through open trade.25 8 The
254. See id. at 1527 (arguing that a state's interest in protecting local firms will
result in under regulation when the state is unable to enforce its laws
extraterritorially).
255. See id. (noting that the full effect of antitrust policy is felt by local firms,
whereas the impact on consumers is felt worldwide).
256. See id. at 1526 (asserting that full extraterritoriality results in the blockage
of welfare reducing activities and restrictive antitrust policies).
257. See discussion infra Part II.B-C (proving a detailed account of the
difficulties in harmonization and noting the different ideological approaches
between the E.C and U.S. competition policies, particularly the U.S. emphasis on
the consumer approach).
258. See Gregory Schaffer, Reconciling Trade ad Regulatory Goals: The
Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through
2004]
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past twelve years since the institution of the 1991 Agreement
underscore the resulting divergences inherent in seeking such a
balance.
In general, the goals of consumer and social protection through
regulation and the aims of free and open trade may be
complementary and/or conflicting.5 9 The basic theory behind social
regulatory policies is both protective and beneficial for the consumer
by protecting consumers from market failures through state
intervention.2 60 Free trade policies aspire to promote competition and
lower prices for consumers by providing for a diverse selection of
goods and services in the market, thereby increasing consumption
possibilities and raising the standard of living. 61  Trade and
regulatory policies typically conflict for two primary reasons, the
first being that domestic regulators do not account for the impact of
their own regulations on foreign consumers or markets.262 Second,genuine differences exist in constituent preferences and regulatory
strategies that prevent total and complete harmonization and
necessitate flexibility in any dealings between sovereign states.26 J
The differences in U.S. and E.C. competition policy the previous
section of this thesis described emphasize the inherent difficulties in
harmonizing the competition law of the United States and European
Community. 264 Transatlantic merger cooperation, especially the
Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 30
(2002) (commenting on the balance between social regulation and free
competition, and noting that depending on the circumstances, these objective can
be "complementary or in conflict").
259. See id. (noting that social regulation and free trade are simultaneously
complementary and in conflict).
260. See id. (stating that the ideal social regulatory policies seeks to protect
consumers from market failure).
261. See id. (asserting that the ideal form of free trade policies seeks to offer
consumers an increased selection of goods at lower prices).
262. See id. (commenting on the lack of voice foreign investors have in
domestic political and regulatory processes).
263. See Schaffer, supra note 258, at 31 (noting the differences between
constituent preferences and regulatory strategies and arguing that there is no reason
for attempting to harmonize such differences).
264. See discussion supra Part II.A (elaborating on the systemic differences
between U.S. and E.C. competition policies and subsequent difficulty in aligning
the two systems).
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recent GE/Honeywell case, highlights several differences in the
political, social, and economic objectives of the United States and
European Union in the aims of competition policy and antitrust
enforcement.265
With respect to the European Union, the history of the Common
Market serves to explain many of the peculiarities present in
contemporary policy.266  The creation and development of the
European Union and the Common Market itself finds much of its
foundation in rebuilding a war-tom continent following the end of
the Second World War and the desire for an economic unity and
interdependence, especially in the post-Cold War era.267 The central
goal of the European Economic Community, established in 1958,
aimed to establish an integrated common market as a means to
"promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between its Member States. 26s The European
Economic Community also sought to establish a system that would
guard against distortion to competition in the common market.269
Neither Articles 81 nor 82 are explicitly concerned with mergers,
though the Commission has made use of terms within these
provisions to control such transactions at a Community level as early
as 1973.27o The relatively late development of the ECMR in 1989
265. See discussion infra Part JJ.B (using the GE/Honeywell case to further
illustrate vital differences in the U.S. and E.C. competition laws).
266. See discussion supra Part I.B.l.a (discussing the domestic framework that
is the basis of current E.C. competition policies).
267. See Eric S. Hochstadt, The Brown Shoe of European Union Competition
Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 318 (2002) (describing the political and historical
background underlying the European Union's desire for both unity and
independence).
268. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
269. See id. art. 3(f) (listing the goal of establishing such a system as one of the
European Economic Community's intended objectives).
270. See Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. v. E.C. Commission, [1973] E.C.R.
215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199, 200-01 (1973) (drawing on Article 82's use of the term
"abuse" to include mergers for the first time); Case 142/84, British-American
Tobacco Co. Ltd v. E.C. Commission, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24,
51-52 (1988) (applying Article 81 to mergers under a 1966 Commission
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relies partly on the European focus on rebuilding the Member State
economies and becoming more competitive throughout the world,
rather than encouraging the type of growth associated with merger
activity."' At the point when the region became economically
unified, the focus shifted to ensuring that merger activities did not
erect market barriers in place of national barriers. The focus also
shifted to addressing deficiencies in Community law from the lack of
an exclusive framework for merger review. 2 Of particular concern
for this analysis, E.C. competition policy plays the role of ensuring
that private companies do not erect private barriers to trade, while
governmental actors and institutions seek to abolish national barriers
to trade.273
U. S. antitrust law, in contrast, tends to elevate consumer welfare
as the ultimate goal of competition regulation.274  The origins and
development of U.S. competition law, beginning with the
implementation of the Sherman Act and continuing with subsequent
Memorandum and holding that Article 81 could apply in transactions falling short
of a merger but resulting in closer ties between competitors); see also
WEATHERILL, supra note 76 , 940-43 (discussing the origins of the Commission's
application of Articles 81 and 82 to mergers).
271. See WEATHERILL, supra note 76, at 944 (explaining that European
Community legislation aimed to prevent mergers from disrupting the Community
market).
272. See id. (explaining the inadequacies of the existing Community law and
stating that the Merger Control Regulation represented a framework for analyzing
mergers, in which larger mergers would be regulated at the Community level, and
smaller mergers would be subject to the regulation of national authorities).
273. See generally Philip Marsden, The Divide on Verticals, in ANTITRUST GOES
GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION?, supra note 28, at
117, 117-38 (examining variances in the way one reviews vertical arrangements on
competition policy grounds in both America and Europe); Spencer Weber Waller,
Anticartel Cooperation, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT FUTURE FOR
TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION?, supra note 28, at 98, 98-116 (examining the
European and U.S. mechanisms for cartel investigation, and arguing that currently
there is no mechanism that would facilitate easy or significant cooperation for
purposes of cartel enforcement).
274. See Sarah Stevens, The Increased Aggression of the EC Commission in
Extraterritorial Enforcement of the Merger Regulation and its Impact on
Transatlantic Cooperation in Antitrust, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 263, 284-
85 (2002) (noting that, while U.S. antitrust law focuses on the consumer, at the
international level, a consensus does not exist as to the overall goals of competition
policy).
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legislation, explains much of the development of the consumer
orientation as a mechanism for combating trusts and preserving
competition for the benefit of consumers in the market.275  Few
would argue that maximizing consumer welfare has always been the
sole aim of U.S. competition law, but consumer welfare represents
the evolved aim of U.S. antitrust policy in its present form, resulting
from an "extensive history of case law, enforcement actions, and
guidelines. '276 In large part, U.S. antitrust law incorporates a pure
form efficiency-based analysis, whereas competition policy in the
European Community often serves as a mechanism for non-
efficiency related goals. 7  Interesting aspects of European
competition policy, especially evident in recent merger review
activity, is the sensitivity to, and focus on, the behavior of dominant
firms.27s As opposed to U.S. antitrust law that is more concerned
with ensuring a market structure not conducive to oligopoly price
fixing, E.U. competition law focuses more on preventing market
leaders from becoming dominant. 79  U.S. competition law,
especially evident in merger regulation, can best be summarized as
an inquiry into the impact of market activity on consumers,
analyzing market conduct that lowers output and raises prices. The
E.C. approach, however not only looks at the impact on consumers,
but further analyses the unfair competitive advantages and abuses of
dominant firms, irrespective of output and pricing efficiencies.280
275. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGs L.J.
871, 899 (1999) (arguing that Congress believed trusts and monopolies possessed
market power to raise prices, which would harm consumers).
276. See Hochstadt, supra note 267, at 321-22 (describing the sources
underlying the evolving nature of U.S. antitrust law and its goals).
277. See Stevens, supra note 274, at 285 (contrasting the U.S. efficiency-based
system, which focuses on consumers, to the European non-efficiency based
system, which also considers the competitive advantages large firms may realize).
278. See Hochstadt, supra note 267, at 319 (emphasizing that, historically,
European antitrust laws focused largely on dominant firm behavior).
279. See id. (elaborating on the inherent differences between the goals of U.S.
and European antitrust laws).
280. See generally Eleanor M. Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism: The
Vision of One World, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221 (1992) (presenting disharmonies
in the competition policies between the European Union and the United States and
providing a context for understanding the differences between the two systems);
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The recent diverging decisions by U.S. and E.C. competition
authorities over the GE/Honeywell merger proposal highlight many
of the differences present in contemporary antitrust policy in these
respective jurisdictions. U.S. regulators first reviewed the £28
billion proposal to make Honeywell a wholly owned subsidiary of
GE, both companies being American firms.28 ' The DOJ noted two
prime markets that the merger would have affected: 1) military
helicopter engines and 2) heavy maintenance, repair, and overhaul
("MRO") services for aircraft engines, and auxiliary power units
("APU").282 Though ultimately approving the merger, the DOJ
required the parties to divest Honeywell's helicopter engine business
due to its adverse affect on competition in the sector.283 The DOJ
also required the parties to authorize a different third-party MRO
service provider for various Honeywell aircraft engines and APUs, in
order to allow for more competition by introducing a new market
player.284 Four months after GE/Honeywell notified U.S. competition
authorities of the proposed transaction, the parties notified the
Commission, and the Commission responded by opening a full-scale
investigation. 285  Negotiations between the Commission and the
Fox, supra note 34, at 1-5 (examining the European and U.S. views of the world
competition issue and suggesting options for created world market access).
281. See Schmitz, supra note 91, at 565 (explaining that the DOJ reviewed the
proposed merger and decided not to challenge it).
282. See id. at 566 (noting the limited areas of investigation the DOJ explored,
as opposed to the European Commission's broader investigatory scope).
283. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department
Requires Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2,
2001) (describing the terms of the DOJ's requirements in the GE/Honeywell
merger), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2O01/8140.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004).
284. See id. (quoting the Director of Operations and Merger Enforcement for the
Antitrust Division as stating that '[w]ithout this divesture, the U.S. military would
likely have faced higher prices, lower quality and reduced innovation in the design,
development, and production of the next generation of advanced U.S. military
helicopter engines").
285. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Opens Full
Investigation into the General Electric/Honeywell Merger (Feb. 3, 2001) (advising
the public of the European Commission's plan to conduct a thorough assessment of
the merger's impact on competition),
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/2981
OAGED&lg=EN&display = (last visited Feb. 7, 2004); see also Donna E. Patterson
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parties failed to result in an acceptable compromise, leading the
Commission to, for the first time, block a merger already approved
by U.S. regulators."8 6 The Commission's decision accentuated the
differences in U.S and E.C. policy and analysis, most apparent in the
Commission's disregard for the helicopter and MRO service
markets, a factor that alarmed the DOJ.287 Rather, the Commission
identified numerous other markets that the merger would potentially
adversely affect in the Common Market, specifically the market for
jet aircraft engines, avionics, and engine starters.2 s Concerns over
the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in aircraft engine
sectors and bundling of the new company's products led to the
Commission's conclusion. 2 9  Given the lack of dominance the
market shares of the proposed entity would create, the Commission
relied heavily on GE's financial strength, a focus on pre-existing
dominance that justified the Commission's decision. 290  Further, in
addition to customary analysis of the proposal's effects on relevant
markets and assessments of horizontal and vertical effects, the
Commission also employed an analysis of how positions in unrelated
markets might be combined through bundling, even without clear
evidence such behavior would emerge. 29' The assessment of
& Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell. Causes and Lessons,
16 ANTITRUST 18, 22 (2001) (detailing GE's and Honeywell's efforts to provide
both U.S. and EU competition authorities with pertinent information prior to
merging, and the authorities' response to such information).
286. See Schmitz, supra note 91, 592-94 (discussing three recent challenges to
European Commission decisions). Both GE and Honeywell have launched
separate appeals to the Commission's decision in the Court of First Instance,
particularly addressing whether the Commission acted beyond the scope of the
Merger Regulation. Id. at 594.
287. See id. at 568 (reasoning that the Commission's lack of concern with the
helicopter and MRO services markets was not surprising, as they had little effect
on the Common Market).
288. See id. at 568-69 (comparing the Commission's lack of concern with the
helicopter and MRO service markets, to its concentration on other markets).
289. See id. at 576-77 (exploring the Commission's unprecedented concern with
bundling).
290. See id. at 585-86 (noting that, because the Commission did not determine
that GE and Honeywell would attain market dominance, a valid challenge to the
decision exists).
291. See Schmitz, supra note 91, at 586 (questioning the Commission's
methodology supporting its decision in the merger case). The Commission's
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completely different markets and the Commission's focus on
bundling and potential risks to unrelated markets underscore deeper
focuses of U.S. and E.C. competition policy, as well as post-merger
mechanisms available to address disruptive market effects.
GE/Honeywell judiciously identified the true differences in U.S.
and E.C. competition law policy.292 The United States has almost
uniformly recognized that its consumer welfare focus is the
fundamental difference.293  While the importance of consumer
protection is undoubtedly an important factor in European
competition policy, and one can argue that the Commission's
decision to block the merger was a consumer protection motivated
decision (i.e., blocking the creation of a dominant entity that could
have been detrimental to competition and consumers), consumer
welfare is the starting point and dominant, overriding interest of the
Chicago School-driven U.S. antitrust system.9  European
competition policy may in the end justify its decisions as consumer
oriented, but factors such as business protectionism and the
prevention of barriers in the Common Market serve as
correspondingly important factors as well.295  As discussed
previously, the substantial tests employed in merger assessment are
actually quite similar, as both analyze the consequences of the
merger for competition and whether or not it will affect
competition.296  The application of these questions, however,
highlights the difference in approaches, as consumer welfare is
analysis has been heavily criticized, especially in regards to the bundling issue and
whether such an assessment has a basis in the Merger Regulation, primarily for
adverse effects on legal certainty and its blurring of the distinction between merger
control and post-merger control through Article 82 investigations. Id.
292. See id. at 587 (asserting that the United States more clearly identified the
fundamental differences between its system, and that of Europe).
293. See id. (noting that the United States consistently insists that the division
between its system and Europe's is the U.S focus on consumer welfare).
294. See id. (acknowledging Europe's commitment to consumers, but
emphasizing the dominant position the United States retains in that respect).
295. See id. (noting that Europe missed the primary criticism U.S. lawyers
offered regarding Europe's main antitrust concerns).
296. See supra Part I.B. l.a-b (discussing the similar criteria and tests the U.S.
and E.C. use in assessing proposed mergers).
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clearly the starting point for the U.S. assessment, while the E.C.
emphasis differs.297
The contrast in a consumer focused U.S. approach and hybrid
focus of the European Community serves to explain many of the
procedural and substantive differences evident in recent merger
cooperative efforts.2 98 The role of judicial review provides one such
example. Whereas the Commission decides whether to allow a
merger to take place itself, subject to review by the Community
judicative, U.S. courts play a more direct role in merger review as
the entity charged with blocking the merger itself.2 99 In the event a
U.S. court determines a merger to "substantially lessen competition,"
the DOJ and FTC must seek an injunction and take mergers they
wish to prevent to trial in order to prevent such activity.300 As argued
by many scholars critical of the lack of judicial review in the
European Community when it comes to merger regulation, the U.S.
requirement that an agency must prove its case against a proposed
activity before an independent tribunal, rather than empowering an
agency to play both judge and jury deciding a matter on its own,
accounts for the sometimes profound analytical differences in U.S.
and E.C. merger decisions.3 0' Had the DOJ decided to block the
297. See Schmitz, supra note 91, at 587 (stating that the U.S. and European
tests, while rather similar, do not emphasize the same goal).
298. See James S. Venit & William J. Kolasky, Substantive Convergence and
Procedural Dissonance in Merger Review, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT
FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION?, supra note 28, at 79, 79-97
(discussing the opportunity recent multinational mergers have given to
practitioners desiring to compare the U.S. and European merger systems).
299. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 285, at 22 (stressing that the primary
process difference between the U.S. and Europe judicial systems is that the United
States needs to obtain consent from the judiciary to block a merger).
300. See id. (pointing out the fact that while U.S. authorities must obtain judicial
assistance in obtaining injunctions, the European Commission investigates,
prosecutes, and judges each case itself).
301. See, e.g., id. at 21 (positing that the U.S. procedural system played a
determinative role in the merger case outcome). Regarding the GE/Honeywell
conflicting decisions by U.S. and E.C. authorities:
[H]ad the DOJ sought an injunction barring the transaction [because the
merged parties would foreclose competitors by winning bids through
discounted prices on engines and component parts] ... it is very unlikely
that the Antitrust Division would have prevailed. Attacking a merger
based on fears of discounting would be quite a challenge before an
8292004]
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GE/Honeywell merger, it would have had to prove its case before a
federal court, as opposed to the Commission, which was able to
make the determination on its own, subject to appeal to the European
judicative. °2
A related and concrete example of procedural dissonance is the
role of third parties in the merger review process." 3 Under the E.C.
system, third parties play a unique role by raising objections in
special hearings and receiving access to relevant merger documents
not available to the general public.30 4 The oral hearing stage of the
Commission's investigation provides such an example, where the
merging parties must not only answer to the challenges of the
Commission, but also to the objections of third parties.30 5 The third
party competitors' access to highly relevant unpublished documents
in preparation for oral hearing further supplements their role.30 6 This
practice stands in sharp contrast to the more transparent U.S. system,
where only judicial proceeding material is available to the general
public in the event an injunction is sought, and where third parties
objective and independent court. U.S. courts long ago abandoned the
assumption that size alone inevitably leads to a diminution of
competition, and would have great difficulty classifying above-cost
discounting as anticompetitive. Lack of concern about the deal by large,
sophisticated buyers would have been another major problem for any
Division case.. . In short, with independent judicial oversight, with the
conventional rights of defense as one would enjoy before a court, and
with some burden on the government to actually establish the likelihood
of anticompetitive effects, even the most zealous prosecutors in the
United States do not bring cases like this one.
Id.
302. See id. (noting the lack of substantive European checks and balances at the
initial decision on whether to approve the merger at issue).
303. See Venit & Kolasky, supra note 298, 87-88 (detailing the role competitors
play in the U.S. and European merger review process).
304. See id. at 95 (noting that the practice of providing merger-related
information to competitors enhances the transparency of the proceedings).
305. See id. at 88 (relating various factors which stress the important role
competitors play in the merger process and that "competitors are normally given
the better part of a full day to attack the proposed merger, after the notifying
parties have made their defense to the commission's statement of objections").
306. See id. (explaining that competitors have abundant preparation time and
ample opportunity to attack a competitor's proposed merger).
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play a much less prominent role, if one at all.3°7 U.S. agencies
generally discount third party evidence while conducting
investigations and assessing proposed merger transactions, whereas
such evidence would be subject to cross-examination and rebuttal in
the European Community.30
In addition, the role of post-merger relief provides another
example of U.S. and E.U. differences.30 9 Private enforcement of
antitrust laws plays an important role in the United States, where
treble damages are available to successful plaintiffs.310 The ability of
third parties to bring cases against companies abusing dominant
positions explains largely why U.S. authorities are seemingly more
relaxed in approving certain mergers.3" In the GE/Honeywell case,
the U.S. decision to allow the merger to take place reflected much of
the reliance on post-merger litigation to address anticompetitive
effects that could have arisen, but were improbable enough to allow
the transaction to proceed.312 In contrast, the European Community
maintains a large amount of control over enforcement, especially
over Article 81, which makes it difficult for states and private parties
to enforce violations themselves without going through the
307. See id. at 88 (noting how the third party's opportunity in the European
Community to have a full day to attack the merger magnifies how the role of the
competitor far exceeds its place in the U.S. system).
308. See Venit & Kolasky, supra note 298, at 88 (explaining how in the
European Community the competitors may challenge the notifying party's
arguments and how the parties have to address the competitor's rebuttals).
309. See Hochstadt, supra note 267, at 309 (asserting that the European Union's
lack of post-merger relief may be the most significant procedural difference
between the European Union and the United States).
310. See id. 313-14 (explaining the pecuniary reason behind the prevalence of
U.S. private citizens seeking antitrust enforcement).
311. See id. at 309-14 (noting that the European Union's fears focused on the
likelihood of GE/Honeywell post-merger anticompetitive activities, due to the lack
of E.U. post-merger relief and explaining the diverse antitrust enforcement system
in the United States).
312. See id. at 315-17 (arguing that "[p]rivate enforcement of the antitrust law is
also positively correlated to an enforcement agency's degree of independence").
"It is logical to assume that private parties with remedial tools at their disposal will
be less inclined to pressure governmental agencies into action of some sort." Id.
20041
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Community level.3"3 While the upcoming enactment of Regulation
139/2004 will allow for more involvement by the Member States in
enforcing certain areas of E.C. competition law in state courts,
mergers of the required size remain within the sole discretion of the
Commission.3 14  The Commission's proposed reforms of this
provision allow for an increasingly litigation-based approach by de-
monopolizing the Commission's control over enforcing Article 81.315
In GE/Honeywell, the lack of meaningful third-party enforcement in
the post-merger context partly explains the Commission's focus on
potential, unforeseeable effects, as the Commission needed to
address such matters at an early stage rather than revisit the matter
itself at a latter stage through Article 82 investigations.3 6 Further
procedural differences in E.C. and U.S. competition law systems
include pre-notification procedures, thresholds triggering review,
timetables and deadlines governing both notification by the parties,
and the conduct of review by the respective governmental
agencies.31 7
313. See Weatherill, supra note 76, at 884-95 (explaining the role of the
Commission in enforcing antirust cases and explaining the powers of the
Commission). But see Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. I-
6297, [2001] (discussing the Courage Ltd. v. Berhard Crehan case). The "direct
effect" doctrine of the Courage decision provides a potential avenue for third
parties to enforce competition policy in a similar manner to the U.S. practices. Id.;
see also Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation
of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003
O.J. (L 1) 1, 2 [hereinafter Regulation 1/2003] (noting that national courts will also
play an important role in Community competition enforcement under Council
Regulation 1/2003, which goes into effect in May 2004).
314. See Regulation 1/2003, supra note 313, at 2 (outlining the Member States'
power to authorise their authorities and courts to apply competition laws).
315. See Hochstadt, supra note 267, at 310 (explaining that while the European
Community does not technically have the sole enforcement power in respect to
Articles 81 and 82, there is a lack of private enforcement).
316. See Schmitz, supra note 91, at 586 (assessing the lack of legal certainty
involved with the European Union's system of merger assessment, and the blurring
line between merger control and post-merger, which fall under E.C. Article 82
investigations).
317. See Venit & Kolasky, supra note 298, at 88-94 (elaborating on the
procedural dissonance between the U.S. and E.U. procedural methods involved in
investigating proposed mergers).
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The analysis employed by the respective antitrust authorities, the
role of the judicial system, and the roles of consumer welfare and
business protection are fundamental, and hence not easily
harmonized or converged.318 Coupled with the economic model that
seeks to describe how states act based on the interests of national
economies, difficulties in harmonizing competition law on a bilateral
basis become increasingly apparent while the case for the desirability
of such actions appears even more difficult to make.319 When taken
to a multinational forum, the inherent difficulties and differences
become even more pronounced.320
C. DIFFICULTIES IN MULTINATIONAL HARMONIZATION
AGREEMENT
On the surface, harmonization of laws purports to be a desirable
mechanism for promoting efficiency.321 Structuring a set of laws by
and among two or more states logically helps facilitate smooth, joint,
and simultaneous application, without the cacophony of
disagreements or opposing purposes.3 2 Yet efforts on a multilateral
scale for an international competition law system have fared with
much less success than bilateral agreements, such as the one between
the United States and European Community.323 As the previous
318. See Diane Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The
Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 391, 394-96 (2002) (discussing the major
substantive and procedural differences existing worldwide that make
harmonization difficult).
319. See id. at 398 (posing questions regarding economic harms inherent in the
current system versus those that may arise as unintended consequences of
harmonization).
320. See id. 396-97 (concluding that the three different tests used globally in
assessing proposed mergers are indicative of the difficulty that may arise in global
transactions)
321. See id. at 399 (hypothesizing that, currently, two global firms wishing to
merge may have to satisfy varying national requirements in different countries, and
concluding that merger enforcement harmonization would certainly reduce such
transactional costs).
322. See id. at 407 (suggesting that if harmonization efforts proceed, countries
will not be forced to sacrifice their own systemic values, and eventually they will
desire to follow the dominant U.S. and E.U. systems, without undue force).
323. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International
Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 557, 558-59
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section demonstrates, harmonization between states with similar
political and market systems has proven difficult, while initiating
cooperation and coordination have been more desirable
alternatives.324 Antitrust represents a set of highly held public values,
dearly held. These values are not a set of neutral principles upon
which all states can agree upon by gathering in good faith and
communicating precisely. 325 Thus, in an effort to better understand
the cooperative and coordinated nature of bilateral agreements, it is
important to note the significant limitations on harmonization
national differences impose, especially on a multilateral scale.326
This is of particular importance to those agreements between the
United States and European Community, as well as to the
extraterritorial enforcement of domestic competition law used as an
alternative to bilateral or multilateral harmonization.327
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a handful of
unsuccessful attempts to achieve a harmonized international law for
competition. 328  The ill-fated League of Nations made the first
attempt with an exploration of a system of controlling cartels, but
failed to adopt any such measures.32 9 The proposed International
Trade Organization ("ITO") of the Havana Charter, immediately
following the Second World War, contained detailed rules on the
substance and enforcement of competition law, and yet the United
(1994) (noting five failed previous international attempts at harmonizing
competition laws).
324. See discussion supra Part II.B (exploring the difficulty in harmonizing
competition laws).
325. See Waller, supra note 323, at 599-603 (arguing that a candid discussion
of norms and values, rather than the enactment of specific legal rules, would
increase the likelihood of attaining meaningful international harmonization).
326. See id. at 601 (expressing the belief that multinational states must first
overcome the difficult task of understanding each others' competition laws and
policies before they can make any effort to propose common competition laws).
327. See id. at 603 (stressing the importance of U.S. and E.U. national
competition laws through the fact that other nations see them as the model to be
used to develop multilateral competition laws).
328. See Waller supra note 323, at 558-59 (referencing previously failed
attempts at internationally harmonizing competition laws).
329. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 36 (1969)
(stating that the League of Nations made efforts to garner international agreement
on multiple issues of international economic relationships).
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States' refusal to ratify the Charter meant such rules would never
come into force.33 The United Nations ("U.N.") also made two
unsuccessful attempts at internationalizing a system of competition
law, including a revamped code of the ITO system under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
("UNESC"), and a coordinated non-binding code between the OECD
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD").331  The most recent efforts for international
harmonization have been made in the Doha Round negotiations at
the World Trade Organization ("WTO").332 The proposal has met
stark opposition from the United States, as have most other failed
attempts discussed. The current proposal will likely suffer a similar
fate.
Failed attempts at creating a competition law on an international
scale stem from difficulties inherent to competition law itself.333 The
330. The ITO, intended to supplement the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund to complete a liberal-post war economic order gave way to a
weaker General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") system that came into
effect without explicit rules on competition or with a sufficiently strong
mechanism for enforcement. The GATT system came into force with the tacit
understanding that competition issues would not be considered within the system.
See Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77
B.U. L. REV. 343, 350 (1997) (discussing the second attempt by the international
community to establish a truly harmonized competition law).
331. See The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for
Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10, reprinted
in 19 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 813 (1980). As Waller notes, the UNCTAD code is
of some significance given the difficulties and frustrations of negotiating a
multilateral competition law approach, as key blocs with incompatible objectives
developed and led an ineffective, watered down document that was unanimously
accepted by the United Nations General Assembly. Waller, supra note 350, at 350.
332. See World Trade Organization, Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, 9-14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (stressing the WTO as a "unique forum for
global trade rule-making and liberalization),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/minO 1_e/mindecle.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2004); Mario Monti, Commissioner for Competition Policy, A
Global Competition Policy, Address at European Competition Day (Sept. 17,
2002) (stating that the WTO is the best forum for a world competition policy),
available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPE
ECH/02/399[0]RAPID& 1 g=EN&display= (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
333. See Waller, supra note 330, at 395 (arguing that competition law is an
intimate reflection of a nation's values and goals). "Competition law has potent
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administration of an antitrust system stands as a reflection of
important economic values unique to every state administering such
laws and policies.334 Internationalizing such a system would be
highly inconsistent with the concept of national sovereignty and the
rights of individual states to enforce and carry out their own
competition rules.335  Though globalization and contemporary
business practices within the global market have taken their own toll
on national sovereignty and state regulatory administration, states are
still able to manage their own competition law systems through
abrogated means, such as bilateral cooperation agreements, that are
much less ambitious than that of an international competition law
system.336 Also, common norms on competition law are not easily
forged or created, especially in a multilateral sphere where a range of
dissimilar ideologies, governmental systems, and economic
philosophies are present.337 The example of the differing consumer
historical, economic, political, and social roots that make it a market nation's
ultimate form of public law." Id.
334. See id. (explaining why U.S. antitrust laws resemble constitutional
provisions and are hailed as a Magna Carta of free enterprise and the European
Union's competition provisions are contained in its constitutive treaties).
335. See id. at 384 (noting that nations view any form of transnational antitrust
enforcement as threatening their sovereignty, or more specifically, their business
sector's economic welfare).
336. See Waller, supra note 330, at 362 (noting that bilateral cooperation
agreements have been much more successful than multilateral ones and that the
United States has been the most zealous advocate of seeking such agreements).
337. See id. at 395 (explaining the difficulties associated with negotiating
agreements on competition law due to the differing values of the respective
societies). As Spencer Waller Weber observes:
Harmonization of antitrust law is not just an exercise in the reduction of
transaction costs. It is not like deciding which side of the road to drive
on, the color of traffic signals, or the shape of traffic signs, where it
probably does not matter ab initio what you decide as long as everyone
agrees on something. Competition law has potent historical, economic,
political, and social roots that make it a market nation's ultimate form of
public law. Short of reading a written constitution, a nation's competition
law will tell you the most about its economic and political system and
whether it puts its faith in commands of the government or the operation
of the market. That is why in the United States the antitrust laws are
quasi-constitutional in nature and hailed as a magna carta of free
enterprise. That is why the European Union placed its competition
provisions in its constitutive treaties. That is why competition law is not
[19:769
GLOBAL COMPETITION Go VERNANCE
based approach of the United States and the business protectionist
attitude of the European Community demonstrates some of the
complexities in harmonizing the laws of two political and
economically similar systems.338
Further, the resolve and interest in an international competition
law regime necessary for successful implementation may not actually
exist.33 9 As demonstrated through past failed efforts, the support may
be seemingly broad, but it is certainly not deep.340 Several factors
underlie this belief, particularly the infringement upon state
jurisdiction and the rights of states to initiate enforcement actions
when possible and necessary.3 41 Also, the watering down of any
proposed rules would almost certainly occur for a significant number
of states to agree upon any code. This would impound the "lowest
possible denominator" effect common in most multilateral
agreements, thereby leading to weak rules and potentially ineffective
something you negotiate about to reach a common text, unless the major
players are deeply committed to the same values.
Id.
338. But see Rex J. Adhar, Antitrust Policy in New Zealand: The Beginning of a
New Era, 9 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAW. 329, 335 (1992) (noting recent efforts in the
free trade area between Australia and New Zealand). Adhar reports that a free
trade area between Australia and New Zealand has been created and deepened,
national competition laws have been significantly harmonised, competition law
provisions have replaced antidumping law, and amendments have been made to
facilitate Trans-Tasman competition enforcement. Id. Such efforts stand as a
model for deep economic integration with little to no political integration and
present the possibility that competition laws may be quite unique and non-
transferable to other cultural or economic settings. Id. See generally, Maureen
Brunt, The Role ofAntitrust Policy in the Development ofAustralian-New Zealand
Free Trade, in 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST 131, 131-93 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993)
(analyzing Australian and New Zealand competition policy).
339. See Andre Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in International Merger Control, 20
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 233, 245 (2000) (noting that the primary obstacle to an
international competition law regime is convincing politicians representing
divergent national interests that agreement is in their national interest).
340. See Waller, supra note 330, at 349 (detailing the history of efforts by the
League of Nations, the ITO, the GATT, and the U.N. system, and the difficulties in
each to create a successful competition law regime).
341. See Fieberg, supra note 339, at 246 (suggesting that these issues could be
resolved if the threats to sovereignty were limited to cases with low political value
at the beginning).
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means of enforcement.342  Another factor of overwhelming
significance lies within the nature of developed competition law
systems where countervailing interests and pressures often exist, that
dilute a state's commitment to competition law in certain cases.343
Such counter-pressures include protectionist trade policies aimed at
limiting competition from foreign imports or investment, trade
initiatives favoring foreign export cartels, state subsidies for national
industries, regulation policies in certain sectors unconcerned With
competition, and even the level of commitment to the monopolies
established through intellectual property rights.344 Contemporary
calls for an international system of competition law by the
Commission represent a deeper issue and power struggle within the
Commission between the Member States and the Community.345
342. See Thomas L. Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger. The Return of
PorOfolio-Effects Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1331 (2003) (arguing that
because of the wide variety of antitrust regulations coming from each country, a
multilateral agreement will only legitimize the weak and ineffective rules).
343. See Waller, supra note 330, at 374 (listing some pressures such as
governmental and subgovernmental, business pressures, institutional pressures,
private interest groups, transnational coalitions, and international organizations).
344. See id. (noting that the competing interests will determine the rate and
nature of future progress).
345. See Opinion 1/94, Opinion on Community Competence to Conclude
Certain International Agreements, [1994] E.C.R 5267, 1 CEC (CCH) 153, 235-47
(1995) (explaining areas of joint and exclusive competence held by the
Commission). The European Commission's dominant strategy calling for deeper
harmonization and outright internationalization of competition law can be
attributed to the greater power it would derive through further efforts for
competition enforcement at the Community level. Id. The Commission is limited
to act only in areas of exclusive competence and to accomplish the objectives of
the EC Treaty only when Member States cannot achieve such objectives. Id. The
tension between Member State action and the Community level can be viewed
within the twenty-five year period before the passage of the Merger Regulation as
the Commission continually lobbied for such legislation and took steps through
judicially sanctioned interpretations of Articles 81 and 82 to effectuate
Community-level merger review. Id. The Commission stands to gain a significant
amount of power should its call for internationalization of competition law be held
through the WTO, as the ECJ has already approved a sizeable role for the
Commission in the WTO. The Commission's push for competition law to be
pursued by the WTO has been highly publicized through speeches by
Commissioners, a published report, and even a proposal for the WTO to develop
international competition law rules. Id.
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Focused, non-binding recommended practices represent the major
contribution of international efforts to pragmatic and useful merger
review practice. The OECD has played a central role in these efforts,
while the recently created International Competition Network
("ICN") has shown signs of promise for contributing to the area.
The OECD and its Competition Law and Policy Committee have
been instrumental in the promotion of competition, specifically
through a series of recommendations on bilateral soft cooperation.
The first generation of these recommendations were adopted by the
OECD in 1967346 and 1973, 347 specifically in response to a 1960
Report of a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
group of experts expressing growing concern over United States
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. These recommendations
provided a principle of traditional comity, notification by states
investigating competition issues to other states with important
interests in the investigation, calls for coordination in procedures
against the same anticompetitive business practices, and advise states
to share information.34 Significantly, these recommendations were
non-binding and called for cooperation to the extent permitted under
346. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION AND DEV., COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Oct. 5, 1967), reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 1309 (1969) [hereinafter 1967 RECOMMENDATION].
347. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION AND DEV.,COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
CONCERNING A CONSULTATION AND CONCILIATION PROCEDURE ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE C (73) 99 (Final) (July 3,
1973) [hereinafter 1973 RECOMMENDATION], reprinted in 19 ANTITRUST BULL.
283 (1974).
348. 1967 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 347 (providing a list of
reocmmendations for member countries to follow in order to promote an
environment conducive to free competition); 1973 RECOMMENDATION, supra note
347 (same). It should be noted the OECD adopted an additional recommendation
in 1979, though the document adds nothing new and seems to be a reminder to
member countries of the basic comity principle at the height of the Uranium case.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION AND DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL
CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE C (79) 154 (Final) (Sept.
25, 1979), reprinted in ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION AND DEV., COMPETITION
LAW ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE COLLECTION OF
INFORMATION 78 (1984).
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domestic law.3 49 The second generation of these recommendations
came into effect in the 1986 Recommendation, which is
substantively identical to the prior documents, but contains an
appendix remedying the lack of precision of its predecessors through
detailed procedures and guidelines.350 The latest development came
in the 1995 Recommendation, which places particular emphasis on
mergers at the height of the 1990s merger wave and reflects a greater
concern for efficient cooperation and coordination of investigations
through additional guidelines.3 51 The OECD Recommendations have
enjoyed a great amount of success as a tool for soft bilateral
cooperation, evolving from defensive agreements, to weak
cooperation, to active cooperation and positive comity.
In addition, the ICN has proved to be a potentially useful tool for
modest soft harmonisation at the international level. Composed of
state competition agencies, the ICN provides a network for
addressing practical issues of concern and attempts to facilitate
procedural and substantive convergence. In a relatively short
period of operation, the ICN has published Guiding Principles for
Merger Notification and Review353 and Recommended Practices for
349. OECD JOINT GLOBAL FORUM ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, JOINT GLOBAL
FORUM ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, MODALITIES FOR VOLUNTARY
COOPERATION 1, OECD Doc. CCNM/GF/COMP/TR(2003)l1 (Apr. 01, 2003)
(noting how the OECD principly functions as "a forum for voluntary co-operation
in the form of policy dialogue"), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/0/4b5b2743398d264bc l256cfc0028c lb
b/$FILE/JT00141961.PDF (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
350. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION AND DEV., COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE C (86) 44 (Final) )June
5, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1629 (1986).
351. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPEARTION AND DEV., COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION
CONCERNING COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES ON RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE C (95) 130 (Final) (July
27-28), 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1313 (1996)..
352. Int'l Competition Network, About the ICN (discussing the purposes of the
ICN), at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/aboutus.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2004).
353. Int'l Competition Network, Guiding Principles for Merger Notification and
Review (listing the eight guiding principles), at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/icnnpguidingprin.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2004).
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Merger Notification Procedures,354 which have already had in impact
in the EC through recent Merger Regulation reforms.355
Competition law harmonization poses significant difficulties and
problems on both a bilateral and multilateral scale as issues discussed
in this section demonstrate. The cooperative and coordinative
agreements and networks established between the United States and
European Community stand as both a testament of success in regards
to a difficult issue, as well as an indicator of how difficult
competition law harmonization remains, even between the most
similar economic and political systems.356  The contemporary
practices of global market participants, which a global competition
law system would seek to regulate and bilateral cooperative
agreements have emerged to control, suffer from significant defects
and shortcomings.357  This necessitates alternative state action,
specifically the extraterritorial application of domestic competition
law.358  This gap-filling mechanism remains an important and
effective medium for the contemporary administration of
competition law, especially within the United Stats and European
Community, and will likely form the basis for future action until
harmonization or convergence can occur.359
354. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES (addressing the seven areas that the private and public
sectors have identified as the most pressing in international competition), available
at http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/2003-practices.pdf (last visited
Apr. 12, 2004).
355. See infra sec. II.B.
356. See supra notes 281-302 and accompanying text (explaining how the
different decisions the U.S. and E.U. authorities reached in the GE/Honeywell
merger highlight the deep differences between two seemingly systems).
357. See supra notes 259-263 and accompanying text (detailing the difficulties
of bilateral harmonization in the U.S. - E.C. model).
358. See Ariel Ezrachi, Globalization of Merger Control: A Look at Bilateral
Cooperation through the GE/Honeywell Case, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 397, 408 (2002)
(discussing the international effects of extraterritorial application of competition
laws).
359. See id. (arguing that the extraterritoriality of competition laws serves "as
the perfect non-diplomatic, undetected platform from which to advance local
economic and industrial considerations under the mask of legal arguments").
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D. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF STATE
COMPETITION LAW: THE ECONOMIC MODEL IN FORCE
As the economic model discussed in section II.A holds, powerful
states with large economies attractive to foreign producers enjoy a
great capacity to apply their own competition law on an
extraterritorial basis.36 This model has developed into the common
practice of both the United States and the European Community."
This activity explains much of the success of the 1991/98 U.S. - E.C.
Agreement as well as the persisting improbability for international
consensus and agreement or harmonization of competition policy
beyond a certain level.362
1. United States Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law
The extraterritorial application of competition law in the United
States closely follows the development of the U.S. market and the
strength of the U.S. economy in the global arena. As the economic
model denotes, states with the capacity to apply competition laws on
an extraterritorial basis in order to protect domestic markets often do
so, whereas states lacking the ability to engage in such enforcement
are left without such an option.363 Similarly, the development of U.S.
statutory and common law doctrine on the use of extraterritoriality
reflects this growth and emergence of the U.S. economy.
360. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1506 (explaining that countries vary in
their ability to apply their laws extraterritorially, and that if a firm has a small
amount of assets in a country, that country will probably not be able to exert
control over that firm).
361. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 627, 682-83 (2001) (noting that "extraterritorial application of
competition laws has been legitimated").
362. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy
at the World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 585, 603 (2001)
(explaining that although there is near unanimity that there should be competition
agreements to fix prices and divide markets, countries agree on little else).
Kennedy states that differences exist on mergers, resale price maintenance, parallel
imports, vertical restraints, and abuse of a dominant position. Id.
363. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1506 (providing examples of differences in
countries' ability to apply their laws extraterritorially).
364. See, e.g., Russell J. Davis, Extraterritoral Application of Federal Antitrust
Laws to Acts Occurring in Foreign Commerce, 40 A.L.R. 343 (2004) (describing
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Following several years of inactivity and reluctant enforcement of
the Sherman Act, the U.S. Supreme Court took on the issue of
extraterritoriality in the 1909 case of American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.365 In an action involving the confiscation and damaging of
a banana plantation in Costa Rica, the Supreme Court adopted a strict
territorial approach, or "vested rights" theory.366 It held that the
Sherman Act could not regulate the alleged monopolization scheme
as the seized plantation lay within the defacto jurisdiction of Costa
Rica and the injury occurred outside of the jurisdiction of the United
States.3 67 The formulation of the strict territoriality rule that would
govern the Court for the next thirty years came through Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' holding that "the general and almost
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done."368
The strict territoriality approach did not last long in the United
States, as jurisdictional doctrines developed that brought actions
taking place abroad with an anticompetitive effect on the U.S. market
and U.S. corporations within the scope of U.S. law.369 The United
States adopted the intended effects doctrine in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa) in 1945, a case involving judicial
interpretation of whether Congress intended U.S. antitrust laws to
apply to parties located outside of the United States.370 In this case,
comprehensively the statutes and cases involving U.S. federal antitrust laws that
have been applied extraterritorially).
365. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
366. See id. at 356 (stating that the exercise of jurisdiction over acts that
occurred in another country or territory would be unjust and contrary to principle
of international comity).
367. See id. at 357-58 (stating that "we think it entirely plain that what the
defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far
as the present suit is concerned").
368. Id. at 356 (quoting Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126
(1903)).
369. See infra notes 370-373 and accompanying text (providing examples of
case law demonstrating the development of the judicial doctrine).
370. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (holding that, in some circumstances, it is proper to balance the effect of
restrictions in a contract with its industrial or commercial advantages, but that it is
not proper when a contract is made with intent to establish a monopoly).
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the U.S. government challenged Alcoa's monopolization of interstate
and foreign commerce and also challenged a related conspiracy in
Canada that utilized a quota agreement with its Canadian subsidiary
limited and several other European corporations, creating an
international cartel known as the "Alliance. 37' Judge Learned Hand,
after taking into account American Banana's traditional territorial
approach "for conduct which has no consequences within the United
States," stated that "it is settled law.., that-any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends; and not these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize." '372 Out of this general proposition, Judge Learned Hand
denoted the intended effects doctrine, which holds that U.S. courts
may assert jurisdiction over any foreign firm whose activity is
intended to affect, and actually does affect, the domestic market of
the United States.3 73 The U.S. Supreme Court would later officially
adopt this rule and reject the strict territorial approach of American
Banana in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.374
Following the Alcoa decision, both the judiciary and the
legislature focused the scope of the doctrine of extraterritoriality for
the United States to enforce competition policy beyond its domestic
jurisdiction. The first instance came through the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, where the
Alcoa decision came under scrutiny for not taking into account a
comity analysis of other nations' interests.375 In Timberlane, the
Court scaled back the intended effects doctrine, adopting a tripartite
test to determine whether it should enforce extraterritoriality. The
Court stated that: (1) there must be an effect, actual or intended, on
American foreign commerce in the alleged restraint, (2) the effect
371. Id. at 440 (stating that there was some evidence that Alcoa took part in the
formation of the "Alliance").
372. Id. at 443.
373. See id. at 444 (stating.that both agreements would have been unlawful if
they were made in the United States, and so it follows that both were unlawful
even if made abroad because they were intended to affect, and did affect, imports).
374. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
375. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (1976)
(stating that the Sherman Act is not limited to trade restraints which have both a
direct and substantial effect on our foreign commerce).
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must be sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury, and (3) the
court should determine whether the interest of the United States are
sufficiently strong over the interest of other nations to justify the
extraterritorial assertion of authority.376 In addition, Congress
weighed in on the debate through the 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act stating that a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce from the activity in question
must exist in order for the United States, under the Alcoa test, to
assert jurisdiction over export commerce or wholly foreign
conduct.377
The Supreme Court considered these statutory and jurisprudential
standards for comity in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California with the
Court formulating a new true conflicts principal for
extraterritoriality.378  In Hartford Fire, the Court upheld the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign or
multinational corporations in violation of U.S. antitrust law while
operating in the U.S. market without considering the interests of the
foreign sovereign state.379 In effect, the comity requirements of
Timberlane do not bar the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law and a
U.S. court should only consider comity where a "true conflict" exists
between U.S. and foreign law.38° A "true conflict" does not exist
"where a person subject to regulations by two states can comply with
the laws of both. 381
376. See id. at 613 (noting that the third prong of the test was the most
complicated because in some cases, the application of the direct effects test in the
international context might open the door too wide while at other times, it may
cause the dismissal of a case "closing the jurisdictional door too tightly").
377. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a.(1)
(2000).
378. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (examining
whether or not the principle of international comity precluded the district court
from applying Sherman Act jurisdiction to the actions of foreign reinsurers).
379. See id. at 765 (stating that the only substantive issue in the case was
whether there was a conflict between domestic and foreign law).
380. See id. at 799 (stating that the reinsurers did not claim that British law
required them to act in a way prohibited by US law).
381. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e (1987)). In dissent, Justice Scalia argued against the
Court's interpretation of the Restatement's rule, stating that:
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The Hartford Fire decision has resulted in a general state of
confusion for the principles and criteria for U.S. extraterritorial
competition law enforcement. By holding that courts should only
consider comity when a direct conflict exists, the decision
substantially reduced the role of comity, and the Timberlane comity
analysis has lost much of its significance.382 While some courts
continue to utilize the comity analysis of Timberlane and others
reject the formula completely, the Hartford Fire decision indicates
the focus of the Supreme Court on U.S. national antitrust interests
and the application and enforcement of extraterritoriality over the
issues of comity and those of other states.383
Several factors explain the aggressive state of U.S. extraterritorial
enforcement from Alcoa onwards. As the economic model
describes, the United States' behavior is not surprising. 384 Given the
power of the U.S. economy and the relative significance of the
United States in the global marketplace, the options for undertaking
extraterritorial enforcement are more readily available to the United
Under the Restatement, a nation having some 'basis' for jurisdiction to
prescribe law should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction
'with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state
when the exercise of such jurisdiction would be unreasonable .... Rarely
would these factors point more clearly against application of United States
law.. .[Therefore, it is] unimaginable that an assertion of legislative
jurisdiction by the United States would be considered reasonable, and
therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the absence of statutory indication
to the contrary, that Congress has made such an assertion.
Id. at 818-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further argued that the true
conflict analysis formulated by the majority was "breathtakingly broad" and would
"bring the Sherman Act into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate
interests of other countries - particularly our closest trading partners." Id. at 820.
382. See William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an
International Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 989, 1010 (2002) (explaining
that district courts have disputed how to interpret the Alcoa effects test and the
Timberlane comity factors).
383. See id. (stating that the Supreme Court substantially reduced the role of
comity).
384. See discussion supra Part II.A (describing an economic model that governs
competition law and stating that a country's ability to exercise control over firms
correlates with the degree to which such firms are dependent on its markets).
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States.385 The increase in transnational business enterprises, a
majority of which conduct some form of business in the United
States, in the post-World War II era and especially over the past
twenty years, has made extraterritoriality an integral and necessary
part of U.S. competition policy, given the United States' capacity to
act extraterritorially and its desire to protect the competitive nature of
the U.S. marketplace.386 The relative political dominance of the
United States is also a factor, as is the lack of any adequate
international machinery to address transnational competition
problems.387 In fact, the lack of such an international mechanism is
primarily due to economic and political position of the United States
and its capacity for extraterritorial competition law enforcement.388
The United States has not been persuaded that there is a need for
such an organization and has seemingly undermined any attempts at
accomplishing such an end.389 The persuasive and coercive power of
extraterritoriality coupled with the facility for acting in such a
manner best justifies the United States' adoption and enforcement of
extraterritoriality in the past and for the future.3 90
2. European Community Extraterritorial Application of Competition
Law
Developing in a fashion similar to that of the United States,
extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust law by the European
385. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1506 (stating that a country has
considerable leverage over foreign firms where the firms have substantial assets
and conduct a large segment of their business in that country).
386. See id. at 1521 (arguing that the ability of a particular state to enforce its
laws beyond its borders antitrust laws).
387. See id. (noting that because developing nations lack market power these
nations have a difficult time enforcing their competition laws abroad).
388. See id. at 1536-38 (noting that after WWII, the United States was the only
country that was in a strong position to apply its laws extraterritorially).
389. See id. (noting that the developing countries' efforts to establish an
international agreement is a sharp contrast to the position of the United States).
390. See id. (observing that because of the United States' favorable position, it
does not have a strong incentive to engage in international agreements dealing with
competition law).
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Community plays an integral role in E.C. competition policy. 91
Although, the evolution of extraterritoriality in E.C. law is a
relatively recent phenomenon with the first exercise of such only
taking place in 1988, recent activity by the Commission and the ECJ
indicate a trend towards aggressive contemporary extraterritorial
enforcement.392 Like the United States, concerns over international
comity have become second to enforcement and protection of the
E.C. market.3 93 As predicted by the economic model, the European
Community holds a position to enforce its competition policies in an
extraterritorial manner and does so accordingly based on its
economic importance in the world marketplace. 94
Mirroring the economic growth and integration of the E.C. market
and the refinement of the extraterritoriality principle in general,
extraterritoriality gradually became accepted practice in the
European Community. The argument for enforcing Community law
against conduct undertaken in non-Member States with harmful
effects on the Common Market was set forth as early as 1972 by the
Commission in Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Commission,
though the ECJ at that time adopted a more cautious approach and
effectively avoided answering the question.3 95 In 1998, the ECJ
adopted the principle of extraterritoriality in Wood Pulp Cartel,
holding a foreign-based export cartel that sold products in the
391. See infra notes 395-404 and accompanying text (summarizing the
extraterritorial application of E.C. competition law).
392. See infra notes 396-397 and accompanying text (referencing the decision
in Wood Pulp Cartel, where the ECJ applied the principle of extraterritoriality, and
tracing the development of this doctrine through various other cases).
393. See infra notes 396-403 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases where the concern for the EU market arguably superseded concerns for
international comity)
394. See Guzman, supra note 217, at 1506 (explaining that as firm's assets and
its frequency of transactions increases in a particular country, that country's ability
to regulate foreign activity increases).
395. See Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Commission, [1972] E.C.R.
619, paras 120-147 (1972) (noting that the behaviors implicated occurred in a
third county and holding that this was illegal based upon their effects on the
common market of the products).
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common market subject to the jurisdiction of E.C. law.396 The ECJ
based jurisdiction on the fact that "[t]he producers in this case
implemented their pricing agreement within the Common Market"
and found that it was immaterial that they used "subsidiaries, agents,
sub-agents, or branches within the Community" for making "their
contacts with purchasers within the Community."3 97 The Wood Pulp
Cartel decision indicates that the reach and enforcement of E.C.
competition law on an extraterritorial basis is seemingly co-existent
with the U.S. formulation.3 98
The Commission's use of international comity in decisions to act
extraterritorially is also reflective of U.S. law.3 99  Though the
European Community has formally adopted the 1986 OECD
Recommendation for extraterritorial application of competition laws
focusing on giving "effect to the principles of international law and
comity and to use moderation and self-restraint,"400 the ECJ has
adopted an approach similar to that of the United States in the
Hartford Fire decision.40 1 The CFI's decision in Gencor Ltd. v.
Commission, a case involving the merger of South African Platinum
Mining Companies, bears much resemblance to Hartford Fire, with
the ECJ holding that the Commission could apply Community law to
a proposed concentration with offices and productive operations
lying outside of the common market. 40 2 The "mere sale within the
396. See Case 89/95, AhIstrom v. Commission, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4
C.M.L.R. 901, 908 (1988) (holding that foreign-based companies could be subject
to these regulations when selling products in the common market).
397. Id. at 941.
398. See discussion supra Part II.D.1 and accompanying text (explaining major
tenets of US extraterritorial competition law).
399. Compare supra notes 374-383 and accompanying text, with infra notes
402-405 and accompanying text (providing examples of the extraterritorial
application of laws in the United States and the European Community).
400. Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation
Between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting Trade,
OECD Doc. No. C (86) 44 (Final) (May 21, 1986)).
401. See supra notes 378-383 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's
decision in Hartford Fire).
402. See Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, [1999] E.C.R. 11-753,
para. 78-88 (1999) (holding that the court could apply community law to
undertakings with registered offices and mining and production operations outside
the Community); see also Stevens, supra notes 274, at 279 (noting the ECJ's
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Community" was held to be enough for E.C. law to apply, regardless
of the location of the sources of supply or production. 4°3 Further, the
ECJ went on to hold that the application of the Merger Regulation is
compatible with international law when "it is foreseeable that a
proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect
in the Community.' '4°4  The similarities between Gencor and
Hartford Fire supports the idea that the doctrinal foundations for
Commission and E.C. extraterritorial enforcement bear great
similarity to the grounds on which U.S. antitrust law relies on for its
use extraterritoriality. °5
The Commission and the Directorate General's recent activities
have enforced the notions of the ECJ on international comity and
highlight many of the contentious issues associated with
extraterritorial competition law enforcement.4 6  Of notable
importance is the 1997 Commission initiation of an in-depth Phase II
investigation into the proposed acquisition of McDonnell Douglas
Corporation by Boeing Company on the suspicion the proposed
merger could adversely affect the common market. 407 Significantly,
McDonnell Douglas and Boeing were both U.S. companies, neither
rejection of the argument that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to intervene in a
concentration taking place in a non-member country, where that country had
permitted the concentration).
403. Gencor Ltd., [1999] E.C.R. 11-753 at para. 87.
404. Id. at para. 90.
405. See Stevens, supra note 274, at 281 (noting that the similarity between the
Gencor decision and the Hartford decision further reinforces the legitimacy of the
Commission's enforcement objectives).
406. See infra notes 407-410 and accompanying text (providing an example of
proposed mergers that shows the potential conflicts between comity and
extraterritorial application of laws).
407. See Press Release, European Commission, Commission Begins an In-depth
Investigation of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger (Mar. 19, 1997)
(announcing that the European Commission would start the second phase of
proceedings under E.C. Merger Regulation and that in particular, it would examine
how the potential merger would strengthen Boeings strong position in the market
for commercial jet aircraft), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=-gt&doc=IP/9
7/236101AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited Feb. 8, 2004); see also Stevens,
supra note 274, at 266 (mentioning that the European Community held a Phase II
investigation into the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger based on the argument
that the merger may be incompatible with the common market).
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of which had production assets in the European Community.4 °8
Further, the FTC in the United States had already made a ruling that
McDonnell Douglas no longer constituted a meaningful competitive
force and that the proposed merger would not adversely affect
competition or lead to a monopoly in defense and commercial
aircraft markets. 40 9 Though the Commission eventually allowed the
merger to proceed, the assertion of jurisdiction by the European
Community was significant in that it heralded it's willingness to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over corporations and activities
outside of the common market.410
The Commission's actions in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
foreshadowed further extraterritorial interventions by the European
Community. The most notable of these high profile interventions
include the Commission's blocking of a proposed merger between
two U.S. telecommunication firms, MCI WorldCom and Sprint Corp
in 1999.411 Though the DOJ set down a similar ruling prohibiting the
408. See Christopher Carey, Europeans Ask Bloc for Boeing Rejection;
Resistance Could Delay Deal by Several Months, ST. Louis POST- DISPATCH, July
17, 1997, at IC (noting that U.S. Congressmen and other officials were angered by
the E.U. action because Boeing/McDonnell Douglas are based in the U.S. and have
no contacts with the European markets other than sales to the European market),
1997 WL 3354510; see also Stevens, supra note 274, at 266 (noting that neither
companies were European, and that the Commission's decision became an
international controversy).
409. See Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D.
Steiger, Roscoe B Starek III and Christine A. Varney in the Matter of The Boeing
Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation (explaining that "[w]ith respect to -the
commercial aircraft sector, our decision not to challenge the proposed merger was
a result of evidence that (1) McDonnell Douglas, looking to the future, no longer
constitutes a meaningful competitive force in the commercial aircraft market and
(2) there is no economically plausible strategy that McDonnell Douglas could
follow, either as a stand-alone concern or as part of another concern, that would
change that grim prospect"), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/boeingsta.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2004).
410. See Press Release, European Commission, The Commission Clears the
Merger Between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Under Conditions and
Obligations (July 30, 1997) (stating that the E.C. permitted the acquisition and
outlining the E.C.'s conditions for their approval) available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/9
7/729101AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
411. See Schmitz, supra note 92, 363-65 (describing the Commission's
disapproval of the MCI WorldCom and Sprint agreement, and stating that after the
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merger over fears of reduced competition, the MCI/Sprint decision
by the Commission is significant in that it marked the first time the
Commission rejected an entirely non-European merger.412
Contention between U.S. and E.C. competition authorities reached
new heights in 2001 with the Commission's decision to block the
proposed GE/Honeywell merger.413 The distinguishing characteristic
of this decision derives from the fact that DOJ had already approved
the transaction and that the Commission blocked the merger despite
the contrary ruling from US authorities.414
Of notable importance to the present legal state of extraterritorial
enforcement of competition law by the European Community is the
recent collision between the Commission and the CFI over certain
Commission merger decisions.415  The relative youth of
extraterritorial doctrines in the European Community, coupled with
the new found zeal of the Commission under the leadership of
Commissioner Mario Monti, has led to several interesting
developments. Since Commissioner Monti entered into office in
1999, the Commission has blocked no less than five mergers,
compared to ten over the course of the preceding decade, increasing
the average blocking rate from two to six per year.416 This
parties received a negative verdict from the Commission, they abandoned their
proposal).
412. See id at 364 (stating that the case's prominence is largely because it was
the first U.S. corporate merger that the United States prohibited).
413. See Ruffner, supra note 342, at 1285-87 (describing the E.C. decision and
highlighting why the decision was revolutionary in the development of competition
law).
414. See id. at 1286 (explaining that the European Community's decision to
intervene was the realization of one of the worst fears of American companies).
The Commission's decision in the GE/Honeywell case has been appealed to the
Court of First Instance and may possibly be overturned based on recent decisions
by the CFI. See Case T-209/01, Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Commission, 2001 O.J.
C331/23 (2001) (indicating that Honeywell is appealing the decision); see also
Case T-210/01, General Electric Inc. v. Commission, 2001 O.J. C331/24 (2001)
(stating that General Electric is also appealing the decision).
415. See infra note 417 and accompanying text (providing an example of a case
where the CFI overruled the Commission's decision involving a proposed merger).
416. See James Arnold, Mario Monti: Merger Man on a Mission, BBC NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2002 (analyzing Commissioner Monti's new focus on competition issues
and willingness to block deals), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/2385037.stm (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
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aggressive enforcement, part of which extends into the sphere of
extraterritoriality, spawned a series of decisions by the CFI. These
decisions, including the Tetra Laval BV v. Commission case where
the CI overruled a Commission decision that blocked a proposed
merger, denote two important points, namely that the court will in
fact act to overrule the Commission on merger decisions, and that
such decisions will not necessarily face a lengthy judicial process
before a decision is rendered.4"7
The European Communities recent actions and its utilization of
extraterritoriality rest on several factors that are comparable to the
reasoning behind the aggressive nature of U.S. extraterritorial
competition law enforcement. Extraterritoriality did not become a
functioning part of E.C. competition law until relatively recently,
largely due to fact that internal market had not completed its gradual
development until 1992, and E.C. merger review is fairly new in
general.41 8 Similar to what is to be expected under the economic
model, the European Community did not incorporate a policy of
extraterritoriality until it was both sufficiently conjoined into a single
market and occupied a position of strength and power in the global
marketplace. 1 9 Until the ECJ decided Wood Pulp Cartel, the
European Community was more concerned with protecting the
Common Market from impediments from within.420  The breaking
417. See Case T-80/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4519,
paras. 32-43 (2002) (examining the applicant's claim that there was a lack of legal
basis for the divesture decision due to the illegality of the prohibition decision);
Case T-342/99, Airtours plc. v. Commission, [2002] O.J. C191/24 (2002)
(annulling the Commission's decision which declared that the concentration at
issue was incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement); Case
T-77/02, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. 11-4201, para. 46
(2002) (annulling the Commission's decision which had ordered the separation of
the undertakings).
418. See Schmitz, supra note 91, at 551-53 (noting that while the U.S. Clayton
Act enshrined the U.S. merger control rules in 1914, the European Community did
not enact its Merger Control Regulation until 1990).
419. See Fox, supra note 34, at 2 (noting that the European Economic
Community addressed many challenged in the mid 1950's, and one of its important
goals was to take the "parochialism" out of trade and competition with its own
market).
420. See, e.g. id. at 2 (stating that after the adoption of the Treaty of Rome,
"German sugar growers could not cartelize to keep out French and Belgian sugar,
and vice versa; nor could the French, the Germans and the Belgians agree with one
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point, wherein extraterritoriality became necessary and
organizationally feasible, did not occur until the late 1980s.42" ' At
that point, globalization was in full force and competition policy
goals demanded protection through enforcement beyond the
domestic share of the common market.4
22
Significant convergence on the general principles of
extraterritoriality and international comity between the United States
and European Community has occurred through their respective
developments of the competition policy and contemporary
enforcement.423 In the same sense that both jurisdictions began with
strict territoriality as the basis for competition law enforcement, both
jurisdictions moved away from this principle to that of
extraterritoriality in the same form.424 The effects doctrine of U.S.
law and the implementation doctrine of the E.C. law are of striking
similarity, and as a former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the
Antirust Division put it, "very close to, if not indistinguishable from"
one another.425 On the issue of international comity, both the United
States and European Community have experienced the phenomenon
another that each would keep its home territory for itself."). "British Telecom
could not obstruct the flow of telephone signals through the United Kingdom.
State action, as well as private action, is subject to limits for the good of the
community." Id.
421. See, e.g., Case 89/95, Ahlstrom v. Commission, [1988] E.C.R. 5193,
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988) (providing an example of one of the first cases
wherein the European Commission adopted the principal of extraterritoriality and
held that a foreign-based export cartel that sold products in the common market
was subject to its jurisdiction).
422. See generally Fox, supra note 34, at 3 (arguing that since business is
increasingly global, it is not longer an easy task to distinguish between national
and foreign business).
423. See Sugden, supra note 382, at 1031 (noting that the European response to
the Wood Pulp Cartel, IBM, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, and GE/Honeywell
shows the similarities between the E.C. and U.S. systems).
424. See Joseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and
Cooperation, 178 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 353, 377 (1994) (noting the similarities
between the "implement" vs. "effects" test and analyzing its implications for the
future).
425. See id. at 377 (quoting the Charles Rule and stating that Sir Leon, the then
Commisioner in charge of E.C. competition policy, disagreed with the contention
that the Wood Pulp decision was similar to the "effects" test that the U.S. courts
apply).
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that the widening of extraterritorial competition law enforcement
narrows the importance of comity concerns.4 26 As the GE/Honeywell
merger case demonstrates, the expansion of extraterritorial
enforcement has been at the cost of comity.427 This natural and
necessary outcome bears a direct correlation between the degree of
extraterritorial enforcement perceived within a jurisdiction's legal
capacity and the amount of deference that jurisdiction will give to
concerns over international comity.428
As this chapter has argued, the use of extraterritoriality by the
United States and European Community represents a necessary and
economically justifiable response to the demands of a globalized
marketplace and the limits of traditional notions of state and
domestic market sovereignty.429  Inherent obstacles impose
overwhelming difficulties to harmonizing the competition laws of
different jurisdictions, even in the case of the two most similar and
highly developed systems found in the United States and European
Community, as well as for the creation of a global competition law
system that is neither wanted by the United States nor economically
desirable for the global marketplace.430 The questions remain as to
what is the most effective way to proceed in the area of U.S. - E.C.
competition law cooperation, to the sphere of developing
competition law on a global scale, and to future cooperation in
426. See Sugden, supra note 382, at 1013 (arguing that "there is a direct
correlation between the degree of extraterritoriality that a jurisdiction perceives
within its laws and the scope of deference it will give to international comity
concerns, and this is a natural result").
427. See, e.g.., Schmitz, supra note 91, at 586 (stating the differences between
the U.S. and European systems in approaching the GE/Honeywell question, and
noting the "harsh exchange of words and hostility that developed among observers
from both sides of the Atlantic").
428. See Sugden, supra note 382, at 1015-16 (commenting on international
comity and the expansion of extraterritorial competition law, and arguing that a
convergence between the United States and the European Community has taken
place in relation to international comity).
429. See discussion supra Parts I.A. (noting that due to the phenomenon of
globalization, it is not favorable to distinguish between national and foreign firms
in relation to the application of jurisdictional principles).
430. See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining the challenges in reaching such
an agreement and noting that antitrust laws are not neutral principles, but that they
are rather linked to deeply held values within a nation).
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general. The answer that the following section argues is simply
stated: long-term convergence through continued strong
extraterritoriality and cooperation by the United States and European
Community as a model for future competition law cooperation in the
global marketplace.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF
COMPETITION LAW IN THE GLOBAL MARKET
Globalization and the emergence of the global marketplace pose
inherent difficulties to states and traditional notions of state
sovereignty, especially in the area of competition policy. The need
for inter-state cooperation and non-traditional responses to the
transnational nature of contemporary business practice is
fundamental to effective competition policy, as antitrust law
continues to spread throughout the world and corporations become
more and more mobile in terms of operational and production
capacities. 43' Changes witnessed in the post-World War II era have
spurred calls for an international system of competition law, whether
it is through supra-national structures or binding codes.432 These
arguments tend to ignore, in fact, the economical rationale for
bilateral cooperation over multilateral agreement and the relative
success enjoyed by ongoing cooperative relationships, in particular
that of the European Community and United States.433 In response to
the needs for the future of competition law in the global marketplace,
this thesis argues for the E.C.-U.S. competition law model as a
paradigm for future bilateral competition law cooperation and the
431. See Griffin, supra note 424, at 385 (concluding that there is a need for
renewed efforts to develop a unified approach to the field of antitrust law).
432. See Fox, supra note 34, at 1-3 (noting the view that since competition law
has become a world issue, internationalization of the laws is one approach to
addressing the problems raised in this field of law, which could maybe be
addressed through the World Trade Organization).
433. Department of Justice, William J. Kolasky, Global Competition
Convergence Cooperation: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, (Nov. 7, 2002)
(discussing the great achievements made in terms of bilateral cooperation and
convergence of policy between the United States and the European Community,
despite the differences in legal traditions, laws, and cultures), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200442.pdf (last visited Feb, 8, 2004).
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continued extraterritorial antitrust law.434 This section sets forth a
two pronged line of reasoning. The first section argues for continued
and enhanced bilateral cooperation on competition law between the
United States and European. Community. The second section
contends that the most effective means for converging and
harmonizing the competition laws of the United States and European
Community is continued strong extraterritorial application of
competition law as opposed to the creation of new transatlantic
institutions or attempting to harmonize competition law on a supra-
national level.
A. THE CASE FOR CONTINUED AND ENHANCED COMPETITION LAW
COOPERATION
Bilateral cooperation coupled with the creation and strengthening
of regulatory networks represents the most effective means available
for competition law regulation and enforcement in the present
globalization era. This section will analyze the advantages afforded
by gradual convergence of competition law through cooperation over
rapid harmonization through the creation of international codes or
use of transnational institutions.4"5  With particular regard to
competition cooperation between the United States and European
Community, the argument for bilateral cooperation modeled on the
U.S. - E.C. relationship will be set forth in detail.436
Fundamental to competition regulation are the issues of efficiency
and reducing transaction costs, both of which can best be effectuated
through cooperation. As for the former, the conventional argument
holds that multiple jurisdictional authorities and the duplication of
required material to satisfy each of the respective competition
434. See discussion infra Parts III.A and III.B (arguing that cooperation between
the United States and the European Community makes competition regulation
more efficient and reduces the transaction costs).
435. See infra notes 440-450 and accompanying text (providing an argument for
why complete harmonization is neither attainable and explaining why it is not
necessarily desirable).
436. See discussion infra Part III.A (arguing that although there are procedural
and substantive differences between the United States and the European
Community, the networks that resulted from the 1991/98 Agreements have created
a system of informal, non-conventional based convergence in competition law
regulation).
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regulators could be easily made more efficient through a reduction in
the amount of reproduction.437 This end could be achieved through
the complete harmonization of competition law regimes, allowing,
for example, a proposed merger to file the same paperwork, meet the
same deadlines, and provide the same material to each of the
jurisdictions initiating an investigation into the effects on
competition likely to be caused through the merger.435 In relation,
transaction costs would be cut significantly given the decrease in
diversity of the procedural and substantive requirements of each of
the jurisdictions, and as a result, corporations and competition
authorities would both share in the equities provided by harmonized
regimes.439
However, the idealistic goal of international uniformity and
consensus needed for competition law harmonization is not
available, desirable, nor realistically achievable." 0 The contention
that competition law needs to be internationalized or that
harmonization needs to occur in order to improve efficiency and
reduce transaction costs relies on several fallacious assumptions.
First of all, the existence of many competition authorities does not
itself make the case for hard harmonization. Varying markets and
varying economies inherently and inevitably have different economic
needs and incorporate different forms of analysis when determining
437. SeeRobert Pitofsky, Chairman, United States Federal Trade Commission,
EU and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers - Views from the US Federal
Trade Commission, Remarks at the Merger Control 10th Anniversary Conference,
(Sept. 14-15, 2000) [hereinafter Pitofsky Remarks] (discussing procedural reforms
undertaken to simply the regulatory process and noting the increase in liaison
between the U.S. and E.U. staff), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/pitintermergers.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2004).
438. See id. (mentioning that although significant efforts have been made over
the past ten years towards reforming procedures, such as creating a single merger
filing form, such coordination is still difficult).
439. See, e.g., Laura E. Keegan, The 1991 U.S./EC Competition Agreement: A
Glimpse of the Future Through the United States v. Microsoft Corp. Window, 2 J.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 149, 173-79 (1996) (discussing the cooperation between the
United States and European Community in the Microsoft investigation and noting
how it had positive results for all parties with respect to efficiency concerns).
440. See discussion supra Parts I.B-C (explaining the difficulties in
harmonization and noting the competition laws are not a series of neutral
principles, but are rather deeply embedded within each nation's value system).
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how business activities affect their own domestic markets.44' As the
economic model demonstrates, a proposed concentration may bring a
substantial benefit to one jurisdiction while being substantially
detrimental to another jurisdiction. 42 The proposed merger of
GE/Honeywell provides such an example, where the calculations and
analysis incorporated by the Commission indicated an unacceptable
risk to the Common Market while the assessment utilized by the
American authorities produced a result tolerable to the U.S.
marketplace. 4 3  As discussed in detail previously, other factors
played an important role in the decision, including the availability of
private litigation in the United States to address anticompetitive
behavior engaged in by the effectuated concentration.444
In addition, while a cursory glance at mergers like GE/Honeywell
and other competition related matters might lead to a conclusion that
a harmonized or single authority would increase efficiency and
reduce transaction costs, significant increases and reductions are not
always likely or possible.445 On the surface, had a single authority
441. See discussion supra Part II.A (noting the differences in how consumer
versus producing states approach competition regulation under the economic
model analysis).
442. See discussion supra Part IL.A (stating that a producing country will adopt a
competition policy aimed at increasing the wealth of the producers, which is not
always consistent with the consumer country's need to maximize welfare for
consumers).
443. See Schmitz, supra note 91, at 566 (discussing the GE/Honeywell merger,
and noting how the two authorities identified different markets that the potential
merger could adversely affect).
444. See Hochstadt, supra note 267, at 315-17 (stressing the important role of
post-merger relief in the United States).
445. See Francesco Guerrera, Study of cross-border merger costs adds'to calls
for reform, FIN. TIMES (London), June, 23 2003, at 21 (describing the costs of
mergers), 2003 WL 57313545. A recent study commissioned by the International
Bar Association and the American Bar Association reveals many of the costs
companies dealing in cross-border mergers must deal with. Id. The so called "tax
on mergers" adds up to an average of 3.9 million euros per deal involving multiple
competition regulators, with costs from dealings with U.S. regulators averaging
around 800,000 euros and costs from dealings with E.C. review averaging 400,000
euros. Id. U.S. regulators are the slowest, taking an average of eight months to
review a proposed merger. Id. Legal fees account for over sixty percent of the total
bill, with regulatory charges and consultant fees making up the remaining forty
percent. Id. However, it should be emphasized that of the fifty-one companies
studied in 500 merger reviews in over fifty states, the average merger bid came to
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reviewed the GE/Honeywell merger applying the same economic
assessments, two authorities and two different procedures would not
have needed to be followed. However, such a conclusion ignores the
fact that in GE/Honeywell, like other proposed mergers, the product
or activity reviewed in one jurisdiction is not always the same
product or activity reviewed in another."6 As discussed in detail
previously, the Commission based its decision to block the merger in
GE/Honeywell primarily on the basis of avionics and jet aircraft
engine production, and the creation or strengthening of the dominant
position the proposed concentration would have in these particular
sectors. 447 In contrast, the DOJ identified two completely distinct
markets that the merger might affect.i s While some duplicated costs
resulted in the merger review by both U.S. and E.C. authorities, the
key issues examined turned on different production capacities, and
their effects on different market sectors." 9  GE/Honeywell had to
make its case to the European Community and United States, and the
individual competitive setting of both markets. Procedural
harmonization may have led to some increase in efficiency and
transaction cost reductions. However, any involvement by a single
authority would have neglected the respective assessments important
to both the United States and European Community, assessments that
are unlikely to be given up to the will and behest of an international
competition authority or signed away immediately for harmonization
without further convergence.45 °
3.9 billion euros, putting the "tax on mergers" into perspective at around one
percent of the total bid. Id.
446. See supra notes 282-289 and accompanying text (noting how the DOJ and
the Commission identified different markets when analyzing the proposed merger).
447. See supra notes 286-401 accompanying text (stating that in addition to the
market for jet aircrafts engines, avionics, and engine starters, the Commission also
considered the potential effects of the bundling of the new company's products).
448. See supra note 281-284 and accompanying text (noting that the DOJ
concluded the proposed merger would affect markets such as the helicopter and
MRO service sectors).
449. See id. (noting that the DOJ was alarmed at the Commissions disregard for
the helicopter and MRO service markets).
450. See supra notes 333-334 and accompanying text (arguing that
administrating the antitrust system is unique to every state's laws and policies, and
that internationalizing such a field is highly inconsistent with the concept of
national sovereignty).
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The attainability of the required international or even bilateral
consensus necessary for competition law harmonization is brought
further into question by the proximity between U.S. and E.C.
competition law. As this thesis has sought to establish, the United
States and European Community represent the two most developed
and important competition law regimes in the world, though a close
analysis of the differences and distances between the United States
and European Community in their enforcement and assessment of
trust and anticompetitive behavior reveals the inherent difficulties in
harmonizing competition law. 45 1  The varying calculations and
evaluations of recently reviewed merger proposals, including
GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, highlight these
differences and the importance of certain principles to the two
closely aligned and ideologically similar jurisdictions.452 The market
competition and consumer-based focus of the United States contrasts
with the private barrier and dominant firm focus of the European
Community.453 Yet, the United States and European Community
engage in an effective and advanced competition law cooperation
scheme, allowing for jurisdictional differences in policy and
enforcement.4 4 U.S. - E.C. competition law cooperation provides a
451. See discussion supra Part II.B (examining the different historical
foundations for the antitrust laws in the United States and the European
Community, and positing that the history explains some of the difference in
contemporary policy).
452. See discussion supra Part II.B (reviewing the DOJ and the Commission's
approach to GE/Honeywell and arguing that the U.S. consumer welfare approach
marks one of the fundamental differences between the two systems).
453. See supra notes 279-280 and accompanying text (providing that while the
Commission also factors consumer welfare in its decision, other factors such as
prevention of barriers are equally as important).
454. See, e.g., Keegan, supra note 439, 173-74 (discussing how the European
Community and the United States were able to cooperate in the Microsoft
investigation and negotiations which produced a more efficient outcome). The
Microsoft investigation provides an example of decreased transaction costs as a
result of cooperation by the United States and European Community. Id. In this
matter, Microsoft elected to allow for joint information sharing by U.S. and E.C.
authorities, where confidential information provided to the US Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission was allowed to be passed on to
investigators in the European Community. Id. The joint effort by U.S. - E.C.
authorities yielded a joint consent agreement substantially reducing the cost of
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means for improving efficiency and reducing transaction costs
through interaction and collaborative efforts.455 Although this model
does not achieve the idealistic efficiency and transaction costs goals
imagined in an international competition law system or through hard
harmonization of U.S. and E.C. laws on competition, it operates
effectively and slowly works to converge the two systems.456
Substantial convergence can best be accomplished through
cooperation and regulatory interaction, as demonstrated in the U.S. -
E.C. relationship.457 Though recent uproar over extraterritorial
antitrust enforcement has occurred, the transatlantic relationship for
competition law review and enforcement has been widely praised
and acclaimed for its effectiveness. 4' 8 Significant progress has been
made since the institution of the 1991 Agreement, leading a former
Chairman of the FTC to declare, in regards to merger review, "it is
hard to imagine how day-to-day cooperation and coordination
between enforcement officials in Europe and the United States could
be much improved. '45 9 Despite the difficulties arising from varying
procedural and substantive differences between the two sides, the
networks and interactions fostered through the 1991/98 Agreement
compliance for Microsoft, allowing it to avoid a significant amount of document
and information duplication. Id.
455. See id. at 179 (describing the past success in E.C. and U.S. cooperation and
noting that the cooperation prevents "duplicative effort" while " reducing
investigation and prosecution costs for both jurisdictions").
456. See Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 437 (outlining the procedural and
substantive convergences between the European Community and the United States
in merger review).
457. See id. (discussing the 1991 Agreement between the United States and the
European Community, noting the increased interactions between the staffs of both
jurisdictions, and commenting of the significant convergence of the two systems,
ten years after the signing of the agreement).
458. See Mario Monti, E.U.-U.S. Cooperation in the Control of International
Mergers: Recent Examples and Trends (Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Cooperation in
International Mergers] (noting that the E.U.-U.S cooperation is very effective and
is a worthy model), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2001/010330mm2.htm (last visited on
Feb. 8, 2004); see also Emma Tucker, Talks on Competition Rules "Premature",
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 29, 1998, at 6 (mentioning that U.S. officials stated that
the dispute over the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger was unusual because the
European Union and United States have a very good relationship).
459. Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 437.
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have yielded a significant amount of informal, non-convention based
convergence in competition law regulation.460 In spite of tensions
mounting over disagreements in merger review and antitrust
enforcement, with each interaction and collaborated effort,
regulatory authorities become more and more familiar and educated
with the system on the opposite side of the Atlantic. 61  In the
aftermath of the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas decision, Joel Klein
went so far as to state that disagreement over the case would not
have a negative impact on future cooperative relations, but would
rather provide an incentive to increase cooperative efforts. 62 The
simultaneous initiation and pursuit of various informal programs
receive much less attention than conflicts like GE/Honeywell, but
may serve more important means over the long-term. 463
Sustained encounters by transatlantic competition regulators
promoted through non-legalistic agreements like the 1991 and 1998
Agreements provide an effective form for competition law
convergence and a model for other jurisdictions demanding
assistance for competition law enforcement. Informal convergence
may arise in numerous ways through the interactions and networks
among regulatory authorities. 46  First, interactions by regulators
allow authorities to compare experiences and learn from each other's
460. See id.- (noting the procedural and substantive convergences between the
European Community and the United States ten years after the signing of the 1991
Agreement).
461. See Cooperation in International Mergers, supra note 458 (noting that there
has been a gradual convergence and stating that "this is an organic process, and it
is a trend which is very much welcome and to be encouraged ").
462. See Joel I. Klein, Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust
Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth Century, Address at the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute 24th Annual Conference on International Law and Policy
(Oct. 16, 1997) (suggesting that that the Boeing experience made the official
acutely aware that in the absence of cooperation and coordination mechanism,
antitrust will become a highly politicized area, which could have adverse
consequences), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1233.htm
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
463. See Cooperation in International Mergers, supra note 458 (highlighting the
various degrees of cooperation between the European Union and the United
States).
464. See Kolasky, supra note 202, 4-7 (mentioning the various interactions that
support convergence and cooperation, such as working group meetings).
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best practices.465  Through informal exchanges of information and
knowledge, effective mechanisms may be transplanted from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, converging towards a form of regulation
through practice and application.466  Transplants are common
throughout the law and facilitated through experience and familiarity
with other systems, allowing for practices and procedures to move
through networks and individuals. A second and related medium for
convergence comes through gradual accounts by regulators of the
effects of their decisions on their transatlantic counterparts. 467 "A
central normative goal of transgovernmental regulatory cooperative
efforts is to create frameworks that conduce national regulators to
reflexively take into account the impact of their actions on
affected... foreign constituents, while remaining deferential to
differing national values and priorities. '468 The account itself by a
regulator of the effect of an enforcement action will have on another
jurisdiction facilitates convergence through more informed and
inclusive decisions.469
Difficulties and limitations remain in an approach to convergence
relying on informal means such as networks and interaction among
regulators. Specifically, the process itself is slow and time-
465. See id. at 5 (noting that regulators benefit from studying how their
counterparts handle various issues, and simultaneously attain a more refined
comprehension as the reasons behind their own approaches).
466. See id. 4-7 (describing the various methods of promoting convergence and
cooperation). Referring to U.S. - E.C. working group sessions, Assistant Attorney
General for the DOJ's Antitrust Division called this form of information exchange
the convergence process at its very best - that is, a coming together of some
of the best and brightest minds at the agencies on both sides of the Atlantic to
question and analyze one another's premises, assumptions and theories in
order to come up with the optimal approach to difficult issues.
Id. at 5.
467. See id. at 5 (noting the importance and effectiveness of the presentations
and discussions to familiarize each side with the other's methods and policy goals).
468. Shaffer, supra note 258, at 71.
469. See Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 437 (noting the increased staff liaison
contacts between the United States and the European Community, and noting the
level of convergence between the two systems).
470. See Ricky D. Rivers, General Electric/Honeywell Merger: European
Commission Antitrust Decision Strikes a Sour Note, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
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consuming.47' Convergence via this method cannot occur overnight,
but requires a significant amount of time and interaction among
regulatory authorities. In addition, such a process lacks much of the
transparency natural to formal agreements, whereas regulatory
cooperation and interaction yields change and reform internally
rather than through external obligation.472 However, the drawbacks
and constraints of such an approach represent precisely why this
method is most effective for competition law convergence.473 As
argued throughout this thesis, competition law represents a
politically and socially sensitive issue unlike other regulatory sectors
of the global market.474 The varying economic and social goals
existing throughout the jurisdictions with competition law regimes
are not as receptive to harmonization as other matters such as trade
or other forms of regulation.475 The economic model supports this
contention by demonstrating the economic considerations and
choices taken by jurisdictions in a typical competition law
assessment, while the lack of any substantive multilateral agreement
underscores the peculiar difficulties intrinsic to regulating
competition in a domestic market. Gradual, slow convergence offers
a long-term, realistic solution to the demands of a global market by
525, 539 (2003) (noting that frictions arise when territorial sovereignty is
perceived to be at stake).
471. See id. 530-35 (maintaining that bilateral agreements do not work when
national interests are involved in antitrust disputes).
472. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition
Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 496-97 (2000) (noting the drawbacks inherent in
bilateral agreements that increase procedural cooperation, but are not legally
binding).
473. See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study
of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 247 (2003) (noting
that voluntary cooperation and informal agreements among national antitrust
agencies fosters common understanding and prepares countries for more
sophisticated international cooperation).
474. See Thomas E. Kauper, Symposium: Antitrust at the Millennium (Part II)
The Legacy ofLTV/Republic Steel, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 753, 768 (2001) (stating that
different nations that have competition policies apply different standards and view
competition differently than the United States).
475. See id. (contending that adoption of consensus standards in a forum that
would include developed and underdeveloped countries may be impossible); see
also Piilola, supra note 473, at 247 (noting that informal, voluntary cooperation
allows for flexibility and adaptability of antitrust law to local circumstances).
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affording informal interactions and information sharing and the
establishment of non-legalistic networks between national
regulators.476
The informal, regulatory interaction and network based
convergence intricate to U.S. - E.C. competition law cooperation has
yielded noteworthy substantive and procedural antitrust convergence
since the institution of the 1991 Agreement.477 The flexibility of the
bilateral system has resulted in the two jurisdictions moving closer
together on non-legal tools, as well as raising the ceiling of domestic
laws to facilitate further convergence. As discussed, the sharing
knowledge from the U.S. experience with merger review and
antitrust has led to significant evolution of E.C. review and the use of
economic analysis. Developments are apparent, ranging from
substantive similarities in the draft E.C. Merger Guidelines with the
U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and 1997 Commission Notice on
market definition to like guidelines in the United States, to
significant convergence from ECMR reforms waiting to take effect.
Convergence on the SLC and new SIEC test are significant
especially in the actual and symbolic move away from the stringent
dominant test to one that will allow for more economic analysis
similar to the United States. Similarly, significant convergence has
occurred in the analysis of merger effects, as the United States has
been more inclined recently to challenge monopolistic mergers in
addition to traditional challenges of mergers facilitating coordinated
effects, while the Commission and the SIEC test demonstrate an
evolution from "dominance" based challenges to include transactions
476. See, e.g., International Competition Network, Memorandum on the
Establishment and Operation of the International Competition Network (Sept.
2002) (forming the basis for a "project-oriented, consensus-based, informal
network of antitrust agencies"), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org
(last visited Feb. 15, 2004). The International Competition Network ("ICN")
consists of regulators rather than state parties and operates similar to the
International Organization of Securities Commissions ("IOSCO") and began
operating in September of 2002. Id.
477. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 41-2 (2002) (maintaining that there is significant cooperation and
convergence in competition policies between the United States and the European
Union even though there is some amount of competition between them for
expanding the geographic scope of their antitrust law).
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with collective or oligopolistic effects.478 As demonstrated in the
preceding chapter, convergence has also been apparent in other areas
including geographic and product market definition, and to a limited
extent in the use of unilateral effects analysis and efficiencies and
range effects, though much room exists for further development in
these areas through experience.
Likewise, significant convergence in the area of remedies has
taken place, from the E.C. adoption of U.S. techniques like the use of
trustees and stricter time frames for compliance.479  The
Commission's Notice on Remedies in Merger Regulation draws
significantly from an FTC study on divestures where a general
consensus has emerged on requiring merged entities to divest an
ongoing business that creates a significant competitor and restores
competition to the market, rather than merely divesting an
overlapping business.480 As numerous important officials and actors
in the process have recognised, this convergence can certainly be
attributed, at least in part, to the high level of interaction between
U.S. and E.C. authorities.481
Furher evidence of convergence came about in 1997 through the
publication of the European Community's market definition
guidelines whereby the a formula for defining the relevant market for
the assessment of the impact of a transaction on competition used by
478. See Case 68/94, France v. Commission, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1375 at para. 97,
102-03 (acknowledging the Commission's development of a concept of collective
dominance); see also Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd. v. Commission [1999] E.C.R. II-
753 at para. 234 (explaining that the Commission's studies on market growth and
changes illustrate a tendency toward oligopolistic dominance).
479. See, e.g., Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable Under Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98,
2001 O.J. (C68/3) (setting forth the notion of the Commission's "evolving
experience" with various remedies under the Merger Regulation in 1990).
480. See id. at para. 13 (stating that where a proposed merger threatens effective
competition in the market, the most effective remedy is to help establish conditions
for a new competitive entity or strengthen existing competition by divestiture); see
also BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE
COMMISSION'S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 14 (1999) (concluding that divestitures have
been successful remedies for anti-competitive mergers), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
481. See, e.g., Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 437 (noting the "improvement in
coordination and cooperation between the two enforcement authorities").
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the Commission was constructed to an almost identical formula used
by U.S. authorities.482 Another example has been the narrowing of
the European Community's single firm dominance as a criterion for
striking down mergers and U.S. concern over market
concentration. 483  A line of E.C. cases on oligopolistic dominance,
from Nestle/Perrier in 1992 to Kali and Salz in 1998 and Gencor v.
EC Commission in 1999, indicate that mergers increasing
concentration and facilitating collective or oligopolistic dominance
are capable of contravening the Merger Regulation, bringing E.C.
review closer to the criteria traditionally applied by U.S. antitrust
regulators.484 Likewise, American authorities showed equal signs of
willingness to move towards the E.C.'s position that a merger can
result in anticompetitive effects, moving closer to the E.C.'s criteria
of dominance by a single firm.485 The recent publication of a set of
"Best Practices" for coordinating merger reviews drafted by staff
482. Compare Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for
the Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. C372/1 (providing the
definition of a relevant market),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevmaen.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2004); with HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 167 (defining a
relevant market).
483. See Frederic Depoortere & Henry Huser, Substantive Enforcement
Standards in Horizontal Mergers Under the EC Merger Regulation, 17 ANTITRUST
44, 45 (Fall 2002) (stating that the 1998 ECJ Kali-Salz decision settled the debate
concerning the European Community's use of "single-firm dominance" by
recognizing the legal principle of collective dominance under E.C. Merger
Regulations).
484. See Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 Relating to a Proceeding Under
Council Regulation 4064/89 EEC, 1992 O.J. L356/1 (clearing the Nestle/Perrier
merger subject to divestments after applying the E.C. Merger Regulation),
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga~doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc
&lg=en&numdoc=31992D0553 (last visited Feb. 8, 2004); see also Case T-
102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Comm'n of European Communities, [1999] E.C.R. 11-753,
(1999) (finding that European law requires proof of a dominant position to make
predatory pricing actionable).
485. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1093
(D.C. 1997) (granting the FTC preliminary injunction against the merger between
Staples and Office Depot after finding that a merger would "substantially reduce
competition"); see also Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 437 (noting that both the
European Community and the FTC concluded that a risk of monopoly existed in
the Shell/Montedison joint venture).
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attorneys and economists from the Commission, the DOJ, and FTC
provides further evidence of the utility of regulatory networks.486
These examples provide an important indicator of the success and
effectiveness of cooperative efforts, as well as being illustrative of
engagement in a cooperative dialogue and the potential for
convergence. The U.S. - E.C. competition law cooperation model
represents a triumph of the many ways of bringing philosophies and
practices on a contentious and litigious issue closer together and
adapted to an effective and working relationship necessary for
transnational competition law regulation.487 The similarities of the
U.S. and E.C. competition law regimes and the state of current
cooperation efforts denote many of the difficulties inherent to
competition law itself and offer important inducements to other
jurisdictions seeking to effectively coordinate competition law
enforcement beyond territorial boundaries.488 Gradual convergence
through informal networks and inter-agency interaction has its
limitations, though, which demands supplementation from exterior
means, specifically the continued extraterritorial enforcement of
486. See Best Practices, supra note 204 (stating that the objectives of the best
practices include reducing the risk of inconsistent outcomes, increasing the
transparency in the decision-making process, and promoting the coordination of
information and timing of the review),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/intemational/docs/20O405.htm (last visited Mar.
25, 2004); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States and European Union
Antitrust Agencies Issue "Best Practices" for Coordinating Merger Reviews (Oct.
30, 2002) (noting that the release of the best practices institutionalized the
cooperation between the United States and the European Union on merger reviews
and is beneficial to both consumers and the business community),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/October/02-at_624.htm (last visited Feb. 10,
2004).
487. See Pitofsky Remarks, supra note 437 (contending that although there were
many concerns that U.S. and E.U. authorities would take different views of
competition policy involving mergers after the adoption of the E.C. Merger
Regulation, most observers agree that there was substantial convergence between
U.S. and E.U. merger enforcement and a remarkable improvement in cooperation
between the two enforcement authorities).
488. See supra 457-463 (noting the efficient results of the U.S.-E.U. model and
the substantial convergence that has resulted out of the bilateral efforts and
informal networks).
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domestic competition law.48 9 The following section will discuss how
further convergence may be achieved through more direct and
aggressive means without resorting to forms of hard harmonization.
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AS A MEANS FOR CONVERGENCE AND
SOFT HARMONIZATION
In conjunction with bilateral cooperation efforts, the
extraterritorial application of a state's competition laws serves as an
effective means for implementing state competition policy in a
global marketplace and should continue to be used as a realistic
alternative to an international competition law system.490  This
controversial, long-term solution provides a medium for regulatory
and policy convergence between jurisdictions, while effectively
regulating multinational corporate conduct inconsistent with
domestic competition policies.4 91 . As this thesis has demonstrated,
extraterritoriality is a functioning policy of both the United States
and European Community. 492 This section will rely on examples of
extraterritorial enforcement by these two jurisdictions as a basis for
arguing that extraterritoriality can serve as a foundation for an
informal and versatile global system of competition law while
effectuating gradual competition law convergence between systems
engaged in bilateral cooperation efforts.
Extraterritorial enforcement of competition law currently stands as
a cornerstone principle for the world's most developed domestic
489. See Ezrachi, supra note 358, at 416 (contending that the United States'
approach to antitrust enforcement is through a complimentary system of
international interaction in the enforcement of national competition laws).
490. See id. (stating that the United States is skeptical of a multinational forum
for competition issues and instead, focuses on vigorous antitrust law enforcement
on domestic unilateral bases in conjunction with the deepening of bilateral
agreements).
491. See id. at 408 (suggesting that one international effect of extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws is that domestic jurisdictions can apply their law
extraterritorially to block mergers that have a negative effect on their domestic
welfare, even though the merger may have the effect of increasing the global
welfare).
492. See id. 415-16 (noting that both the United States and the European Union
have engaged in extraterritorial application of their antitrust laws but to varying
degrees).
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competition law systems in the United States and European
Community. 93 The development of the respective competition law
regimes in each of these jurisdictions demonstrates market control
policy adapting to the needs of the domestic economy and external
capacity to protect the competition policies of the domestic
marketplace. The strict territoriality principle of the American
Banana decision in the United States gave way to a developing form
of extraterritoriality in 1945 as the U.S. played a prominent role in
developing and applying its laws to foreign transactions with effects
on U.S. commerce and interests in the post-World War II era. States
affected by such applications reacted through enacting blocking
statutes aimed at limiting extraterritorial enforcement. A 1960
GATT report on the growing concerns over U.S. extraterritorial
antitrust law application explicitly prompted the first generation of
bilateral agreements arising from 1967 and 1973 OECD
Recommendations. 494 At this time, the United States began limiting
extraterritoriality as in the 1976 Timberlane decision, introducing the
jurisdictional rule of reason accounting for comity in other nations'
interests.495 Similarly, the Commission attempted to obtain the right
to use extraterritoriality in the 1972 ICI-Dyestuffs case, where the
ECJ waived the opportunity to incorporate the doctrine.496 Likewise,
extraterritoriality played a key role in the implementation of the 1991
Agreement, coming into effect upon U.S. concerns over the ECJ's
acceptance of a "quasi-effects" extraterritoriality doctrine in Wood
Pulp Cartel. The desire to avoid conflicts and the negative effects of
extraterritoriality was instrumental in the creation of the 1991
Agreement and bilateral frameworks from OECD Recommendations.
493. See Waller, supra note 330, at 380 (contending that while the European
Union has engaged in extraterritorial enforcement of its own competition laws, it
has done so more cautiously than the United States because of its emphasis on
harmonization or internationalization of competition law).
494. See 1967 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 347; 1973 RECOMMENDATION,
supra note 347.
495. See Timberlane Lumber Co v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th
Cir. 1976) (determining that anti-trust laws can extend over the conduct of other
nations).
496. See Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission, [1972]
E.C.R. 619.
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The use of extraterritoriality as a formidable regulatory principle is
vital to state regulation of transnational business activity.497 As the
analysis of competition laws and policies of the United States and
European Community throughout this thesis demonstrates, attitudes
and beliefs as to what constitutes impermissible or unsustainable
conduct in a marketplace vary significantly. 498  Notions of the
anticompetitive effects dominant firms or concentrations have on the
market in the European Community varies notably from the
consumer welfare focus of the United States.499 As decisions in
merger cases affecting separate markets like GE/Honeywell and
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas demonstrate, decisions and calculations
by one jurisdiction will not always coincide with those instituted by
other jurisdictions. 00 States have a vital interest in protecting their
own markets from activities having anticompetitive effects,
regardless of whether such activities are conducted and implemented
within its own jurisdiction. As globalization continues to spread and
strengthen, activities will become further and further removed from
the markets they effect and, as increasingly clear in the case of U.S. -
E.C. merger cases, jurisdictions will need to react to protect their
497. See Waller, supra note 330, at 389 (observing that many businesses in the
United States and European Community are beginning to see competition law
enforcement as an affirmative tool to aid them in entering foreign markets). Trade
and investment disputes have revealed many of the illusions of the market access
promoted through free trade agreements, leading to extraterritorial enforcement of
domestic laws and policies, whether it is through merger review or the
employment of unilateral trade remedies such as section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act
of 1974. Id. The pursuit of individual trade disputes as forms of private collusion
and government-tolerated exclusion represent an increasing reliance by businesses
on extraterritoriality and antitrust enforcement. Id.
498. See Kauper, supra note 474, at 768 (suggesting that different nations view
competition differently than the United States, with some countries embodying
trade or industrial policies and others overly protecting small businesses).
499. See Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and E. U. Positions on the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 825, 863 (1999) (arguing that the assumptions and focuses of U.S.
and E.U. competition law led to profoundly different results in the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas case).
500. See id. 841-42 (suggesting that the difference in focus in the
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger was due to the contrasting philosophies in
U.S. and E.U. law, including the United States' interest in improving consumer
and social welfare in contrast to the European Union's consideration of certain
non-economic interests that are harmed by significant economic concentrations).
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own markets when other states act in contravention to their
interests.5"' The GE/Honeywell case provides a recent example
where the United States approved the merger without substantial
regard for its effect on the E.C., market, to which the European
Community reacted by blocking the merger given the feared
detrimental effects the concentration would have on certain market
sectors.5 °2 Had extraterritoriality not been an option for the European
Community, the merger would have proceeded without respect to the
E.C. marketplace. Yet through extraterritoriality, the European
Community was able to effectuate its competition policies and act in
what it believed to be the best interests of the Common Market.
Further, the role of comity in extraterritoriality is becoming less
important in both the United States and European Community. 03
The watering-down of the extraterritoriality principle in the
Timberlane Lumber case in the United States that formulated a three-
part test instituting a comity analysis was displaced in the Hartford
Fire case where comity now only comes into play if there is a "true
conflict" between U.S. law and the laws of another involved state.5°4
In fact, the role of comity in U.S. jurisprudence at all is somewhat in
question with some U.S. jurisdictions working around the comity
issue in order to avoid giving such credence to the laws of foreign
states. 05 Similarly, decisions such as IBM v. Commission, where the
ECJ significantly weakened the role of comity by holding a
European court should not consider comity until after a decision is
501. See Rivers, supra note 470, at 533-34 (maintaining that there is a need for
an organizational mechanism that eliminates national interest from the equation in
international antitrust decisions).
502. See id. (arguing that the European Union's decision to block the
GE/Honeywell merger reflected its interest in protecting its aerospace industry).
503. See Yeo Jin Chun, The GE-Honeywell Merger Debacle: The Enforcement
ofAntitrust/Competition Laws Across the Atlantic Pond, 15 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 61,
69-70 (2002) (noting that both regimes have adopted positions against comity in
the area of antitrust law )..
504. See id. (discussing the significance of the Hartford Fire and Wood Pulp
Cartel decisions and noting Scalia's dissent to the court's decision regarding the
role of international comity).
505. See id. 70-71 (noting recent decisions in American courts limiting the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws with the doctrine of international
comity).
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made, illuminate a trend in the European Community lessening the
role of comity similar to that of the United States.0 6
The importance of extraterritoriality for future global competition
regulation lies not only within its inherent capacity to enforce
domestic policies in other jurisdictions, but also the potential for
competition law convergence through its use.50 7 U.S. - E.C. merger
review cases provide numerous examples of the gradual convergence
faculty of extraterritoriality. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case is
illustrative through the European Community's use of
extraterritoriality and initial declaration that the merger would result
in anticompetitive effects on the common market although the
merger had already been cleared by U.S. authorities."' Working in
conjunction with the merging parties, the U.S. and E.C. authorities
devised a compromise arrangement to allow the merger to proceed in
both jurisdictions." 9 The effect of the European Community's use of
extraterritoriality and the brokering of the agreement making the
merger acceptable to the laws of both the United States and
European Community caused the analysis and terms of acceptability
in both jurisdictions to converge slightly. The United States made
concessions to the European Community to allow the merger to
506. See Case 60/81, IBM v. EC Commission, [1981] E.C.R. 2639, 3 C.M.L.R.
635 (1981) (holding that the European Community's decision to initiate a
proceeding against IBM was not reviewable until after a final decision was
rendered by the Commission).
507. See Brian Peck, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws and the U.S.-
E. U Dispute over the Boeing and McDonnell Douglas Merger: From Comity to
Conflict? An Argument for a Binding International Agreement on Antitrust
Enforcement and Dispute Resolution, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1163, 1184 (1998)
(suggesting that the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law has decreased
the conflict between U.S. and foreign antitrust law because more countries have
adopted competition laws compatible with U.S. law).
508. See Press Release, European Union Commission Delegation, The European
Commission Takes a Favorable Decision in Principle on the Merger of Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas After Concessions Offered by Boeing (July 23, 1997)
(announcing the decision to approve the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger after
negotiations with Boeing), http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1997-3/pr5O-
97.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
509. See id. (laying out the comprise agreement). "The Commission welcomes
the result of the negotiations: it will protect the interests of airlines purchasing
aircraft in international markets and will thus be good for consumers. It also
confirms the effectiveness of the European Union's competition laws." Id.
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proceed, shifting its policies slightly and allowing a foreign
jurisdiction to exert some control over a merger involving only U.S.
domestic corporations.' 10 In the future, cases and reviews by both
U.S. and E.C. authorities will be characterized by slight, slow
convergence in areas where U.S. authorities would be conscious of
E.C. standards for a similar merger to proceed. Also, U.S. regulators
will now be forced to make concessions in their own domestic
competition policies in light of past E.C. extraterritoriality to allow
such mergers to proceed and have the opportunity for successful
review by the European Community.
The GE/Honeywell case provides another important example of
competition law convergence through extraterritoriality with a
different outcome. 1 Following the United States' clearance of the
merger, the European Community issued a ruling blocking the
transaction from taking place. 1 2  In this case, no deal could be
brokered as in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas. 3 Unlike the former
case, concessions could not be made by the respective U.S. and E.C.
authorities for the merger to have been acceptable to the laws and
policies of the United States and European Community, unlike the
510. See U.S. Information Agency, Case Study: The Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas Merger, 4 USIA Electronic Journal (Feb. 1, 1999) (stating that even
though the European Union had no jurisdiction over the merger, it was in a
position to level crippling fees on the sales of Boeing aircraft to European airlines,
which were forecasted to account for one-third of all sales of new aircraft until
2007 ), http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/ites/0299/ijee/boeing.htm (last visited Feb.
15, 2004).
511. See Kolasky, supra note 202, at 5 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes,
"sunshine is the best disinfectant" in regards to recent cooperation efforts between
the DOJ and the Commission to clarify the assessments and issues leading to the
diverging decisions in GE/Honeywell).
512. See Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 declaring a concentration to be
incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case No
COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell (July 3, 2001) (finding the proposed
merger to be incompatible with the Common Market because the merger would
strengthen a dominant position in the market and impede competition for large
commercial jet aircraft engines, large regional jet aircraft engines, corporate jet
aircraft engines, avionics and non-avionics products, as well as small marine gas
turbines).
513. See Kevin Guerrero, A New "Convincing Evidence" Standard in European
Merger Review, 72 U. CrN. L. REv. 249, 271 (2003) (stating that even though the
United States and the European Union closely coordinated on the transaction, they
failed to come to a unanimous agreement on approval of the merger).
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convergence that did occur in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas."4
However, the use of extraterritoriality by the European Community
in this case to block the merger of two U.S. corporations arguably led
to some convergence in analysis and implementation of U.S.
competition policy." 5 This was accomplished by demonstrating the
tendency for the European Community to react to transactions
deemed incompatible with the competition policies of the Common
Market and conveying to U.S. competition authorities the terms and
conditions the European Community would institute then and in
future mergers in reviewing such transactions and allowing them to
proceed in the European Community. 16
The practice of extraterritoriality is not without its problems." 7 As
alluded to throughout this discussion, achieving convergence of
significance through extraterritoriality takes a considerable amount
of time.5"8 Extraterritorial enforcement actions such as that of the
European Community in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
514. See id. (noting that the disagreement was due to the different perspective of
the scope of antitrust enforcement between the United States and the European
Union).
515. See John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust
Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 564-65 (2003) (arguing that the
criticism of the European Union's merger laws after the GE/Honeywell decision
prompted changes in the E.U. regime).
516. See Report on the Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, EUR. PARL. DOc. (COM(2001) 745-C-
0159/2002/2067(COS)), at 7 (stating that following the European Community's
decision to block the GE/Honeywell merger, the Commission opened the door for
comments on its use of the "market dominance" test employed and even hinted at
changing its "market dominance" test for an American style "substantially less
competition" test), available at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/committees/econ/20020521/466246en.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2004); see also Schmitz, supra note 91, at 588-89 (suggesting
that the European Commission hinted of the possibility of a change from the
traditional market dominance test to an American-style "substantially less
competition" analysis, but the real distinction between the European and American
systems remained the underlying differences in the goals of merger control).
517. See Rivers, supra note 470, at 530 (arguing that the use of extraterritoriality
causes friction between foreign governments and led to the adoption of bilateral
agreements between the United States and the European Union to promote more
cooperation in the enforcement of competition laws).
518. See supra sections II.D. 1, II.D.2, and II.B (focusing on the extraterritorial
application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law)
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GE/Honeywell achieved modest amounts of convergence over the
span of lengthy investigations and negotiations. As is the case with
regulatory cooperation and the establishment of informal networks
discussed in the previous section, establishing a competition law
system that will be effective in regulating transnational business
activities and the global economy will take a significant amount of
time. In fact, one may view the slow, time consuming convergence
offered through extraterritorial competition law enforcement as an
advantage given the nature of competition law itself.
In addition, extraterritorial enforcement presents an unsettling and
contentious aspect to international relations and trans-governmental
networks.1 9 The application of one state's domestic law to the
jurisdiction of another state impedes upon traditional notions of state
sovereignty. 2 The GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas
merger cases present such an example where in both cases the
European Community imposed its own policies on the U.S. market
through extraterritoriality in a merger involving U.S. corporations.52
As with other cases of extraterritoriality and competition law issues,
public outcry in the United States as the invaded jurisdiction resulted
in calls for sanctions and even a trade war with the Europeans over
their actions, primarily in the aftermath of GE/Honeywell. 22 Herein
lays perhaps the biggest problem with extraterritorial enforcement of
competition law, specifically when the outcry and anger spurs
retributive and reprisal action in other international economic spheres
such as trade law through countervailing measures and anti-dumping
519. See Stevens, supra note 274, at 283 (contending that aggressive
extraterritoriality poses many challenges, including the risk of clashes between
substantive and procedural norms and the temptation to pursue economic self-
interest by the intervening party).
520. See Rivers, supra note 470, at 530 (noting that the extraterritorial
application of one nation's laws on another nation violates the most fundamental
principle of national sovereignty).
521. See Stevens, supra, note 274, at 275 (contending that the United States
questioned the European Union's interest in the U.S. merger and some suspected
that it was acting to protect its own industry).
522. See id. (describing House and Senate resolutions condemning the European
Union's intervention).
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statutes.523  A more related and responsive reaction by some
jurisdictions has been through statutory blocking statutes aimed to
thwart discovery actions in competition law investigations in order to
cause a "true conflict" required for a comity analysis such as the test
in Hartford Fire.524 Statutes and retribution come with the terrain of
extraterritoriality, though as the principal gains acceptance
throughout the global economic community and becomes an
accepted practice the less backlash will likely occur. 25
An additional and related problem with extraterritoriality and
transplanting this principle throughout the global market remains the
issue of capacity and the ability of some states to exert their
competition policies on an extraterritorial basis.526 Critics would
argue this principal may be acceptable for the United States and
European Community given the strength of their economies and the
allure of their respective markets to foreign businesses, but would be
difficult for smaller and weaker states to act in such a manner if they
wish to attract the same business activity. In many ways this is the
nature of extraterritoriality and the free market itself; however, the
use of extraterritoriality and the development of this principal in both
the United States and European Community will likewise be
mimicked in other jurisdictions in the process of developing their
own competition law regimes."2  The development of the
523. See Himmelfarb, supra note 79, at 920-21 (stating that foreign nations have
also developed numerous defenses against personal jurisdiction in response to the
United States' extensive use of legislation that authorizes extraterritoriality).
524. See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Jurisdiction and Enforcement: Foreign
Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 505, 522 (1998) (contending that the Supreme Court's decision in Hartford
Fire has been widely criticized outside of the United States and the decision
provided an incentive for foreign nations to invoke blocking statutes).
525. See Himmelfarb, supra note 523, at 921 (suggesting that the United States
has also entered into international antitrust agreements that codify a bilateral
acceptance of its extraterritorial policy).
526. See supra notes 241-246 and accompanying text (discussing how the
relative power of a country to enforce its laws extraterritorially on foreign
businesses is linked to the degree to which the businesses conduct transactions in
that country).
527. See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 574 (2000) (maintaining that many other nations apply their
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competition law systems in the United States and European
Community closely follow the same path with strict territoriality as
the main principal in the beginning followed by extraterritoriality
when the economies strengthened to the capacity necessary for
developing to the current stage of lessening the role of comity.528
Given the growth of competition law regimes around the world in
recent years and the inclination of states to transplant the U.S. or
E.C. system to their own state, it is possible to conclude that these
states will develop their regimes in a similar fashion to the ones
instituted by the United States and European Community. 29
Extraterritoriality may not be an option at the early stage, but as
globalization continues to spread and foreign markets begin to attract
more and more business activity, the capacity itself will also develop.
The development of extraterritoriality in this manner would be only
slightly different than if a formal competition law regime were
instituted today, as the system would be substantially formed out of
U.S. and E.C. influence and would impose the policies of these two
competition law leaders on the state parties signing on to such a
regime. This is quite the case with trade agreements and institutions
like the WTO.
The fact remains that extraterritoriality undoubtedly plays a
catalyst role by encouraging cooperation and convergence while
constructing an informal global competition law system through U.S.
and E.C. leadership. States look to these two jurisdictions for
direction in this area and for transplanting aspects of the U.S. and
E.C. regimes to their own.530 Extraterritoriality forms an important
foundational principle for the United States and European
Community, a tried and tested method that presents the most
effective and useful path for converging systems of competition
competition laws extraterritorially regardless of their view when the United States
applies its laws to their citizens).
528. See supra Part II.D. 1-2 (highlighting the development of extraterritoriality
in the U.S. and E.U. systems).
529. See David J. Gerber, Competition Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 263, 269-70
(2002) (contending that U.S. antitrust law has influenced other systems of
competition law).
530. See id. at 269-70 (maintaining that U.S. antitrust is at the center of the
competition law universe and has frequently played a "model" role for decision-
makers in other systems).
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law.531 Coupled with constructing and strengthening informal
regulatory networks and continued cooperation efforts for
competition law enforcement, competition law convergence can be
achieved through extraterritoriality in an effective manner conducive
to the needs and idiosyncrasies of competition law itself.
CONCLUSION
As the dilemma described at the beginning of this article
demonstrates, states face important questions over how to effectuate
domestic regulatory policies in a global marketplace. 32 Drawing
from competition law, this thesis argues for future transnational
responses to the demands of globalization to follow the U.S. - E.C.
approach towards bilateral cooperation supplemented with
extraterritorial competition law enforcement. 33 As the analysis of
the relative similarities and differences in the respective U.S. and
E.C. competition regulation systems reveals, limits remain to the
attainable level of competition law harmonization between two of the
world's most similar economic and legal systems, underscoring even
greater difficulty in obtaining multilateral consensus from a ranging
diversity of politically and legally divergent states.534 Coupled with
the economic model, insurmountable obstacles exist for the
realization of a global competition law system. Rather, cooperation
limited to bilateral relationships offering flexibility and an avenue for
convergence through regulatory interaction supplemented with
extraterritoriality represent the most effective and realistic option to
maintaining domestic competition policies in the global marketplace.
531. See id. 273-74 (noting that the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law has played an important role in the harmonization of competition law since
after the Second World War and many see U.S. antitrust as an effective focal point
for harmonization efforts).
532. See Kauper, supra note 474, at 766 (stating that as markets become
increasingly global, the costs of complying with different standards around the
world will increase the pressure for harmonization of standards of competition
law).
533. See supra Part III.A-B (highlighting the advantages and disadvantage of
bilateral cooperation and extraterritorial competition law enforcement).
534. See Kauper, supra note 474, at 762 (contending that most developed and
some transitional countries have antitrust legislation but levels of enforcement and
effectiveness of remedies varies greatly).
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U.S. - E.C. cooperation on competition law has broader
implications for future state responses to the demands of
globalization. While demonstrating the growing difficulty and even
futility in responding to the demands of the global market through
traditional, territorially bound responses, U.S. - E.C. cooperation
efforts also illuminate the possibilities for international efforts
between states to address and rectify the limits of state-centered
solutions. Flexible, non-institutionally bound agreements like the
1991 and 1998 Agreements promote networking and soft
harmonization through non-legal mediums, allowing for changes and
developments to progress at the pace of officials charged with
administering the regulatory policies of the state. Globalization has
diminished the comparative advantage of nations that once inherently
constrained business activities to the territorial jurisdiction of the
state, replacing this principle with the concept of the competitive
advantage of enterprises. The non-location bound nature of
participants in the global market demands adaptive regulatory
solutions from states in order to subject the competitive advantage of
enterprises to regulation in the interest of consumers and free market
competition.
2004]
